THE EU-NATO RELATIONS IN POST COLD WAR ERA

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INTRODUCTION
The EU-NATO relations are relatively new, as each of the two organizations for a longtime occupied a different area of activity, so the possible interface between, them was virtually nothing. Today, in contrast, the EU and NATO appear to develop new areas of cooperation and harmonization of their respective activities with amazing speed, the most widely documented example of which was the 2002 Berlin Plus agreement on the borrowing of assets by the EU from NATO for its crisis management operations in the Balkans. Indeed, it seems increasingly hard today to understand them all in their entirety and to see them together in a coherent framework.

The relationship between NATO and the European Union evolved gradually though the 1990s, to a nearly mature state today. Yet, it seems clear for further changes in the future. During the Cold War, circumstances which shaped the sociopolitical division of the roles of the EU and NATO, as found enshrined in the organizations’ statutes and practice, had remained constant for close to forty years. With the Berlin Wall gone, new and different forces began to unravel and underlying interests began to shift. After the threat of Soviet invasion had disappeared, old definitions of security centering mainly on territorial defense gave way to a broader view reflecting different, and more complex and diverse, security problems, taking also account of the human dimension. In search of answers to these problems, crisis management became significantly more important.

Both NATO and the EU were equally challenged for new roles after the end of the Cold War. In NATO’s case this was evident as, its main raison d’etre, the Soviet threat, had disappeared. Also, after German reunification, there was no more perceived need to ‘contain’ that country. For the EU as well, its respective evolution, politics and agenda were shaped before Maastricht by the logic of the Cold War.

The old status quo between NATO and the European Community essentially consisted in an institutional division of labor between the two organisations: NATO for European security in the military sense, and the European Community, as a ‘civilian institution’ for economic prosperity. This combination, in which America’s protecting role over Western Europe was inborn, is widely credited with restoring the continent from its ruins after the Second World War economically with remarkable speed, and has led to an era of unprecedented peace in this region of the world. But even under this clear division of labor, each of the two organizations recognized that their main

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2 Ibid., p. 131.
function, clearly defined as it was, also had implications into the other’s main function. NATO profited from European economic integration because ‘economic cooperation was a means to strengthen political and ideological cohesion with a view to the establishment and maintenance of a defense capability’. The European Coal and Steel Treaty of 1951, although a purely economic project was born out of the underlying security rationale to prevent another war in Europe and, in this way, also turned out an ‘excellent security instrument’. As long as the massive common threat existed, this division of labor was without alternative.

In many ways, it also laid the tracks for a fully integrated Europe, heading today for confederation or maybe even federation. At the start of the 1990s the idea that the EU should itself take responsibility for the security of the European continent was too uncomfortable to old strategic and popular habits bred in the decades of the Cold War. It was only the St-Malo process driven jointly by France and the UK after the latter’s turn-about on European defense in 1998 which ‘let the genie out of the bottle’ and created the real possibility of a European defense capacity autonomous of the Atlantic alliance. By that time, public opinion was also slowly swinging in favor of a common European defense policy.

But this new development also created a new problem, from the moment the new European Community began, with Maastricht, to assume in addition to its primary economic role a political role as the European Union (with its Common Foreign and Security Policy), gradually taking on responsibility for security in Europe and its near neighbors, it crossed the original Rubicon of the Rome Treaties and ventured into ground traditionally covered by NATO. NATO’s one-time security monopoly ceased to exist, and the possibility was opened for institutional competition. But the entry of the EU into the security sphere did not just represent an additional actor in the scene of international security institutions. It was also a phenomenon of the new emphasis in international security on crisis management.

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12 Ibid.
The EU represents a security model based on the democratic peace theory, according to which integration transforms the security environment among the members into a pluralistic community where the issue of security has been transcended.\textsuperscript{19}

This differed from NATO’s attraction of the mutual benefits of military security. After the EU added a specific defense dimension to the CFSP after 1998, this development became more evident. Today ‘the hitherto dominant civilian power discourse, which has shaped EU policies, is in the process of being replaced by an understanding of military means as a natural part of the Union’s foreign policy instruments’.\textsuperscript{20}

NATO, for its part, also underwent fundamental changes in order to adapt to the new environment after the Cold War. This included internal changes, changes related to its new non-Article 5 activities and a new geographical orientation: ‘out of area’, lastly also out of Europe.\textsuperscript{21} It also tried to give more weight in international crisis management to European Allies within its “European pillar”, using its CJTF concept created in 1994 and completed with the 1996 ‘Berlin Accords’. NATO’s development after the 1990s has been called a “defacto shift from collective defense to collective security”.\textsuperscript{22}

Looking at the two separate developments of the EU and NATO together, one could certainly say that, “from two opposite directions, the organizations’ tasks and fields of competences started to converge and overlap.”\textsuperscript{23} The role specialization of the Cold War has disappeared and both the EU and NATO now aspire to military security functions.\textsuperscript{24}

At the national level, the most powerful member of NATO, the United States does not have the same interest in an overstretched military presence in Europe today as in the Cold War, or even in the first years thereafter. The ‘burden-sharing’ problem, which remained alive in U.S Congress debates even at the height of the Cold War, has returned with renewed vigor, and this is recognized in Europe. The U.S. has been looking for a new role in Europe too. The answer, however it turns out, will have to strike a new balance between NATO and the EU in European security. This assumes that the EU will rise to meet that challenge, and that NATO will allow this to happen.

\textsuperscript{22} Jolyon Howorth, \textit{The ultimate challenge}, 2000, p. 12.
\textsuperscript{24} Anne Deighton, \textit{The Military Security Pool}, 2000, p.41 at 51.
For the greater part of the 1990s, especially in the historical window of opportunity of 1989-1993, issues and interests concerning these new problems were still in flux on both sides of the Atlantic. Put somewhat ironically, 

*All sorts of theories were abroad, most of them interesting, many of them totally unrealistic. Statesmen and political leaders had great difficulty keeping up with the pace of events, let alone attempting to devise for them some sense of direction. Nobody had a blueprint for anything.*

Many of these voices simply argued for a continuation of the Cold-War status quo. The EU should stick to what it was good at, namely economic integration and projection of ‘civil’ power. However, the unflattering picture painted by political thinkers of the EU as an economic giant, political dwarf and a military pygmy was itself a testimony that the situation was increasingly perceived as unsatisfactory. Many stirring opinions held that the EU should assume a role as an international actor able to face up to the United States and Japan on the world political and economic stage. The Maastricht Treaty and its successors were seen as an important vehicle in this regard. Eventually, the need for the triangular NATO-WEU-EU relationship to be replaced with a direct EU-NATO relationship became obvious.

Towards the end of the decade, the confusion described above had largely ebbed. Previously loose positions gave way to more formal statements and declarations by both the Atlantic Alliance and by the EU. Lastly, specific arrangements were concluded between the two parties, fixing consensus in individual areas. But although “clarified” still it remains many things “undefined” in these relations.

A constant feature of the EU-NATO relationship which complicates its analysis is that the membership of the two organizations largely overlaps. For the political analysis, the member States still retain their own policy priorities, and some readily use either organization only as a forum to advance them, sometimes even showing different kinds of behavior depending on whether they are sitting in the EU or in NATO.

When in January 2007 NATO Secretary General Jaap De Hoop Scheffer addressed the German Presidency of the EU in Berlin, he called for “A new EU-NATO chapter”, urging the revitalizing the

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30 WEU Assembly Doc. 1333, 1992, para. 233.
31 The WEU acted as a bridge between the EU and NATO
strategic partnership between EU and the NATO.\textsuperscript{33} Through an anecdote made by his staff he described EU-NATO relations: “a few weeks ago, one of my staff told me that had been invited to a conference on the ‘frozen conflicts’, and then he added with a smile “of course it was not about Caucasus, about EU-NATO relations”.

The following study deals with the EU-NATO relations, after the cold war era.

In the first part, chapter 1-6, a brief history about the functions and objectives of NATO and EU since in their beginning, is given, by dividing their evolution in three phases, the cold war era, the end of the cold-war and, post September 11th 2001 world. In these chapters, the main questions to be answered will be: Why both organizations saw necessary reorienting their objectives at the end of the cold war? What was the effect of the September 11th attacks in their transformation? What are their strategic concepts in the new security environment?

In the second part, chapter 7-8, the EU-NATO relations are in the center of the study by discovering their ups and downs, their institutional relations, operational cooperation and the obstacles that made these relations not effective sufficiently. Why EU searches more autonomous decision-making in security and defense? How much did the “Berlin Plus arrangement” work? Why the end of the Cold War profoundly changed the central parameters of the relationship between EU and the NATO? In this part the EU-NATO relations are treated in their institutional framework.

After analyzing the situation of these big states I conclude by giving the some suggestions to improve the EU-NATO relations to have a good partnership and cooperation between these two very important organizations.

CHAPTER 1
NATO DURING THE COLD WAR ERA
Europe and North America have been linked for centuries. A combination of cultural, demographic, economic, military and political components has produced a unique relationship that is not found in other regions of the world. The dynamics of these components is both one-way - historically from Europe to North America and in a second way increasingly, in recent decades, from North America to Europe. To these, the identification of a significant number of common interests can be added. Two elements have therefore traditionally underpinned the transatlantic relationship and have shaped and consolidated a comprehensive bilateral relationship between North America and Europe, a combination of diverse integrative forces and a coincidence of interests.

The Origins of NATO

The world was full of the fresh blood of thousands dead as the result of the brutal war, which lasted for years. The European continent was tired and afraid of more wars. Only the countries beyond the ocean could be more relaxed and quite being farther from sources of danger. Harry S. Truman had demobilized over twelve million persons in the armed services and, in effect, pulled out of Europe. Good relations with the Soviet Union proved to be impossible. When a weakened Britain decided to withdraw from the Eastern Mediterranean, Greece was left alone to fight a Soviet-backed civil war, and Turkey was also threatened by the Soviet Union. President Truman, on March 12, 1947, then announced the Truman Doctrine to give immediate economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey in a first effort to resist Soviet expansionism.34

All countries engaged in the war had a lot of work to do to recover them and to secure their future. There were attempts within Europe to establish and maintain the needs for all of these but it was unclear what the support the United States would make towards Western Europe ensures its future.

The contemporary transatlantic relationship’s origins can be found in two strategic objectives: the need to integrate Western Europe politically and economically after the Second World War to prevent further conflict, hence the implementation of the Marshall Plan and the need for collective defense against the Soviet threat during forty years of Cold War, consequently the NATO was formed in 1949.35

Under the European Recovery Program, the Marshall Plan, 1947-1951, Truman offered economic aid to help Europe rebuild and recover from the ravages of WW2 which after 1951 was transformed

into a military aid to equip NATO and, in 1954 to rearm West Germany to be NATO’s military shield against the Soviet Union.

**The Birth of NATO**

In Europe itself, Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg established the Western European Union (WEU), to prevent either Germany or the USSR from dominating Europe. Because of the Berlin Blockade in 1948 and the Communist attack in Czechoslovakia and Korea, the United States and the WEU combined forces in a new alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Early in 1950, President Truman set up a working group from the National Security Council, the State Department, and the Department of Defense to revise national security policy. This group shaped the landmark National Security Council (NSC) Memorandum 68, which called for a massive conventional military buildup and a global system of alliances NATO, SEATO, and the United States-Japan Security Treaty. After 1951, economic aid through the Marshall Plan was transformed into military aid to equip NATO and in 1954 to rearm West Germany to be NATO’s military shield against the Soviet Union.

Truman thus reversed the traditional isolationism of the United States, returning troops to Europe in NATO in 1950-51 under General Dwight Eisenhower, then rearming West Germany and thus reconciling World War II enemies and friends. In 1951 Allied Command Europe became operational. With Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) located at Roquencourt, near Paris. The United States, under Truman, helped rebuild the economies of Western Europe, and kept itself involved in European affairs, resulting in fifty years of peace, stability, and economic growth, the “golden years” of modern European history. NATO formed, and continued to form, the most successful peacetime venture in Western cooperation. The alliance lasted much longer than its architects had anticipated; it also developed into a more integrated political and military organization than its makers had planned.

In fact NATO suffered from internal jealousies and disputes, but such deficiencies were at least partially balanced by the fact that the NATO partners freely cooperated in a common endeavor—unlike those of the Eastern Bloc consolidated through the formation of COMECON (Council for

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37 Ibid.


NATO, in fact, was a purely defensive alliance to protect Western Europe and was not able or willing to project its power anywhere else. Initially, the Allies had planned to withdraw behind the Rhine; but when the West Germans were admitted in 1954, NATO switched to “forward defense” that would avoid surrendering the bulk of the Federal Republic to the invaders.

NATO was also defensive in a purely political sense. It lacked a propaganda or political warfare branch. NATO was not framed to exploit what Lenin would have called “internal contradictions.” Of these there were many within the Soviet empire, the contradictions between the needs of rigid central planning and growing consumer demands, between the hegemonic power of the Soviet Union and the dependent Communist regimes, between the ethnic groups within the Soviet Union, between the regnant Marxist-Leninist philosophy and popular religious beliefs. The establishment of NATO represented a turning point in the history, both of the United States and of the Atlantic powers as a whole. For the first time in peacetime, the United States had engaged in a permanent alliance linking itself to Western Europe in both a military and a political sense.

Opposition to NATO continued, from Communist states, old-style isolationists, pacifists, the pro-Communist left and, later on, from the new right. But NATO’s foundations were well laid. The success attained by U.S. policymakers went beyond merely personal factors. The statesmanship shown by Truman and his advisers, and the solidity proved at the time by the so-called Eastern Establishment. Policymakers drew on a mood of deep national confidence at the time when a victorious United States dominated the world militarily, politically, and economically. On the European side there was also widespread commitment, especially among veterans and college-educated youth, the very group most widely inclined to criticize NATO a generation later. To those who had experienced war and its aftermath, the creation of transnational institutions represented a challenge, especially to those tired of traditional chauvinist slogans.

A year after the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, the British held a conference in London in 1950\footnote{Theodore C. Achilles, “The Omaha Milkman: The Role of the United States in the Negotiations,” and Claude Delmas, “A Change of Heart: Concerns behind the Discussions in France,” both in Nicholas Sherwen, ed., NATO’s Anxious Birth: The Prophetic Vision of the 1940s, London, C. Hurst and Co., 1985, p.58-65.} which laid out the basic policy objectives for Great Britain: the necessity to sustain Britain’s position as a great power, although of the second rank; the higher direction of the Cold War; the necessity to develop and extend Atlantic rather than European institutions of cooperation between Western states; and the transformation of the “special relationship” into a more effective partnership with U.S. Cold War strategy.
The founding of NATO had had unplanned consequences. The “special relationship” between Britain and the United States deteriorated. This relationship had depended on the success of the wartime alliance, on Churchill’s personal prestige, on the skill displayed by British diplomacy in creating for a time the illusion of Britain’s enduring great-power status after World War II. The “special relationship” was sustained also by ties of personal friendship like that between Socialist Bevin and General Marshall. In a profounder sense, the “special relationship” was supported by a common cultural heritage that linked many British and U.S. diplomats, senior civil servants, and some Establishment politicians.

A good many Britons, for their part, had transatlantic family connections and felt at home in the United States. These ties did not disappear, but within the framework of NATO’s high command, Britain counted for less than she had in World War II within SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces). By the beginning of the 1950s, there was an end to serious discussions concerning an English-speaking union that would comprise the United States, Britain, and the “white” British dominions. By contrast, NATO was a political benefit to West Germany and Italy. For both of them, membership in NATO and other transnational bodies meant a new acceptance abroad, and a new political legitimacy. The United States gave up on France as the barricade of NATO and chose West Germany as the key to NATO’s defense and Western Europe’s recovery.

**NATO’s Collective Defense Origins and Preoccupations during the Cold War**

The North Atlantic Treaty was not inspired by the United States, but by West European nations, particularly Britain and France. In the aftermath of the Second World War, London and Paris judged that no satisfactory equilibrium and assurance of security could be constructed without U.S. participation in an alliance that would guarantee U.S. involvement in combating aggression. After making a bilateral mutual defense pact, the Treaty of Dunkirk in 1947, Britain and France in 1948 organized the Brussels Pact, which included Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands as well. This was seen as inadequate, however, in light of Soviet behavior. The Brussels Pact nations initiated talks with the United States and Canada about possible defense cooperation in July 1948, shortly after Stalin initiated a blockade of the British, French, and U.S. sectors of Berlin. Formal

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42 Ibid., p.70.
43 Ibid., p.71.
45 The Treaty of Dunkirk referred specifically to the possibility of future German threat in addition to establishing a mutual defense obligation.
negotiations about the North Atlantic Treaty began in December 1948, and the treaty was signed on April 4, 1949, while the Soviet blockade of Berlin was still under way.²⁶

The greatest difficulty in negotiating the North Atlantic Treaty was finding a formula that would satisfy the Europeans, who wanted a U.S. commitment that would be sufficient to deter the USSR, but that would not prevent the United States from deliberating before war. As President Truman noted in his memoirs, “The Brussels Pact nations wanted the North Atlantic pact to state that, if a member was attacked, the other members would supply all the military and other aid and assistance in their power. This, of course, implied going to war. . . . This was an obligation which, in view of our Constitution, we were not prepared to assume.”²⁷

Thanks to Article 11 of the treaty, which stipulates that the treaty’s provisions will be carried out in accordance with the “respective constitutional processes” of the signatories, the final formula adopted in Article 5 contains a strong commitment:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

This was a revolutionary commitment by the United States, in view of its political traditions of isolationism and avoiding “entangling alliances” in peacetime.²⁸ At this point, however, the North Atlantic Treaty was seen as little more than a mutual defense commitment that would deter Soviet aggression and reassure Western Europe during its economic recovery. It was assumed that the West Europeans would rebuild their defense capabilities and that, after some years, they would bear the major military burdens in balancing Soviet power in Europe. To this end, the United States encouraged the countries of Western Europe to replace rivalry with cooperation and to initiate a process of political and economic integration. In a 1949 Senate hearing, Secretary State Dean Acheson was asked, “Are we going to be expected to send substantial numbers of troops over

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²⁶ The essential role of British and French statesmen (such as Ernest Bevin, Georges Bidault, and Robert Schuman) in organizing the Atlantic Alliance has been examined in recent studies such as Alan Bullock, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin, vol. 3, Foreign Secretary, 1945-1951, London, William Heinemann, 1983, p. 529-585, 632-645, 857.
²⁸ The phrase “entangling alliances” has customarily been attributed to President George Washington as a part of his Farewell Address on September 19, 1796, even though his actual words were as follows: “Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humour, or caprice? It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances, with any portion of the foreign world.” Washington’s Farewell Address quoted in Walter Millis, ed., American Military Thought, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1966, p. 68.
there as a more or less permanent contribution to these countries’ capacity to resist?” Acheson replied: The answer to that question, Senator, is a clear and absolute ‘No.’  In December 1950, General Dwight Eisenhower, who had served as the Supreme Commander of Allied Expeditionary Forces in Europe in 1944-45, was appointed the first Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). In April 1951 Allied Command Europe (ACE) became operational, with the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) at Roquencourt, near Paris.

The United States still hoped that the magnitude of its defense burdens in Europe could be minimized through greater West European efforts. The Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) had been founded in 1949, but was still under an occupation regime, with no armed forces of its own. Legal responsibility of West Germany was to the three Western powers, to Britain, France, and the United States. In September 1950 the United States proposed that West German armed forces be established, and the French promptly advanced a counterproposal for a European Defense Community (EDC).

While the French saw the strategic justification for West German forces, given the risk of Soviet aggression in Europe, Paris however sought hard constraints on them. Minister of Defense Jules Moch said that France could never “accept the creation of German divisions.” German soldiers, the French suggested, should be organized in “battalion units of about 1,000 men” that would be distributed throughout the proposed European army. EDC opponents in France argued that it would reconstitute

German armed forces while subordinating the French military to a supranational European organization. U.S. and West German support for the EDC made it appear suspect in the view of many of the French as well.

When the EDCs opponents effectively defeated the project in the French National Assembly in August 1954, another framework for the establishment of West German armed forces was devised. At Britain’s suggestion, the 1948 Brussels Treaty furnished the basis for the London and Paris agreements of 1954. Italy and West Germany were admitted to the Western European Union (WEU), together with the original Brussels Treaty signatories, France, Britain, and the Benelux countries. West Germany renounced the production of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons on its territory, and accepted numerous restrictions on its conventional armaments, all of these

52 The EDC in fact was never directly voted on in the French National Assembly, nor was a full-scale debate held. The EDC was defeated on a procedural motion before such a debate could be held. For details see ibid., 295-297.
within the WEU framework. Britain, Canada, and the United States promised to maintain ground and air forces in Germany, subject to certain conditions. With these assurances and others, France at last agreed to the Federal Republic’s entry into NATO and the establishment of West German armed forces in 1955. West Germany became the Alliance’s first new member since Greece and Turkey joined in 1952.

As a response to these events, the Soviet Union established the Warsaw Pact in 1955, within days of West Germany’s admission to NATO and the establishment of the West German armed forces. At the end of 1955, Moscow signed a treaty with the Soviet-established Communist regime in East Berlin, granting the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) some of the prerogatives of statehood, although it remained under firm Soviet control. Indeed, throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union maintained its most potent concentration of foreign-based troops in East Germany.

In retrospect, the period from the mid-1950s to the breakdown of the Soviet empire in 1989-91 appears to have been one of political and strategic stalemate, with little alteration in formal political-military alignments. Europe, Germany, and Berlin remained divided, and Communist rule in the Warsaw Pact was sustained, for the most part, through Soviet military power and internal security organs. Yugoslavia maintained a unique status throughout this period. Ruled by a Communist party, yet not a member of the Warsaw Pact, Yugoslavia enjoyed privileged relations with the West. Partly because of its geographic isolation, Albania succeeded in leaving the Warsaw Pact in 1968. Romania, like Albania, declined to participate in the Soviet-led suppression of democratic tendencies in Czechoslovakia by other Warsaw Pact states in 1968. Romania was unwilling to participate in the Warsaw Pact’s integrative schemes and managed to achieve an exceptional degree of foreign policy autonomy, in part because it had persuaded Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev to withdraw Soviet forces from its territory in the late 1950s.

On the Western side, as part of its post-Franco “return to Europe,” Spain joined NATO in 1982. Spain and Portugal were invited to accede to the WEU in 1988, and they did so in 1990; but this had little strategic significance, because the WEU at that time still adhered rigorously to the article of the Brussels Treaty, as amended in 1954, calling for the WEU members to “work in close


NATO’s collective defense preoccupations during the Cold War focused on how to deter the Soviet Union from undertaking aggression or coercion. 61 Because of the protection afforded to NATO Europe by U.S. strategic nuclear commitments was seen as a decisively important element of deterrence from the earliest days of the Alliance, a primary issue throughout the Cold War was the credibility of what came to be known as U.S. “extended deterrence” that is, the prevention of aggression or coercion against U.S. allies or security partners through threats of U.S. nuclear retaliation. Extended deterrence involves issues of credibility, command and control, and decision

55 Article IV of the Brussels Treaty, as amended and signed at Paris, October 23, 1954. This article was not in the original 1948 Brussels Treaty, of course, because NATO had not yet been established. In practice, the parties to the Brussels Treaty began to rely on the Alliance promptly after its establishment, particularly after Allied Command Europe became operational in 1951.

56 For a discussion of Soviet ideology and propaganda about military-technical innovation during the Cold War (at times the Soviets claimed credit for being the first to develop ICBMs and certain other capabilities, and at other times portrayed the United States as the sole “engine of the arms race,” with the USSR in a purely reactive mode), see David S. Yost, Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense and the Western Alliance, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1988, p.71-80.


61 Richard L. Kugler, Commitment to Purpose: How Alliance Partnership Won the Cold War, Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corporation, 1993, p.82-85.
making that have been basically more arguable and more difficult to resolve than those associated with “central deterrence”, the prevention of aggression or coercion against the United States itself. Associated issues during the Cold War concerned Allied involvement in U.S. decision making on the potential operational use of nuclear weapons, the types and roles of U.S. nuclear forces in Europe, and the utility and functions of the British and French independent nuclear forces. Nuclear controversies were closely tied to European-American debates about the proper level of investment in conventional forces and burden sharing, about how to assess the NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional force balance, and about what approaches to arms control to pursue in negotiations with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact as a whole.

In a concerted dialogue spanning decades, the NATO Allies concluded that U.S. extended deterrence requires, among other things, U.S. nuclear forces based in Europe. A substantial consensus of officials and experts on both sides of the Atlantic holds that U.S. nuclear commitments would be less credible if they depended solely on forces at sea and in North America. Nonetheless, large-scale reductions in U.S. nuclear forces in Europe began in the late 1970s, and received a further impetus from the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF). This Treaty eliminated U.S. and Soviet land-based missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers.

U.S. decisions in September-October 1991 removed all U.S. ground-launched nuclear systems including artillery, surface-to-air missiles, and surface-to-surface missiles. The only U.S. nuclear weapons remaining in Europe are a reduced number of gravity bombs for U.S. and Allied dual-capable aircraft; unconfirmed published reports put their number between 480 and approximately 700.

In other words, this decrease spared some of the most politically visible elements of the U.S. nuclear posture then remaining in Europe the gravity bombs for dual-capable aircraft, which give several of the Allies a direct role in nuclear risk and responsibility-sharing. According to an unclassified NATO report in 1988, seven allies (Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, and the United Kingdom) have provided delivery systems and “host-nation facilities” for U.S. nuclear-capable forces.

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While the 1991 decisions mean that only nuclear gravity bombs associated with dual-capable aircraft remain, the central importance of their continuing presence in Europe was reaffirmed in the Alliance’s 1991 Strategic Concept:

“A credible Alliance nuclear posture and the demonstration of Alliance solidarity and common commitment to war prevention continue to require widespread participation by European Allies involved in collective defense planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation arrangements. Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an essential political and military link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance. . . . These forces need to have the necessary characteristics and appropriate flexibility and survivability, to be perceived as a credible and effective element of the Allies’ strategy in preventing war. They will be maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve peace and stability.”

The document notes, moreover, that the “supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States,” and that “adequate sub-strategic forces based in Europe . . . will provide an essential link with strategic nuclear forces, reinforcing the trans-Atlantic link.”

Since the founding of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) in 1966-67, the Allies (except for France) have been able to resolve many of the consultation and decision-making issues that were so contentious during the 1950s and early 1960s. The Atlantic Alliance’s nuclear arrangements include multinational risk and responsibility-sharing and multinational decision making and policy implementation. These arrangements have promoted Alliance cohesion, increased the influence of the nonnuclear European Allies regarding U.S. Nuclear policy, and reassured the Allies as to the genuineness and probable deterrent effectiveness of U.S. nuclear commitments.

While the United States is the ultimate nuclear guarantor of NATO European security, Britain and France contribute to the Alliance’s over-all deterrent posture. Although the French have never participated in NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group, France has provided an additional independent locus of nuclear decision making, which has complicated the risk calculations of any nation

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66 North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, par. 56.
67 North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, par. 55, 57.
68 The U.S. Nuclear arsenal available to uphold U.S. security commitments includes forces in addition to those actually based in Europe. The U.S. nuclear posture includes Ohio-class nuclear-powered submarines equipped with ballistic missiles, Minuteman III and MX Peacekeeper intercontinental ballistic missiles, B-52 and B-2 bombers, nuclear-armed Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles, and bombs for tactical aircraft in addition to those in Europe. Since the withdrawal of its last air-delivered bombs in early 1998, the United Kingdom’s nuclear forces have consisted solely of nuclear-powered submarines equipped with ballistic missiles. Since the deactivation of its intermediate-range missile force on the Plateau d’Albion in 1996, France’s operational nuclear forces have consisted solely of nuclear-powered submarines equipped with ballistic missiles, plus aircraft equipped with air-launched missiles. For details, see International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1997/98, London, Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997, p.18, p.50, p.70.
contemplating aggression or coercion against the Alliance. Since the early 1960s, France has insisted on the distinctness and autonomy of the French approach to nuclear strategy in relation to U.S. and NPG concepts. While France participated in the Alliance’s 1990-91 Strategic Concept review and approved the 1991 document, the French are excluded from two of the key paragraphs referring to nuclear deterrence. The British have committed their nuclear forces to NATO planning since 1962, though they have of course retained national command at all times. Moreover, London has reserved the possibility of national use independent of coordinated action in defense of the Alliance in cases involving “supreme national interests.” None of the Alliance arrangements changes the fact that any actual nuclear use decisions would depend on national choices, and would therefore ultimately reside with the U.S. president, the British prime minister, and the French president.

**Alliance Policies for Peaceful Change during the Cold War**

Before the conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, Western leaders were disappointed not only by the scope of the Soviet Union’s territorial acquisitions during World War II that of the Baltic states, as well as portions of Finland, Poland, Germany, Romania, and Czechoslovakia but also by the brutal and dictatorial policies the USSR pursued in the countries it had liberated from fascist rule. Many in the West agreed with what Winston Churchill said in his 1946 “Iron Curtain” speech: “This is certainly not the liberated Europe we fought to build up. Nor is it one which contains the essentials of permanent peace.”

From the outset, therefore, the Alliance defined its purposes as involving more than simply collective defense against external aggression. The Allies repeatedly declared their interest in pursuing positive political changes in Europe while avoiding war: “to live in peace with all governments and all peoples” (1949), “to seek solutions by peaceful means” (1953), and to

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69 In one case, the French are excluded by the “allies concerned” formula (par. 57) and in another by the reference to “European Allies involved in collective defense planning in nuclear roles” (par. 56). For background, see David S. Yost, “Nuclear Weapons Issues in France,” in John C. Hopkins and Weixing Hu, eds., Strategic Views from the Second Tier: The Nuclear Weapons Policies of France, Britain, and China, San Diego, Calif., Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California, San Diego, 1994, especially 24-28.


promote ‘peaceful change’ (1957). In the 1967 Harmel Report, the two main purposes of the Atlantic Alliance were recalled in a classic formulation. The first purpose was to maintain sufficient military strength to deter aggression and attempts at coercion, to defend the Allies in the event of aggression, and “to assure the balance offered, thereby creating a climate of stability, security, and confidence.” Fulfillment of the first purpose would create a basis for the second: “to pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved.”

Such goals were apparent from the 1950s through the 1980s. However, during the late 1950s and early 1960s, Western attitudes slowly changed with respect to two key issues: the relative importance of pursuing arms control and changes in political order in Europe, and the likely processes of change in the East. The Alliance initially held that a settlement of the German question on Western terms “reunification of Germany through free elections” according to a 1955 communiqué, would have to precede the negotiation of arms limitations, and that the Soviets would in any case have to honor their promises at the 1945 Yalta conference for free elections in Eastern Europe before a fundamental improvement in East-West relations could take place.

Starting in the late 1950s and especially after the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, issues of political order in Europe began to be clearly subordinated to arms control and the pursuit of East-West detente. The Atlantic Alliance devoted increasingly less attention to issues of political order and legitimacy in the Eastern countries. While NATO communiqué in the 1950s referred to “the totalitarian menace” and asserted that the peoples of Eastern Europe “have the right to choose their own governments freely, unaffected by external pressure and the use or threat offered,” by 1966 the Alliance was calling for “removing barriers to freer and more friendly reciprocal exchanges between countries of different social and economic systems.” In the 1950s, the division of Germany was regarded as a “continuing threat to world peace.” During the 1960s, however, the goal of eventual German reunification was gradually changed into simply “an essential factor for a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe,

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77 For example, see North Atlantic Council Communiqué of December 16-19, 1957, in ibid., 109.
78 North Atlantic Council declaration of December 11-14, 1956, in ibid., 102.
80 North Atlantic Council Communiqué of May 2-3, 1957, in ibid., 106.
and the Alliance in 1969 celebrated West Germany’s proposals for a “modus Vivendi between the two parts of Germany.”

These changes in priorities and assumptions were linked to the adoption of new views about the likely processes of change in the East. The Alliance ultimately adopted the view that detente, which became shorthand for policies intended to reduce East-West tensions, could only succeed in reassuring the Soviet leadership about the Alliance’s peaceful purposes and bringing about a freer movement of people and ideas and progress toward democratization in Eastern Europe if many years were invested in promoting greater East-West understanding. The sensation of the 1950s as to a certain flexibility gave way to a conviction during the 1960s that change could be brought about only on the basis of a stabilization and acceptance of the existing order, which might then be transformed through a long-term process. Internal changes in the Soviet Union and East European societies, it was hoped, would lead to a gradual East-West rapprochement, thus eventually ending the military confrontation.

An important element in the Cold War’s East-West political competition was the CSCE, which originated in a series of proposals and counter-proposals made by NATO and the Soviet Union during the 1950s and 1960s for an all-European security conference. These proposals finally led to a conference of thirty-five participants, all the countries of Europe, except Albania, plus Canada and the United States that took place in Helsinki during 1973-75.

The concluding document of the conference, called the Final Act, was not a legally binding treaty but a political declaration covering three areas, known as “baskets.” Basket I consists of a Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States and also confidence-wilding measures. Basket II concerns cooperation in economics, science and chronology, and the environment. Basket III covers cooperation in humanitarian domains, such as human rights, freedom of information, culture, and education. The CSCE process involved a series of meetings, including review conferences to discuss the implementation of the political commitments made in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. These review conferences, in turn, commissioned specialized sub-conferences and meetings, such as the Stockholm conference on confidence-building measures in 1984-86.

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81 North Atlantic Council Communiqué of June 13-14, 1967, in ibid, 189
82 North Atlantic Council declaration of December 4-5, 1969, in ibid., 231.
The Helsinki Final Act commitments and the CSCE process became significant instruments in Cold War political competition for both the Soviet Union and the Atlantic Alliance. Some Western governments and political activists sought to use the Basket III commitments made by the Soviet-bloc states to call attention to the denial of human rights in these states and to demand the liberalization and movement toward democratization foreshadowed in the Basket III principles. Basket III was a measure and prism for assessing acts of domination by Moscow and other Warsaw Pact capitals, statements by persecuted dissidents, and struggles by workers’ movements such as Solidarity in Poland.

U.S. diplomacy during the negotiation of the CSCE’s 1975 Helsinki Final Act was under the direction of Henry Kissinger. Paradoxically, even though “Kissinger evidently found human rights issues largely irrelevant to superpower politics,” he played an important role in insisting that the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act have substantive content, in part because of what was then perceived as an increasing U.S. domestic “political need to be seen dealing toughly with the USSR.”

Many Americans and Europeans saw the CSCE human rights guarantees not only as well founded in terms of universal moral principles but also as potentially useful tools in the political struggle with Soviet Communism. Helsinki Final Act principles such as freedom of thought and the freer and wider dissemination of information underscored the illegitimacy of one-party dictatorships in comparison with pluralistic democracies. These principles probably played a much greater role in weakening the Communist regimes of the Warsaw Pact than Kissinger and other Western officials who helped to negotiate the Helsinki Final Act had expected.

For the Soviet Union, Basket I was the decisively important part of the Helsinki Final Act. The USSR claimed that it represented Western ratification of the legitimacy and permanence of the existing European order, including a certain recognition for its territorial acquisitions in 1939-45, its military presence and hegemonic position in Eastern Europe, and its “two-state” view of the German question. In short, the Soviets considered the Helsinki Final Act a “super-Yalta” rather than the “anti-Yalta” accord hailed by many of its proponents in the West.

Although the Soviets commented the Helsinki Final Act and related agreements as recognition of the “irreversibility” of Soviet dominion in Eastern Europe, the governments of the Atlantic Alliance rejected such an interpretation. The United States, in particular, continued to refuse to recognize

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85 Ibid., 158.
86 For a detailed discussion, see ibid., especially p.46, p.121, and p.156-60.
87 For background regarding Soviet efforts to attribute more legal standing to the Helsinki Final Act than it has, see Van Oudenaren, Detente in Europe, p.323-327.
the Soviet incorporation of the Baltic States. Britain, France, and the United States retained their Four Power reservations regarding the ultimate disposition of the German question. West Germany repeatedly noted that the “peaceful change” of existing frontiers was not ruled out by any of its various Ostpolitik treaties with Warsaw Pact states or by the Helsinki Final Act, and that German reunification and national self-determination were still legally feasible.”

It should be acknowledged, however, that despite their declared interest in democratization in the Warsaw Pact states and a process of reconciliation ending the East-West strategic stalemate, many Westerners were reasonably satisfied with the European political order during the Cold War. Some expressed concern that an inadvertent “destabilization” of East European societies through political liberalization could result in war or, at the least, setbacks for detente as a gradual and ultimately effective process. Some even appeared willing to support repression for the sake of stability if it appeared that liberalization trends might escape control. West German chancellor Helmut Schmidt said in December 1981, with respect to the imposition of martial law in Poland, “[East German leader] Honecker is as dismayed as I am, that this was necessary.” Some West European officials even ventured to say that the Alliance’s declared political goal of ultimate German reunification should be abandoned. In September 1984, Italian foreign minister Giulio Andreotti provoked formal West German protests with the following comments: “Everybody agrees that the two Germanys should have good relations. It should be clear; however, that pan-Germanism is something that must be overcome. There are two German states and two German states must remain.”

**NATO’s Role in Defense and Detente**

The French rebellion had shaken the foundations of the alliance. But another fundamental challenge lay at hand. The North Atlantic Treaty was approaching its twentieth anniversary, auspicious primarily because the Treaty’s escape clause gave members the opportunity to leave the alliance after twenty years. As the alliance closed in on the 1969 opportunity for desertion, the greatest challenge to its political viability was not the French challenge. Rather, it was the question of whether this alliance, constructed in the chilly atmosphere of the Cold War, could survive in the warming climate of East-West detente.

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In Germany, Social Democrat Willy Brandt had come into government as foreign minister in a “grand coalition” with the Christian Democrats, assuming the position of foreign minister on December 6, 1966. He believed that the Federal Republic’s policy of non-recognition of East Germany and of existing European borders stood in the way of improving human conditions in Europe and particularly in the German Democratic Republic. Brandt’s concept of “Ostpolitik” represented a major shift from Germany’s orientation under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, and he brought this new philosophy to his first NATO foreign ministerial meeting in Paris later that month.92

Brandt’s Belgian counterpart, Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel, felt strongly that the alliance would have to respond to critics who charged that NATO had become irrelevant under the changed international conditions. On the basis of Harmel’s initiative, at least partly inspired by Brandt’s philosophy that NATO defense and East-West detente could be compatible, the December 1966 meeting of NATO foreign ministers commissioned a yearlong study of “The Future Tasks of the Alliance.” According to Harlan Cleveland, even the title of the study took on special meaning in the context of the mid-1960s. Cleveland, who represented the United States in the North Atlantic Council in the period before, during, and after the study, recalled that “if the ‘Future of the alliance’ had been studied, that would have implied doubt about continuation of the Alliance beyond 1969. ‘Future tasks’ assumed that NATO would survive its twentieth birthday, and called only its functions and priorities into question.”93

The critique of NATO that inspired the Harmel exercise suggested that NATO’s emphasis on the military aspects of security tended to undermine prospects for political solutions to East-West problems. The alliance had, of course, focused primarily on ways to maintain and improve Western defenses. It had not, however, been totally blind to the political aspects of security. Already by the mid-1950s, the allies had recognized that a narrowly focused Western military approach to the Soviet threat would not be sufficient to serve the broad range of allied political and economic as well as security objectives. The communiqué issued by the NATO foreign ministerial meeting in Paris in December 1955 marked the first formal alliance initiative broadening its perspectives on security, taking the Soviet Union to task for Moscow’s refusal to consider intrusive systems of arms control verification, such as President Eisenhower’s “Open Skies” proposal.

In 1956, the allies began developing the rationale and mandate for arms control consultations in the alliance. The spring ministerial of that year appointed a “Committee of Three on Nonmilitary Cooperation” to study ways in which NATO nonmilitary cooperation could be expanded. The “three wise men”, Foreign Minister Gaetano Martino of Italy, Halvard Lange of Norway, and Lester Pearson of Canada, reaffirmed the necessity for collective defense efforts but strongly emphasized the need for better political consultation among the members. In particular, their report, approved

by the North Atlantic Council in December 1956, observed that consultation “means more than letting the NATO Council know about national decisions that have already been taken; or trying to enlist support for those decisions. It means the discussion of problems collectively, in the early stages of policy formation, and before national positions become fixed.”

“The habit of consultation, ” strongly advocated by the three wise men, became an important part of alliance rhetoric, almost approaching theological heights. Even before the report and ever since NATO problems, to one extent or another, have been blamed on the failure of one or more allies to consult adequately. Virtually no report or commentary on the alliance can reach its conclusion without recommending “improved consultations.”

The Harmel Report appropriately commended the virtues of improved consultation. The report’s most important contribution, however, was its conclusion that “military security and the policy of detente are not contradictory but complementary.” The report, the product of a prestigious committee led by Harmel, asserted that the alliance had two main functions. The first function, and the one with which the alliance had become most closely identified, was “to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of member countries if aggression should occur.” The second, newly assigned function of the alliance was “to pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship with the East, in which the underlying political issues can be solved.” Approved by all the allies, including de Gaulle’s France, the report offered this summary perspective:

Collective defense is a stabilizing factor in world politics. It is a necessary condition for effective policies directed towards a greater relaxation of tensions. The way to peace and stability in Europe rests in particular on the use of the Alliance constructively in the interest of detente. The participation of the USSR and the USA will be necessary to achieve a settlement of the political problems in Europe.

The allies adopted the Harmel Report at their ministerial meeting in December 1967 and, in this bold stroke, fundamentally altered the objectives, image, and “future tasks” of the alliance. The report’s “defense and detente” combination provided an intellectual and political framework for NATO policies that accommodated the growing split in the alliance between left and right. By bridging two different views of how best to ameliorate East-West tensions, it broadened the potential base of political support for NATO in European countries and in the United States. Subsequently, instead of polarizing Western politicians, policy elites, and publics, the alliance could serve as a fulcrum for balancing divergent perspectives on the requirements for the West’s security

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95 NATO Online Library, www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b671213a.htm [accessed December 9, 2006].
policy in Europe. Not inconsequentially, this critical addition to NATO’s role provided the foundation for NATO to become a viable political instrument following the end of the Cold War, when its military relevance appeared open for debate following disappearance of the Soviet threat.

Acceptance of the Harmel Report also provided a way to deal with another problem that had been brewing between the United States and the European allies. The United States had become actively involved in bilateral arms control discussions with the Soviet Union, and these discussions occasionally left the allies wondering whether their interests would be protected by their American ally. At the same time, American officials had become increasingly concerned that the European allies would become “infected” by the Soviet peace campaign, with individual allies drifting off to cut their own deals with Moscow. The Harmel Report implied that NATO consultations could serve to coordinate Western approaches to the East. This coordination function would help alleviate European concerns about US-Soviet bilateralism while providing a brake on any European tendencies toward excessive detente fever.

In a very practical sense, the Harmel exercise created a whole new set of responsibilities for NATO. A few weeks after the Harmel Report had been approved, the allies agreed to strengthen the political institutions of the alliance by establishing a “Senior Political Committee.” This step could be regarded as institutional sleight of hand because the new box on the organizational chart simply referred to meetings of the NATO Political Committee, with the allies represented by the deputy permanent representatives (instead of the lower-ranking political counsellors). Nonetheless, to the extent that bureaucratic structures can be manipulated to send political signals, the alliance in this way marked the increased importance of the political side of alliance activities. A further institutional signal was sent later in 1968, when a new section in the NATO international staff was created to deal with disarmament and arms control issues.

The allies wasted no time translating the Harmel mandate into alliance policy. When the North Atlantic Council met in Reykjavik, Iceland, in June 1968, the allies issued a “Declaration on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions.” The so-called Reykjavik signal announced allied agreement that “it was desirable that a process leading to mutual force reductions should be initiated.” They agreed “to make all necessary preparations for discussions on this subject with the Soviet Union and other countries of Eastern Europe,” and they urged the Warsaw Pact countries “to join in this search for progress toward peace.”

The Reykjavik signal echoed NATO’s June 1967 expression of interest in mutual force reductions. However, the Reykjavik declaration was notable in that it not only expressed interest but also voiced NATO’s intention to prepare for discussions that the East was invited to join. The Reykjavik

signal, therefore, marked NATO’s formal entry into the world of arms control initiatives, making operational the recommendations adopted in the Harmel Report six months before.

The Harmel exercise revitalized the foundations of the alliance. It reiterated NATO’s commitment to maintain a strong defense, but it broadened substantially the goals of the alliance. This amendment to the original transatlantic bargain provided a political framework more relevant to the challenges posed by the East-West environment of the 1960s. It also responded to the evolving relationships between the United States and its West European allies. The Harmel formula gave the alliance a new lease on life and a renewed sense of purpose.

Perhaps the most lasting contribution of the Harmel exercise was the change in NATO’s mission that would become so relevant at the end of the Cold War. For many years, NATO’s search for the fruits of detente appeared unproductive and to some perhaps even counterproductive. Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) opened in 1973 but droned on for more than a decade before being converted into negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe in the mid-1980s; the latter negotiations finally produced a deal, largely because the fading Cold War finally made it possible. That deal not only provided the framework for dramatic cuts in military forces and equipment across Europe but also established an intensive, cooperative monitoring system that would eventually help ease the transition from Cold War confrontation to a more cooperative security system in Europe.

In addition, in 1975, NATO’s initiatives helped turn Moscow’s propagandistic proposals for a “Conference on European Security” into the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), a meaningful East-West forum on a broad spectrum of issues. The East-West dialogue in the CSCE may well have contributed to undermining the control of communist regimes in the East and to the unraveling of the East-West conflict.

Despite the opening of MBFR talks and the beginning of the CSCE process, many Americans saw little in the way of demonstrable benefits for NATO’s pursuit of detente. When President Gerald Ford (in 1974 Ford succeeded President Richard Nixon, who had stepped down after the Watergate scandal) suggested that the term “detente” should be removed from the West’s political vocabulary,

97 MBFR was the Western term for their initiative, emphasizing the word “balanced” to imply the need for larger Warsaw Pact than NATO reductions to overcome Pact numerical advantages. Moscow, of course, objected to this term, and the agreed title of the negotiations was Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments in Central Europe (MURFAAMCE).

98 At a summit meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Paris on November 19, 1990, the twenty-two member states of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization signed a major Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and published a joint declaration on nonaggression. The treaty included major reductions of military manpower and equipment in Europe as well as a wide array of cooperative inspection and compliance measures.

99 On August 1, 1975, the heads of state and government of thirty-three European states, Canada, and the United States signed the Helsinki Final Act establishing the CSCE.

many Europeans winced but hoped that the comment would not be prophetic. Ford’s declaration, inspired by some deeper trends in American thinking, in fact did project accurately the future course of American policy.

The administration of President Jimmy Carter (1977-1980) was unsure in its early years what it would do about the growing disenchantment, particularly among American conservatives, with the era of detente. The administration revealed a split personality in its approach to the Soviets. On the one hand, it wanted and negotiated a strategic arms control accord with Moscow. On the other hand, the administration’s fixation on human rights issues produced a strong critique of the Soviet Union’s treatment of its own citizens, criticism that cohabited very uncomfortable with the administration’s attempts to sell a U.S.-Soviet arms control deal to the U.S. Congress.

While the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) treaty was languishing in the U.S. Senate, the Soviet Union provided the stimulus for resolution of the dilemma in Carter administration policy. In the closing days of 1979, Moscow sent troops into neighboring Afghanistan, collapsing whatever was left of U.S.-Soviet detente. An U.S. Atlantic Council report in 1983 noted, “The death of detente was sounded when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979. President Carter imposed sanctions, withdrew the SALT II agreement from Senate ratification, and recommended substantial increases in U.S. defense spending which were further enlarged under the Reagan Administration.”

Washington’s unilateral declaration of the death of detente, however, was never fully accepted in Europe. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was seen as distasteful evidence of Soviet insecurity and interventionism but not as a direct threat to Europe and certainly not as a sufficient rationale for jeopardizing the fruits of detente in Europe. As Josef Joffe put it, “For the United States, detente did not ‘work,’ for the Europeans it did hence their almost obsessive attempts to snatch as many pieces as possible from the jaws of the rattled giants.”

Even before the invasion of Afghanistan, Henry Kissinger had argued that the Harmel formula was inappropriate for the circumstances of the late 1970s. Addressing a conference on the future of NATO in Brussels in September 1979, Kissinger dismissed NATO’s detente role as an intrusion on the real business of the alliance. European and some American participants in the conference shook their heads in amazement that Kissinger could so lightly dismiss a political aspect of NATO that had been so important to the credibility of the alliance for more than a decade. Kissinger’s approach,

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102 Julianne Smith, Transforming NATO (…Again), Csis Primer For The 2006 NATO Summit, November 2006.
however, was a clear warning that the critique from the political right in the United States was increasingly affecting American perspectives on the alliance.\footnote{103}

In the late 1970s and into the 1980s, the United States and the European allies struggled with the great variety of issues raised by their differing perspectives on the importance of detente and whether detente was “divisible,” applicable to Europe but not the Third World. The debate intensified with the advent of the Reagan administration in 1981, which was determined to implement a tough new American policy toward the Soviet Union, backed by a substantial defense buildup.

The allies managed to work out compromises on many of the specific issues raised by the differing American and European perspectives. But European governments never accepted the American contention that detente was dead or that the alliance should jettison its mandate for pursuing improved relations and arms control agreements with the Soviet Union.

Ironically, the Reagan administration, whose hard line toward Moscow had troubled the Europeans so much, managed to initiate the end-game negotiations on both intermediate range nuclear missile cuts and conventional force reduction negotiations in Europe. In subsequent years, supporters of President Reagan claimed that his tough policies toward the Soviet Union had helped bring about its collapse. Critics of the American president suggested that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev should be given most of the credit for opening both the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact for change. Looking back, it would appear that both factors played a role and that, to some extent, the outcomes that unraveled the Warsaw Pact and dissolved the Soviet Union were unexpected consequences of Soviet and American policies. In any case, the relevance and importance of the Harmel doctrine appear in historical perspective to have been borne out by the end of the Cold War and the need for NATO to adapt its role further to accommodate the dramatically new international realities.

**NATO’s Nuclear Strategy**

*From Massive Retaliation to Flexible Response*

\footnote{103 The September 1979 gathering in Brussels received its greatest notoriety for Kissinger’s warning to the European allies that they could no longer count on the American nuclear guarantee against the Soviets. Kissinger’s observations were substantially edited and revised before publication, taking some of the rhetorical edge off the more dramatic statements made in the conference session. Kissinger’s (revised) speech and other major statements to this conference can be found in Kenneth A. Myers, ed., *NATO-The Next Thirty Years: The Changing Political, Economic, and Military Setting*, Boulder, Colo., Westview, 1980.}
NATO’s reliance on the threat of a massive nuclear attack on the Soviet Union had been suspect virtually from the day MC 48 was approved in December 1954. NATO’s first nuclear strategy was not quite as simple as implied by the image of “massive retaliation” most frequently used to describe the essence of MC 48. The strategy spelled out in this document did not exclude the possibility that nuclear weapons might be used only within the confines of the battlefield. Despite U.S. deployment in the 1950s of a variety of nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Western Europe, alliance strategy remained at least implicitly reliant on the suggestion that the Soviet Union would risk a massive nuclear strike on its territory should its forces attack Western Europe.

This nuclear strategy, driven principally by the austerity program of the Eisenhower administration and the failure of the allies to meet the Lisbon convention force goals, did not sufficiently anticipate the implications of Soviet nuclear force deployments. The Soviet Union had successfully tested an atomic device in 1949 and a hydrogen bomb in 1953, but when MC 48 was approved, the Soviet Union had only limited means for delivering its few weapons on Western targets and virtually no credible means for threatening American territory. The United States, meanwhile, had surrounded Soviet territory with a bomber force capable of devastating strikes on the Soviet Union. This situation was, for obvious reasons, intolerable for the Soviets, and even as the NATO ministers were approving MC 48, Moscow was developing its own long-range bomber force and planning to deploy medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles targeted on Western Europe. The launch of the Sputnik satellite in 1957 symbolized the dramatic progress the Soviet Union had made in a very few years toward developing its own strategic nuclear weapons force capable of holding both European and American cities hostage to a nuclear threat, calling into question the U.S. policy of massive retaliation.

The NATO allies struggled from the mid-1950s with attempts to adjust NATO’s strategy and force posture to the evolving strategic environment. In 1959, the Eisenhower administration deployed U.S. medium-range ballistic missiles to Europe: sixty Thor missiles to England and ninety Jupiter missiles divided evenly between Italy and Turkey. The missile deployments were intended to help offset the Soviet deployment of SS-4 and SS-5 missiles that had begun in the late 1950s and to bolster the confidence of European governments in the ability of the United States to implement its nuclear guarantee.

The alliance was at the same time grappling with some internal political dynamics that had begun to undermine its nuclear weapons strategy. European fretting about civilian control of nuclear weapons, so much in evidence when the United States had first attempted to sell the new-look strategy to the alliance in 1954, developed into a more specific European desire to have a say in Western nuclear decision making. By the late 1950s, the British had an independent nuclear capability, and the French were on the way toward nuclear power status. The United States was
by no means anxious to encourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons states and would have preferred that neither France nor Great Britain develop nuclear forces.

Between 1959 and 1963, a number of schemes emerged for some form of nuclear sharing among the NATO allies. These schemes were motivated to varying degrees by Soviet nuclear weapons advances and by the tension within the alliance about the American monopoly in nuclear decision making. Of these proposals, only the Multilateral Force (MLF) made any headway. The MLF would have been a force of twenty-five surface ships, each carrying eight Polaris nuclear missiles, manned and funded by multinational crews and assigned to the NATO Supreme Allied Commander. The United States would have retained ultimate veto power over the use of the MLF weapons.

The MLF proposal, ingenious as it might have been, never had much chance of political acceptance. President de Gaulle interpreted the scheme simply as a means for the United States to retain control over Western nuclear policies while appearing to share it. He saw his suspicions confirmed when the British, seeking to modernize their nuclear forces, chose to purchase Polaris missiles from the United States. According to de Gaulle, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan “mortgaged” Britain’s future nuclear capability to the United States in the Nassau Agreement with President John F. Kennedy in December 1962, when he agreed to buy Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles from the United States. After further NATO discussions of various MLF variants that continued into the administration of Lyndon B. Johnson, MLF joined the ranks of historic curiosities.

The MLF failure left unresolved the issues it had been designed to address, in particular, the political requirement for broader allied participation in nuclear decision making. Even if France and Great Britain were determined to maintain their own nuclear forces, U.S. officials remained convinced that West Germany would have to be given a more acceptable role in nuclear decision making given Bonn’s increasingly central role in the alliance.

By the early 1960s, the United States had positioned in Western Europe a wide array of nuclear weapons, ranging from intermediate-range systems to short-range weapons intended for use on the battlefield. However, it kept either full control over the weapons or joint control by retaining one of two keys necessary to release them. This massive infusion of U.S. nuclear weapons in NATO defenses, combined with the desire of some West European allies for a more influential role in NATO nuclear planning, led to the creation of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) in 1966. The NPG was designed to allow alliance members to influence planning for the potential use of nuclear weapons and to give them a role in nuclear decision making in a crisis. The United States also agreed to assign sixty-four
Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles directly to NATO along with the British Polaris force, both of which would be responsive to requirements of the SACEUR.\(^{104}\)

The abortive MLF project and the subsequent creation of the NPG were responses largely to developments within the alliance. During the same period, the alliance was also moving toward a substantial shift in its nuclear strategy. Although massive retaliation had died years before, it had never been formally buried; the United States started pushing for a proper interment in the early 1960s.

From an American perspective, the steady growth of Soviet nuclear capabilities clearly necessitated a more flexible set of guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons. It was no longer credible simply to threaten attacks on the Soviet heartland with nuclear weapons in response to a Warsaw Pact offensive in Western Europe—the American heartland had become vulnerable to a response in kind. The need for change had been signaled by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in 1962. Such a momentous change in nuclear strategy, however, met with skepticism in Western Europe, largely from fear that the credibility of the nuclear guarantee would be destroyed by a strategy that foresaw the possibility of limited or controlled nuclear exchanges. The concepts that lay behind MC 48 had been of American origin, but they had been embraced by the European allies, and in the 1960s the threat of a massive nuclear strike still seemed a needed deterrent to Soviet aggression in Europe.

In 1967, following France’s departure from NATO’s integrated military command structure and after several wrenching years of discussion and debate among the allies, NATO adopted the doctrine of flexible response. According to the new strategy, NATO would be prepared to meet any level of aggression with equivalent force, conventional or nuclear, and would increase the level of force, if necessary, to end the conflict. The doctrine attempted to accommodate the American desire for more flexible nuclear options and West European concerns about the nuclear umbrella. Under the doctrine, Chicago might not be put at risk in the early stages of a conflict, but the possibility of escalation supposedly “coupled” the fate of Chicago to that of Paris, Hamburg, or London.

The new strategy, substantially altering the original transatlantic bargain, compromised conflicting U.S. and European perspectives on the requirements of deterrence. As Simon Lunn wrote, “While theoretically sound, it left considerable latitude for differences concerning the levels offerees necessary at each stage to insure credible deterrence. This ambiguity permitted the accommodation of conflicting American and European interests, but it did not represent their reconciliation.”\(^{105}\) The new nuclear doctrine did not reconcile American and European differences on nuclear strategy, but it did provide a formula that was sufficiently ambiguous to achieve political credibility on both

\(^{104}\) The Nassau agreement had included a British pledge that its Polaris force would be assigned to the alliance and withdrawn only when “supreme national interests are at stake.”

sides of the Atlantic at least for a while. The strategy, combined with the advent of allied consultations on NATO’s nuclear policy in the NPG, formally accorded nuclear weapons, from the smallest-yield battlefield systems to the strategic forces of the United States, their own unique places in NATO military strategy. Not only would nuclear weapons serve as a deterrent against a Warsaw Pact attack, but, under flexible response, the entire range of nuclear weapons had a potential role to play in wartime scenarios. Furthermore, the United States had acknowledged the legitimate interests of the allies in shaping NATO nuclear doctrine and sharing the responsibilities of decision making in a crisis. The United States provided no iron-clad guarantee about how extensive consultations might be in a crisis, but at least the NPG provided the ways and means for such consultations.

The decision also recalled the long-standing but unfulfilled NATO objective of mounting a credible nonnuclear defense against the Warsaw Pact. A more substantial conventional capability would fit comfortably within the flexible response framework. In this regard, the new strategy was at least superficially consistent with the original bargain, in which substantial European nonnuclear forces were to be a key support for NATO strategy. Under the circumstances of conventional insufficiency, however, the new doctrine implied greater reliance on the possible use of short-range nuclear weapons as well as the possibility that a nuclear exchange might be limited to the battlefield or to the European continent.

Flexible response, in this sense, was a double-edged sword. Reliance on a wide range of battlefield nuclear weapons implied an even more permanent U.S. commitment to its force presence in Europe because virtually all of NATO’s nuclear weapons were under exclusive U.S. control or subject to U.S. veto. NATO’s defense options as well as its deterrent strategy had become more dependent on the U.S. troop presence. The October 1954 American commitment to maintain troops in Europe for “as long as is necessary” therefore became longer and more necessary under the flexible response strategy.

At the same time, whether or not the U.S. intent was to provide a greater buffer between its homeland and a possible war in Europe, the new doctrine clearly left open the possibility that the United States would place a higher value on avoiding nuclear strikes on the United States than it would on protecting West European territory. Although the first edge of the sword committed the United States even more firmly to participate in the defense of Europe, the second edge of the sword cut away some of the credibility of that commitment.

In fact, the Soviet Union’s drive, first to obtain the means to threaten the United States directly and then to achieve nuclear parity, changed one of the most important conditioning factors for the original transatlantic bargain. The American homeland became dangerously exposed for the first time since the young upstart of a nation had chased the European powers from the Western
Hemisphere. Technological advances had given the Soviet Union the potential to threaten all of the United States with its nuclear weapons. But the Atlantic Ocean still separated the United States from its European allies, and it therefore remained possible, at least in theory, for the United States to limit its involvement in a war in Europe in order to save the American homeland, and, given the emerging Soviet nuclear capabilities, it had much more reason to do so.

**Flexible Response Undermined**

With the advent of flexible response and the development of limited nuclear options, the certainty implied by massive retaliation was replaced by the elusive goal of “escalation control.” That NATO “advantage” was countered in the 1970s by Soviet nuclear force improvements, including deployment of the SS-20, a mobile, accurate missile system capable of carrying three independently targeted warheads on each missile.

For many West Europeans, the nuclear deterrent had remained credible throughout the perturbations in the nuclear balance and adjustments in Western nuclear policy. There was no certain guarantee that the American president would push the button for Europe, but no iron-clad commitment could be expected. The Soviet Union had not risked an attack on Western Europe and did not seem likely to do so. A qualified guarantee, therefore, appeared sufficient for deterrence. For many nuclear strategists, however, there was no such confidence.

In the 1970s, West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt became the single most influential European commentator on alliance strategy and force posture. By the mid-1970s, Schmidt had become convinced that Soviet conventional force advantages over NATO, combined with its superiority in theater nuclear forces, put Europe at risk. Schmidt was concerned that the codification of a U.S.-Soviet balance of strategic weapons in the SALT process could make these weapons of “last resort,” weaken extended deterrence, and leave Europe exposed to Soviet power. He highlighted such concerns in a major address to the London International Institute for Strategic Studies in October 1977. Although Schmidt’s comments did not refer to theater nuclear forces, they “focused public attention on the concept that a gap was appearing in NATO’s deterrent capability.”

In the fall of 1979, Henry Kissinger, having served earlier as national security adviser and then secretary of state under Presidents Nixon and Ford, strongly criticized European and American governments for permitting the fate of their nations to rest on such a foundation of hope rather than on adequate deterrence forces. Kissinger “confessed” to a Brussels meeting of American and

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European defense experts and officials that he had “sat around the NATO council table in Brussels and elsewhere and uttered the magic words, promising extended deterrence for Western Europe, which had a profoundly reassuring effect and which permitted allied ministers to return home with a rationale for not increasing defense expenditures.” Then Kissinger stunned much of his audience with his conclusion:

*If my analysis is correct, these words cannot be true. And we must face the fact that it is absurd to base the strategy of the West on the credibility of the threat of mutual suicide. Therefore, I would say—which I might not say in office—the European allies should not keep asking us to multiply strategic assurances that we cannot possibly mean, or, if we do mean, we should not want to execute, because if we execute we risk the destruction of civilization.*

Kissinger urged that NATO modernize its European-based nuclear forces (an action the alliance was already preparing to take three months later) and encouraged the allies to strengthen conventional defense, an objective sought with limited enthusiasm since the alliance was founded. In other words, Kissinger argued primarily for more “credible” nuclear options combined with a stronger conventional defense to deal with NATO’s nuclear dilemma. His analysis suggested that extended deterrence had been invalidated by the advent of Soviet strategic nuclear parity and that the expansion of Soviet theater nuclear forces, particularly deployment of the SS-20 missiles capable of striking targets throughout Western Europe, had checkmated NATO’s adoption of the flexible response strategy and deployment of thousands of short-range nuclear weapons in Europe. Kissinger’s argument, framed by a politically conservative analysis and a pessimistic perspective on trends in the East-West military balance, represented the conventional wisdom that justified NATO’s December 1979 decision to deploy new long-range theater nuclear forces.

Kissinger’s message, while compelling, gave short shrift to some additional requirements of Western policy. First, NATO’s political viability had come to depend on a fine balance between allied defense efforts and Western attempts to reach mutually acceptable accommodations with the East. Second, any unilateral NATO efforts to improve its nuclear force posture would likely produce a countervailing response from the Soviet Union. As a consequence of the first requirement, NATO’s plan for dealing with the perceived deterioration in the nuclear deterrent would have to make sense to European and American publics. In order to gain public confidence, the allies would have to make a serious arms control proposal to the East. Furthermore, the only way to reduce the threat posed by Soviet SS-20 missiles and to forestall a countervailing Soviet response would be to negotiate limits on such systems with the Soviet Union.

And so, in December 1979, led by the U.S. administration of President Carter, the NATO allies decided to modernize its theater nuclear forces while seeking to negotiate limits on such forces with

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The debate between East and West and within the Western community that preceded the initial deployments tended to obscure rather than illuminate the rationale of the original decision. The debate between East and West became a contest for the “hearts and minds” of the Europeans. Within the West, the issue became part of a larger struggle between competing concepts of how best to deal with the Soviet Union. The 1979 decision therefore became a surrogate for the discussion of much broader aspects of East-West relations. The initial deployments, marking as they did a “victory” for one side of the debate, perhaps opened the way for a more reflective look at the fate of the 1979 decision and its implications for the future of NATO.

The 1979 “dual-track” decision was, after all, perfectly consistent with the stated objectives and strategies of the alliance. The decision attempted to deal with conflicting American and European perspectives on deterrence by providing more flexible nuclear systems, in response to the American requirement for credible nuclear options which, nonetheless in their ability to strike Soviet territory, could be seen as strengthening the link between the European theatre and the strategic nuclear standoff in response to the European requirement for extended deterrence.

According to the decision’s rationale, deterrence for Europe would be strengthened because the Soviet Union, in contemplating any attack on Western Europe, would be forced to calculate that the West might respond by striking Soviet territory with the new systems. And, in using the systems, the West would know that the Soviet Union might respond by striking American, not just European, targets. Therefore, both sides would be aware that hostilities initiated in Europe might escalate rapidly to a strategic exchange.

This logic was no foolproof guarantee of extended deterrence. The American president could, in theory, decide not to use the new systems in case of a Soviet attack and could even choose to “lose” them rather than invite strategic retaliation. The decision, however, would have to be made much earlier in the conflict, than might previously have been the case. The new deployments, therefore, compressed the time in which the Soviet Union could advance through Western Europe without risking a nuclear strike on Soviet territory. So the new missiles were not principally intended as a means for targeting the Soviet SS-20 missiles, as some observers mistakenly thought. Given the linkage rationale for deploying the new weapons, there was no magic number of missiles that had to be deployed. The

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108 NATO members agreed to modernize the Europe-based US nuclear arsenal by deploying a total of 572 new ground-launched systems capable of reaching Soviet territory from West European sites. The deployment would consist of 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles, all with single nuclear warheads. The missiles would be deployed in five European countries: P-ITs and cruise missiles in West Germany and cruise missiles only in the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium. The allies also agreed to attempt to negotiate with the Soviet Union East-West limitations on theater nuclear forces in the context of SALT.
deployment would have to be sufficiently large to guarantee (in combination with other factors, such as mobility) survival of enough weapons to remain a serious option in a crisis. Beyond this pragmatic rationale, the final number of 572 missiles was also influenced by the desire to deploy systems in a number of allied countries to “share” the risks and responsibilities of the decision.

The arms control “track” of the dual-track decision also had a very specific purpose. It brought the decision in line with the Harmel formula, which the allies had developed in 1967 to give NATO a role in promoting detente with the East as well as sustaining defense and deterrence. It undoubtedly was clear to the allies that they might need to demonstrate their interest in arms control in order to defend the deployment decision before their publics. The arms control initiative, however, could do something that the deployment would not accomplish on its own. Only if there were an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union to limit intermediate-range nuclear systems could the West restrict the extent of the SS-20 threat to Western Europe.

Why, when the decision on intermediate-range nuclear forces seemed so well designed to serve the strategy of extended deterrence, did it ultimately provoke in Europe fear of nuclear war rather than produce increased confidence that war would be deterred? The answer lies in the fact that the viability of extended deterrence rested on three pillars: the weapons themselves, a credible strategy relating the weapons to the purpose of the alliance, and political confidence that the weapons and the strategy would make it less rather than more likely that war would occur. Historically, the United States has tended to place greater emphasis on the weapons and the strategy for their use than on the political context for their deployment. Europeans, on the other hand, have tended to place greater emphasis on the political context, believing that wars usually are “about something,” the product of political disagreements rather than spontaneous unexplainable events. Critiquing the 1979 decision, one European analyst suggested:

*The historical record since the Second World War demonstrates that the faith of Europeans in Washington’s ability to use its power in a measured and prompt way to defend Western interests, whether inside or outside the NATO area, is a far more important determinant of their confidence in the reliability of the US nuclear umbrella and of their acceptance of nuclear defense than is the nuclear balance between the Superpowers.*

Even under the best of circumstances, it would not have been easy to negotiate an arms control agreement limiting intermediate-range nuclear systems. As it happened, the negotiations began under a dark cloud because of the general deterioration in U.S.-Soviet relations that had begun in the years immediately prior to the NATO decision and that quickened in its wake.

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The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, only two weeks after the NATO 1979 decision, provided a rallying point for the critique of Soviet global intervention that had been building in the United States for a number of years. The critique had already been a major factor in the failure of the Senate to ratify the SALT II treaty. The invasion brought consideration of the treaty to a full stop.

Ronald Reagan, after trouncing Jimmy Carter in the 1980 elections, set American foreign policy on a new course. President Carter had already begun a defense build-up that the Reagan administration promptly accelerated. Just as important, the Reagan administration came to office infused with great skepticism about arms control based on a perception of unrelenting Soviet antagonism toward U.S. interests. The administration put arms control on a back burner and concentrated on developing its defense program.

On December 8, 1987, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty designed to eliminate two categories of their intermediate-range nuclear missiles: long-range INF, with a range between 600 and 3,400 miles, and short-range INF, with a range between 300 and 600 miles. The treaty did not cover short-range (under 300 miles) nuclear force missiles. In this shorter-range category, NATO countries still had the aging LANCE missile system with approximately 700 warheads. The United States deployed some thirty-six LANCE missile launchers in Western Europe. Belgium, the Netherlands, West Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom deployed around sixty LANCE launchers with nuclear warheads available under dual-key arrangements with the United States. These missiles could not reach Soviet targets from their launch sites in Europe and therefore were not of great concern to Moscow and did not accomplish the same strategic objectives intended in deployment of the INF missiles.

Although European as well as American public opinion strongly supported the INF Treaty, some observers judged that elimination of the missiles would undermine the credibility of flexible response and argued that the alliance would have to compensate for the loss of the INF missiles to keep its strategy intact. Others argued, however, that the United States still committed a small but strategically significant portion of its relatively invulnerable sea-launched ballistic missile force for use by NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, and that this force, plus nuclear weapons carried on FB-111 and B-52 bombers based in the United States, preserved a strategic strike potential for NATO. They also argued that a substantial U.S. troop presence in Europe served as a “trip wire” and thus ensured linkage to U.S. strategic nuclear forces.

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111 Ibid. p.109.
In addition, British and French strategic capabilities, capable of hitting targets in the Soviet Union, which were not included either in the INF negotiations or in U.S.-Soviet strategic arms talks, were being modernized and expanded.

In the event, implementation of the INF Treaty became part of the process of winding down the Cold War, a circumstance anticipated by no one when the treaty was signed in 1987. The intensive inspection regime associated with provisions for dismantling the missiles created a vehicle for testing the possibilities for U.S.-Russian cooperation in the post-Cold War era.

With the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, NATO’s struggles with nuclear doctrine and extended deterrence promised to enter a dramatically new phase. The aspect of the transatlantic relationship that, in many ways, had been the most difficult for the allies to sustain in capabilities and public support was suddenly overtaken by welcome events.
CHAPTER 2

NATO’S ADAPTATION IN POST COLD WAR ERA
Whatever the causes of the Soviet empire’s collapse, it came as a surprise to most Western officials and experts, who had generally attributed much more strength and staying power to the Soviet Union than proved to be the case. The events in 1989-91 that marked the end of the Cold War, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of Communist governments in East-Central Europe, the unification of Germany, and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, obliged the Allies to redefine NATO’s purposes and to endow it with new roles in addition to its traditional core missions of collective defense and dialogue with adversaries.\textsuperscript{113}

These new roles can be defined and categorized in various ways, but the two most significant new roles are clearly cooperation with former adversaries and other non-NATO countries in new institutions such as Partnership for Peace, and crisis management and peace operations beyond the territory of NATO allies. In conjunction with the pursuit of these two new roles, the Alliance has been engaged in a complex process of internal adaptation. This process includes the establishment of new institutions intended to promote an even closer political control over military operations such as crisis management and peacekeeping; a certain “Europeanization,” with more attention to structural changes conducive to the emergence of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI); and a greater flexibility for the ad hoc improvisation of effective “coalitions of the willing” through Combined Joint Task Forces. Coalitions of the willing would be composed of the states volunteering to participate in specific non-Article 5 operations. At the same time, the Alliance’s collective defense function has been redefined, with much more attention than in the past to countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that is, nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.

**Cooperation with Former Adversaries and other Non-NATO Nations**

At NATO’s July 1990 London summit, the first after the collapse of the Communist governments in Eastern Europe in the fall of 1989, the Allies affirmed their determination to maintain the peace, and asserted an unprecedented confidence in the Alliance’s ability to serve as an “agent of change,” an instrument useful in constructing “a Europe whole and free.” In the words of NATO’s London Declaration, “We need to keep standing together, to extend the long peace we have enjoyed these past four decades. Yet our alliance must be even more an agent of change. It can help build the structures of a more united continent, supporting security and stability with the strength of our shared faith in democracy, the rights of the individual, and the peaceful resolution of disputes.”\textsuperscript{114}


NATO added in its London Declaration that it would “reach out to the countries of the East which were our adversaries in the Cold War, and extend to them the hand of friendship.” In terms of concrete proposals, NATO suggested “military contacts” between NATO and Warsaw Pact commanders, “regular diplomatic liaison” between NATO and the states of the Warsaw Pact, and a joint declaration by the nations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact affirming that they were “no longer adversaries.”\(^\text{115}\) Such a declaration by the members of the opposing alliances was made in Paris in November 1990, less than eight months before the Warsaw Pact was formally disbanded in July 1991.

In November 1991, NATO proposed “a more institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on political and security issues” with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union.\(^\text{116}\) The Baltic republics regained their independence from the Soviet Union and were admitted to the United Nations in September 1991, before the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991. Before its replacement by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in May 1997, the mechanism for the “more institutional relationship” was the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which consisted of meetings of representatives of the invited states with NATO officials.

In their November 1991 Strategic Concept, the Allies recalled the Alliance’s two classic purposes, most famously formulated in the Harmel Report, as follows: “safeguarding the security and territorial integrity of its members, and establishing a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe.” The Allies added, “what is new is that, with the radical changes in the security situation, the opportunities for achieving Alliance objectives through political means are greater than ever before.” As a result, “Allied security policy” would henceforth be based on “three mutually reinforcing elements the dialogue, the co-operation, and the maintenance of a collective defense capability.”\(^\text{117}\) Michael Legge, then NATO’s assistant secretary general for defense planning and policy and the chairman of the Strategy Review Group that drafted the new Strategic Concept, wrote that “the former Harmel dual approach of dialogue and defense” was expanded into “a triad of cooperation, dialogue and defense.”\(^\text{118}\)

In January 1994, NATO went well beyond declaring the addition of “cooperation” as a basic purpose. The Alliance announced its intention “to launch an immediate and practical program that will transform the relationship between NATO and participating states. This new program goes

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\(^\text{115}\) North Atlantic Council, London Declaration, par. 6-8.

\(^\text{116}\) North Atlantic Council, Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, November 8, 1991, par. 11.

\(^\text{117}\) North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, par. 24-25.

beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership called Partnership for Peace. We invite the other states participating in the NACC, and other CSCE countries able and willing to contribute to this program, to join with us in this Partnership.”

What would the Partnership for Peace (PfP) accomplish? According to the North Atlantic Council, “The Partnership will expand and intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened relationships by promoting the spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles that underpin our Alliance.” By the end of 1996, twenty-seven non-NATO nations had joined PfP, with some much more active than others.

In mid-1997, the Alliance’s cooperation activities were extended with the establishment of three new institutions: the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, created by the May 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act; the NATO-Ukraine Commission, established by the July 1997 NATO-Ukraine Charter; and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council which replaced the NACC in May 1997.

The Alliance’s Mediterranean Dialogue should be mentioned in this context as well. In December 1994, the North Atlantic Council declared that NATO was prepared “to establish contacts, on a case-by-case basis between the Alliance and Mediterranean nonmember countries with view to contributing to the strengthening of regional stability.” NATO has subsequently initiated a dialogue with six countries: Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. Each dialogue has been bilateral between NATO and the specific country, although the initiative allows for multilateral meetings on a case-by-case basis. The dialogue has concerned NATO’s policies, and “Mediterranean partners have been invited to participate in specific activities such as science, information civil emergency planning and courses at NATO schools in fields such as peacekeeping, civil emergency planning, arms control, responsibility of military forces in environmental protection and European security cooperation.”

Crisis Management and Peace Operations

The war in Yugoslavia did not begin until May 1991, a circumstance that helps to explain why the Alliance’s July 1990 London Declaration had nothing to say about the need to be prepared for such crises. By the fall of 1991, the Alliance had adjusted its expectations. Although the European Community initially claimed responsibility for dealing with the conflict in what was soon to become

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120 Ibid., par. 14.
121 North Atlantic Council, final communique, December 1, 1994, par. 19.
known as the former Yugoslavia, the Alliance foresaw multiple risks of comparable conflicts. In the words of the November 1991 Strategic Concept, Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in central and eastern Europe. The tensions could lead to crises unfavorable to European stability and even to armed conflicts, which could involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, having a direct effect on the security of the Alliance.\footnote{123}

The Alliance’s November 1991 Rome Declaration accordingly called for capabilities “to prevent or manage crises affecting our security” in a “wide range of contingencies.”\footnote{124} In June 1992, the Allies declared their willingness “to support, on a case-by-case basis in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise.” This decision was made in light of the outbreaks of “violence and destruction ... in various areas of the Euro-Atlantic region,” notably in the former Yugoslavia.\footnote{125} In December 1992, the Allies extended the same principle to “peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council.” This decision formalized the various NATO activities under the Security Council’s auspices under way since mid-1992. As the December 1992 communiqué noted, “For the first time in its history, the Alliance is taking part in UN peacekeeping and sanctions enforcement operations.”\footnote{126} At the January 1994 summit, the Allies reaffirmed their offer to support “peacekeeping and other operations” under UN or CSCE auspices, and endorsed “the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces as a means to facilitate contingency operations, including operations with participating nations outside the Alliance.”\footnote{127} The essential purpose of CJTFs was to facilitate the organization of effective “coalitions of the willing,” particularly for non-Article 5 operations that is, operations other than those to honor the binding commitment to collective defense in the case of external aggression against the Alliance.\footnote{128} The operations would in all likelihood be conducted by “combined” multinational and “joint” multiservice formations.

Although the formal institutionalization of the CJTF concept would take years to accomplish, a de facto CJTF was established at the end of 1995, in the form of the Implementation Force (IFOR) for Operation Joint Endeavor, the instrument for the enforcement of the military aspects of the Dayton peace agreement for Bosnia. In addition to the Allies, IFOR ultimately included eighteen

\footnote{123 North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, par. 10.}
\footnote{124 North Atlantic Council, Rome Declaration, par. 4-5. See also the Strategic Concept, especially par. 47.}
\footnote{125 North Atlantic Council communiqué, June 4, 1992, par. 4, 11.}
\footnote{126 North Atlantic Council communiqué, December 17, 1992, par. 4-5.}
\footnote{127 North Atlantic Council declaration, January 11, 1994, par. 7, 9.}
\footnote{128 NATO has nonetheless specified that “The employment of CJTFs for Article 5 operations is also not excluded.” Final communiqué of the North Atlantic Council in defense ministers session, December 18, 1996, par. 15.}
non-NATO countries, fourteen of which were NACC and PfP members. The follow-on force for IFOR, known as the Stabilization Force (SFOR), was activated on the day IFOR’s mandate expired in December 20, 1996. All sixteen Allies contribute to SFOR, as do all the countries that participated in IFOR, as well as Ireland and Slovenia. NATO holds that “SFOR’s mission is clear, limited and achievable: to deter renewed hostilities and to stabilize and consolidate the peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to contribute to a secure environment in which civil implementation plans can be pursued.”

Internal Adaptation

The WEU was formed in 1954 on the basis of the 1948 Brussels Treaty; Italy and West Germany then joined the original parties to the treaty, Britain, France, and the Benelux countries. During the Cold War, the WEU served primarily as a mechanism to reassure West Germany’s neighbors and Alliance partners that Bonn’s military capabilities would respect agreed constraints. Although the WEU’s member governments made some efforts during the 1980s to give the WEU greater practical significance, it was not until the end of the Cold War that the concept of building a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) won a wider and more substantial consensus. The ESDI concept means a greater European capacity for autonomous military action, thanks in part to deeper political cohesion. Interest in the ESDI quickened at this point, for at least three reasons: a sense of diminished dependence on U.S. security commitments, resulting from the collapse of the Soviet empire; a determination on the part of the newly reunited Germany’s European allies and partners to “embrace” Germany in a stronger common framework; and a recognition that the European NATO Allies might be wise to hedge against the risk of U.S. disengagement from European security commitments or at least, the possibility of U.S. nonparticipation in the management of some crises of concern to the European Allies.

The ESDI concept is not linked to a single institutional framework. Multiple organizations and efforts are involved, including bilateral enterprises, notably Franco-German and Franco-British cooperative frameworks, and trilateral endeavors, for instance, those involving French, Italian, and Spanish forces in joint exercises and training. The European Community’s member governments had engaged in some foreign and security policy cooperation since the early 1970s, and by the end of the 1980s the European Community states were actively considering a more explicit

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129 The fourteen Partner countries that participated in IFOR were Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Sweden, and Ukraine. The other four participants were Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia, and Morocco. SFOR includes Slovenia, an additional Partner country, and Ireland, which has not joined PfP.

130 Final communique of the North Atlantic Council in defense ministers session, December 18, 1996, par. 7-8.
engagement in defense matters, the possible utility of the WEU in this regard, and the significance of the vaguely defined ESDI within the Alliance.

NATO’s July 1990 London Declaration included only a single sentence about what was to become a major element in the Alliance’s internal adaptation, being prepared to support WEU-led operations and the emergence of an ESDI: “The move within the European Community towards political union, including the development of a European identity in the domain of security, will also contribute to Atlantic solidarity and to the establishment of a just and lasting order of peace throughout the whole of Europe.”\(^\text{131}\)

By December 1990, however, the concept had become more complex and explicit: “enhancing the role of the European Allies with a view to ensuring a full and equitable sharing of leadership and responsibilities between Europe and North America. ... A European security identity and defense role, reflected in the construction of a European pillar within the Alliance, will not only serve the interests of the European states but also help to strengthen Atlantic solidarity.”\(^\text{132}\)

This statement was made in the context of the opening that month of the European Community’s Intergovernmental Conferences on Political Union and Economic and Monetary Union. These conferences led to corresponding treaties, adopted by the heads of state and government of the European Community in December 1991 at Maastricht, the Netherlands. In June 1991 the Alliance welcomed “the progress made by the countries of the European Community toward the goal of political union, including the development of a common foreign and security policy” and “a European security and defense role.”\(^\text{133}\) The Alliance’s November 1991 Rome Declaration also endorsed the “enhancement of the role and responsibility of the European members” and applauded “the perspective of a reinforcement of the role of the WEU.”\(^\text{134}\)

It was not until January 1994, however, that the Alliance decided to support the emergence of an ESDI and, more specifically, the conduct of WEU led operations by European “coalitions of the willing” with practical changes in its organizational structure. Although, as suggested above, one of the major purposes for devising Combined Joint Task Forces was to support non-Article 5 contingency operations conducted under NATO auspices that might involve a coalition of NATO and non-NATO nations, another basic purpose was to facilitate the organization of such operations under WEU leadership.

The Maastricht Treaty had taken effect in November 1993, transforming the European Community into the European Union. In January 1994, the Alliance welcomed this development: “We give our

\(^{131}\) North Atlantic Council, London Declaration, par. 3.
\(^{132}\) North Atlantic Council communiqué, December 18, 1990, par. 5.
\(^{133}\) North Atlantic Council communiqué, June 7, 1991, par. 1.
\(^{134}\) North Atlantic Council, Rome Declaration, par. 6-7.
full support to the development of a European Security and Defense Identity which, as called for in the Maastricht Treaty, in the longer term perspective of a common defense policy within the European Union, might in time lead to a common defense compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance. ... We support strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance through the Western European Union, which is being developed as the defense component of the European Union. . . We therefore stand ready to make collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy.”

The mechanism for making these collective Alliance assets available was to be CJTFs. It was assumed in January 1994 that reliance on Alliance assets would avoid a duplication of effort on the part of the European allies, and that it would be relatively easy to devise arrangements for “separable but not separate capabilities which could respond to European requirements and contribute to Alliance security.” In fact, the challenge of the Alliance’s internal adaptation has proved to be politically contentious in some ways. Because the declared purposes of the ESDI include the “Petersberg tasks” approved by the WEU in 1992 (humanitarian and rescue operations; peacekeeping; and crisis management, including “peacemaking”), the internal adaptation issues associated with the ESDI constitute a key challenge for the Alliance in preparing for (and conducting) crisis management and peace operations.

Redefining Collective Defense

It was not until after the outbreak of the Gulf War the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and the operations under the authority of the UN Security Council to expel the Iraqi forces that the Alliance began to identify countering the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as one of the main challenges in the post-Cold War world. The subject was not even mentioned in the Alliance’s July 1990 London Declaration. In December 1990, however, the North Atlantic Council noted that “The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the spread of destabilizing military technology have implications for Allies’ security and illustrate that in an ever more interdependent world, we face new security risks and challenges of a global nature. Where they pose a threat to our common interests we will consider what individual or joint action may be most appropriate under the circumstances.”

135 North Atlantic Council declaration, January 11, 1994, par. 4-6.
136 Ibid., par. 6.
137 August 1990-February 1991
138 North Atlantic Council communiqué, December 18, 1990, par. 15.
By June 1991, the UN Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency and other organizations had made a number of unanticipated discoveries about the magnitude and progress of Iraqi programs to build chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. The Allies noted the dangers of WMD proliferation demonstrated by the Gulf War, but saw no need at that time for Alliance action. Instead, the Allies restated their “commitment to the earliest possible achievement of advances in the international forums dealing with specific proliferation issues,” such as efforts to conclude a Chemical Weapons Convention and strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention.\(^{139}\)

Similarly, the November 1991 Rome Declaration did not call for any specific Alliance initiative, and it repeated support for international arms control regimes.\(^{140}\) In contrast, the November 1991 Strategic Concept referred specifically to the need for “missile defenses” in light of “the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction” and for “precautions of a purely defensive nature” against chemical weapons, “even after implementation of a global ban.”\(^{141}\)

Nonetheless, it was not until the January 1994 summit that the Alliance “decided to intensify and expand NATO’s political and defence efforts against proliferation, taking into account the work already underway in other international fora and institutions.” The Allies directed “that work begin immediately ... to develop an overall policy framework to consider how to reinforce ongoing prevention efforts and how to reduce the proliferation threat and protect against it.”\(^ {142}\) The Alliance established a Joint Committee on Proliferation, composed of a Senior Political-Military Group on Proliferation and a Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP). The Joint Committee on Proliferation has been noteworthy, among other reasons, because France has participated fully. The DGP is co-chaired by the United States and, on a rotating basis, a European ally; France served as the first European co-chair. In June 1996 the North Atlantic Council endorsed recommendations by the DGP “to improve Alliance military capabilities to address the risks posed by NBC, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, proliferation.”\(^{143}\)

**The Continuing Collective Defense Role**

The new emphasis on countering WMD proliferation has not entailed an abandonment of the Alliance’s traditional collective defense role. While the Soviet Union constituted the main focus of the Alliance’s collective defense planning during the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty makes no reference to the Soviet Union or any other specific potential adversary, and the Article 5 obligations of the Allies were never limited exclusively to contingencies involving the USSR. By the same token,

\(^{139}\) North Atlantic Council communique, June 7, 1991, par. 7.

\(^{140}\) North Atlantic Council, Rome Declaration, par. 18.

\(^{141}\) North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, par. 50-51.

\(^{142}\) North Atlantic Council declaration, January 11, 1994, par. 17.

\(^{143}\) Final communique of the North Atlantic Council in defense ministers session, June 13, 1996, par. 21.
since the end of the Cold War, uncertainties about Russia’s future have not provided the sole rationale for maintaining the Alliance’s collective defense posture. During the 1990-91 Gulf War it was feared that Iraq might attack Turkey, and the Allies took precautionary steps to hedge against that possibility. Since the end of the Cold War, some Allies have explicitly made a distinction between different types of Article 5 contingencies. In the 1996 British defense white paper, for instance, two of the seven types of missions for British forces embrace the mutual-defense pledge: “A limited regional conflict involving a NATO Ally who calls for assistance under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty” and “General War, a large scale attack against NATO.”144 Such distinctions implicitly acknowledge both significant changes in international circumstances, the greater potential for limited regional contingencies and persisting concerns about Russia’s future. According to the 1991 Strategic Concept, the Alliance’s “fundamental security tasks” continue to include the following: to “deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state” and to “preserve the strategic balance within Europe.”145 Because the Strategic Concept was approved in November 1991, a month before the collapse of the Soviet Union, it uses the word “Soviet” in discussing what must be considered in defining the strategic balance in Europe: “Even in a non-adversarial and cooperative relationship, Soviet military capability and build-up potential, including its nuclear dimension, still constitute the most significant factor of which the Alliance has to take account in maintaining the strategic balance in Europe.”146

In political terms, as the Allies have multiplied their efforts to cultivate cooperative relations with Moscow, it has become increasingly awkward to refer explicitly to Russia as a potential threat to Alliance security. Nonetheless, at various points since the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, U.S. officials have acknowledged although, it seems, less frequently and more discreetly over time that the Russian question is far from being conclusively resolved, and that it is prudent to hedge against reversals in Russian politics and policies. In January 1992, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney suggested that the United States would need to maintain a deterrence posture vis-a-vis Russia until it had “unambiguous evidence of a fundamental reorientation of the Russian government: institutionalization of democracy, positive ties to the West, compliance with existing arms reduction agreements, possession of a nuclear force that is non-threatening to the West, and possession of conventional capabilities nonthreatening to its neighbors.”147 Cheney’s successor as defense secretary, Les Aspin, said in March 1993 that while the United States and other Western countries obviously hoped that democracy and reform would prevail in Russia, two other possible

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145 North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, par. 21.
146 Ibid., par. 14.
147 Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, January 31, 1992, text furnished by the Department of Defense, 21-22. The expression “non-MIRVed” means without multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles—that is, separate warheads containing nuclear weapons aimed at distinct targets on submarine-launched and intercontinental ballistic missiles (SLBMs and ICBMs).
outcomes had to be considered. Reversals could lead to “an ultra nationalistic, hostile and authoritarian form of government,” or “there could be a breakdown of authority, and nobody would be in charge.” In October 1993, Aspin mentioned the possibility that “anti-Western elements [could] take control of the Russian government.” This might have been the situation Aspin had in mind when he referred to the option of reconstituting U.S. nuclear forces and other capabilities if the United States faced “a threatening reversal of events.”

In a rare and significant reference to NATO’s continuing collective defense function vis-a-vis Russian military power, U.S. undersecretary of defense Walter Slocombe said in June 1996, “The course that we are seeking for Russia foresees an optimistic outcome, and maintains an optimistic outlook. But we are not naive about Russia, and we are acutely conscious of the dangers, of the hard lessons of history. Should Russia turn away from its new path, we can re-evaluate our approach and indeed we would have to do so. An integral part of our pragmatic partnership policy for Russia is that we continue to remain strong, so that we have a military hedge against whatever might come.”

Similarly, in an unusually explicit allusion to potential “direct threats against the soil of NATO members that a collective defense pact is designed to meet,” in October 1997 Secretary of State Madeleine Albright referred to “questions about the future of Russia. We have an interest in seeing Russian democracy endure. We are doing all we can with our Russian partners to see that it does. And we have many reasons to be optimistic. At the same time, one should not dismiss the possibility that Russia could return to the patterns of its past.”

As these statements suggest, concerns about Russia as a potential threat to the Alliance are rooted mainly in uncertainties about the country’s long-term political future. Why Western officials and experts have concerns about Russia’s prospects for successful democratization is no mystery. Historians and other scholars of the country’s political culture report that the precedents for stable democracy are minimal to nonexistent in Russia. Moreover, Russia has virtually no tradition of peaceful political successions. In 1988, before the Soviet empire’s collapse, and before he became the special adviser for Central and East European affairs to NATO’s secretary general, Christopher Donnelly called attention to the fact that Russia’s political history has repeatedly featured a

150 Walter B. Slocombe, under secretary of defense for policy, remarks to the Atlantic Council, June 14, 1996, text furnished by the Department of Defense, 15.
151 Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, prepared statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 7, 1997, in The Debate on NATO Enlargement, 13. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott has used a similar formulation, noting that “among the contingencies for which NATO must be prepared is that Russia will abandon democracy and return to the threatening patterns of international behavior that have sometimes characterized its history, particularly during the Soviet period.” Strobe Talbott, “Why NATO Should Grow,” New York Review of Books, August 10, 1995, 28.
“pendulum effect” of relatively liberalizing efforts terminated by war, revolt, or revolution, and the
reimposition of dictatorial rule: “a change of ruler in Russia and the USSR has rarely been natural
and graceful, but often accompanied by assassination, disgrace, war, or a combination of these
factors”152

The situation in Russia since the Soviet collapse has been one of continuing social and economic
upheaval, 153 with ambivalent relations toward the West. The regime is nominally democratic but
falls far short of Western standards and pursues rather erratic and inconsistent policies, in part
because of power struggles within the Russian government and, more broadly, within Russia as a
whole. According to Vladimir Shlapentokh, a prominent sociologist and specialist in Russian affairs,
“in the next few years, and possibly even longer, ... Russia will continue to be a country with a
stagnant economy, extremely high social polarization of the population, and permanent internal
political conflicts.”154

The internal political conflicts have led at times to violent and deadly confrontations—for instance,
in October 1993, when Yeltsin called upon the military to attack his parliamentary adversaries.155
Given the magnitude of the economic and social crisis in Russia, some Western experts fear that
the country’s post-Yeltsin future could include an authoritarian regime led by someone like
Gennadi Zuganov, the Communist Party leader, or Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the head of the so-called
Liberal Democratic Party.156 In 1995, Andrei Kozyrev, then the Russian foreign minister, warned
that while the “collapse of the totalitarian system has opened up unprecedented vistas for political
and economic freedom in Russia,” it has also “triggered the kind of decay and inertia that can bury
everything; the Russian economy, its statehood, law and order, and eventually freedom itself.” In
his view, Russia’s problems have “created a feeding ground for political forces that openly strive
to establish a nationalist dictatorship of a fascist nature rather than merely a revival of the previous
system.”157

Some of the contending political camps in Russia may succeed in their efforts to rally support and
build national unity on the basis of radical populist ideologies, including militant Russian
nationalism and antagonism toward the West. Sergey Rogov, the director of Russia’s Institute of
the USA and Canada, has compared today’s Russia with Germany’s Weimar Republic, adding that
there are “strong internal forces pushing Russia into ‘self-isolation’ as a disgruntled nation seeking

152 Christopher Donnelly, Red Banner. - The Soviet Military System in Peace and War , London, Jane’s Information Group Ltd.,
1988, p.44.
1996, 84.
157 Andrei Kozyrev, “Partnership or Cold Peace?” Foreign Policy, no. 99 (Summer 1995), p.4-5.
to undermine the international order . . . with a ‘more assertive’ stance toward protecting what are seen as Russia’s national interests.”

Western concerns about Russia’s potential to threaten the Alliance’s security interests are not rooted in the country’s current conventional military might. As Alexei Arbatov, deputy chairman of the Russian parliament’s Defense Committee, acknowledged, “As recently as 1988, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies held a quantitative edge over NATO of about 3-1 in main weapons of conventional ground and air forces. But as a consequence of the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and as a result of reductions in compliance with the CFE Treaty, today Russia is quantitatively inferior to NATO forces by a ratio of from 1-2 to 1-3.”

The state of the Russian military is probably far worse than these numbers suggest, because it has an array of grave problems: shortages of able-bodied personnel, brought on by desertion, draft evasion, malnutrition, and illness; inadequate and unpaid salaries; deficiencies in food, clothing, and housing, even for officers; underfunded and insufficient training and maintenance; and, above all, a dramatic decline in status, morale, cohesion, and discipline, with growing evidence of pervasive crime and corruption.

While Yeltsin’s distrust for the regular military services may have deepened as a result of the army’s hesitation about supporting him against the parliament in 1993, a general determination to prepare for further domestic turbulence probably also accounts for the expansion of the internal security forces.

If the regular armed forces had the funds to redress their shortcomings, British analyst Charles Dick has argued, the likely result would be “a rebuilding of the old Soviet Army, writ smaller, with all that implies for the growth of nationalist, anti-Western and authoritarian sentiment.” Russian military officers are probably divided in many ways, however, and some studies question the extent to which these officers would be willing to use force against separatists or domestic political rivals. According to Deborah Ball, “If the central government continues to insist that the military

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become embroiled in internal domestic disputes, then the Russian military may go the way of the Soviet Union complete disintegration.”

The likelihood of Moscow’s engaging in confrontational or aggressive behavior toward the Alliance under the current government may be rated as low, for various reasons beyond the substantially weakened state of Russia’s conventional armed forces. To begin with, the country’s governing political and business elites probably recognize that such behavior would not be in Russia’s economic interests. Rather than direct aggression or coercion against the Alliance as a whole or a specific Ally, which seems implausible in current circumstances, the greater risk is that of Russian military intervention in other former Soviet republics. Such interventions have already taken place in the Caucasus, Moldova, and Central Asia. Alliance interests could be engaged if an intervention spilled over into conflict involving an Ally such as Turkey or countries with which several Allies have cultivated close relations, such as the Baltic States. According to a recent analysis, while “there is no credible Russian military threat” to Central Europe today, “the armed forces of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are so small, weak, and geographically exposed that the Russian Army, even in its present condition, is generally viewed as capable of rolling over the Baltic States at will.”

Collective defense contingencies could also arise involving Russia and Turkey, because of disputes regarding other former Soviet republics. For example, some Russian officials have discerned Turkish designs on former Soviet holdings in the Caucasus and Central Asia. In fact, Turkish efforts to gain influence in Islamic areas of the former Soviet Union alarmed Russia enough for it to take countermeasures in 1992-93: “Russia began to amass forces and leverage to become the sole and decisive arbiter of the Nagorno-Karabakh war and to defeat Turkey’s grand design. . . . Moscow aided insurgents against an anti-Moscow Azeri government, supported the Armenian forces fighting Azerbaidzhan, and deterred, by nuclear threats, any Turkish plans to act on behalf of Baku.”

Such reports of vague nuclear threats against Turkey by Russian military officers or civilian officials have gained little public attention in the West. Some Russian analysts have nonetheless argued that Russia’s conventional military weakness could lead to the operational employment of nuclear weapons. According to Paul Fegengauer, a prominent Russian military analyst, “The Russian Army could easily suffer defeat in a local conflict in the Caucasus or in Central Asia. The political and military consequences of such a defeat could prove wholly unacceptable to Russia, and a direct

threat to use nuclear weapons or even a limited ‘demonstration’ nuclear strike could for this reason suddenly become the last realistic possibility of winning or evening up a war that has been lost, although no one in Moscow is seriously planning such actions at this time, of course.”\textsuperscript{166} The risk of such use of nuclear weapons may be higher than is generally suspected, in view of reports about the primitive character of some Russian technical security measures.\textsuperscript{167}

Russian officials and commentators have increasingly underscored the central importance of nuclear capabilities in guaranteeing the country’s security. Although concerns continue to be raised about biological weapons programs in Russia, despite the government’s denials, Russian nuclear forces command the Alliance’s attention far more than any other “unconventional” assets.\textsuperscript{168} NATO governments generally agree that the Alliance still requires an effective military posture to ensure stability in its relations with Russia, to furnish a solid foundation for dialogue and cooperation, and to provide a hedge against potential political upheavals in Russia. Furthermore, Allied officials and experts judge that the nuclear dimension of the Alliance’s military posture may have a distinctively important stabilizing effect.

British officials in particular have described the continuing Russia-NATO deterrence relationship in positive terms at times. Secretary of State for Defense Malcolm Rifkind said in 1992, “Our strategy makes military recidivism by any future Russian leadership a pointless option for them. It is therefore in the interest both of the Allies and Russia as well as the other states of the former Soviet Union.”\textsuperscript{169} In 1996, David Ornand, the deputy under secretary of state for policy in the Ministry of Defense, added that “we should be profoundly glad that history has bequeathed us a stable deterrence relationship maintained by both Russia and NATO.”\textsuperscript{170}

Because of the awkwardness of referring to Russia, as a potential nuclear threat, while trying to cultivate cooperative relations with Moscow, U.S. officials in recent years generally have been circumspect in discussing the strategic and political functions of U.S. nuclear forces vis-a-vis Russia. However, at the September 1994 press conference announcing the results of the Nuclear Posture Review that, among other decisions, confirmed the retention of U.S. nuclear forces in Europe, Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch said, “Let me remind you that Russia has little prospect of returning to the kind of conventional force structure that they had at the height of the Cold War due to the collapse of their economy and the change in their political situation. It is a less expensive and less demanding matter for them to return to a much more aggressive nuclear posture. If

\begin{itemize}
  \item Malcolm Rifkind, British secretary of state for defense, speech in Paris on September 30, 1992.
\end{itemize}
something does go wrong in Russia, it is likely that it is in the nuclear forces area that we will face the first challenge.”\textsuperscript{171}

Although the Allies have remained conscious of Russia’s nuclear capabilities and overall military potential, they have seen grounds for cautious hope about prospects for continuing economic reform and further movement toward democratization. In a long-term historical perspective, the Yeltsin regime has remarkable achievements to its credit. Renowned Polish author Adam Michnik has recommended that observers discouraged by the ponderous pace (and the setbacks) in economic reform and democratization in Russia compare the Yeltsin regime to every known historical regime that Russia has had. After all, this is the first time in its thousand-year history that Russia has had six years of freedom. It’s never happened before. The whole history of freedom that Russia had known hitherto was between February and October in 1917. Of course it is true that in Russia there is corruption, nepotism, criminal mafias. That’s all there. But there are also newspapers which write about it all, there are meetings where it is possible to speak about it. Put briefly, there is a realistic positive scenario available for Russia.\textsuperscript{172}

Indeed, many Western observers would agree with Zbigniew Brzezinski’s argument that a Russia interested in avoiding “dangerous geopolitical isolation . . . will have no choice other than eventually to emulate the course chosen by post-Ottoman Turkey, when it decided to shed its imperial ambitions and embarked very deliberately on the road of modernization, Europeanization, and democratization.”\textsuperscript{173}

The Allies have underscored their interest in promoting constructive trends and enhancing prospects for such a positive outcome in various ways, including bilateral national programs of cooperation with Russia, dialogue in the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, and efforts in other international institutions. While the Allies hope that negative scenarios are unlikely and can be successfully averted, part of the continuing collective defense function of the Alliance resides in hedging against the unforeseen in Russia.

\textbf{Reconciling Traditional and New Roles}

The Alliance’s role as an instrument of collective defense has remained central, despite a tendency to place more emphasis on non-Article 5 activities. The robustness of NATO’s collective defense posture is still seen as an essential basis for relations with non-Allies, including former adversaries for constructive cooperation with them. The challenge is to preserve the Alliance’s coherence and

\textsuperscript{172} Adam Michnik, interview reproduced in \textit{The National Interest}, Spring 1998, 128.
effectiveness while reconciling the traditional role of collective defense with the new roles of cooperation with non-NATO countries in the Euro-Atlantic region, and crisis management and peace operations. The Alliance’s new roles overlap in significant ways. While the Allies consider cooperation with former adversaries and other non-NATO countries to be intrinsically valuable as a matter of principle, preparations for, and the conduct of, crisis management and peace operations have given it practical meaning. As the Allies noted in June 1996, IFOR “benefited from the experience and increased interoperability gained through PfP activities, in particular joint exercises” and the Planning and Review Process (PARP). At the same time, the IFOR experience fortified PfP, as a result of a “joint Allied-Partner rolling evaluation of the lessons learned from political and military cooperation in IFOR with a view to applying such lessons to strengthening the PfP.” Moreover, three of the six nations in the Alliance’s Mediterranean Dialogue have contributed forces to IFOR and SFOR.

The new emphasis in collective defense on countering WMD proliferation has also enlarged options for cooperation with former adversaries and others in the Partnership for Peace. In June 1996, for example, the NATO defense ministers indicated that “The substantial progress made by the DGP [Defense Group on Proliferation] over the past two years provides a solid basis for continued co-operation among all Allies and, where appropriate, with Partners on relevant defense issues related to proliferation.” Consultations with Ukraine and Russia in this regard have been particularly significant. The Alliance’s work against the spread of weapons of mass destruction can be seen as an extension of its traditional collective defense function, but the Allies are well aware of the risk that WMD threats could also arise in “non-Article 5” operations.

**NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept: Strength and Weakness**

The acceptance of the Alliance’s Strategic Concept, addressing NATO’s future role and the initiatives increasing its capability to act in the new geo-strategic environment, was a crucial element at the Washington Summit on April 23-24, 1999. The Concept defines the new geo-strategic environment, created after the failure of the bipolar division of the world and the induced strategic changes in the Alliance’s environment. Considering NATO’s role in consolidating the positive changes and facing new challenges and threats, it must maintain its ability for collective defense, strengthen the transatlantic union and ensure a bigger participation of the Alliance’s European members in order to secure the common security interests in a still unstable environment. However, the majority of overall definitions and statements in the Concept are very

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174 Final communiqué of the North Atlantic Council in defense ministers session, June 13, 1996, par. 23.
175 Ibid., par. 25.
176 Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco
177 Ibid., par. 21.
178 Alliance’s Strategic Concept, Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C, NATO Press Release, April 1999.
general and vague, without any specific addressing of the primary objectives and missions, without a precise examination of the threats and risks and without the proper guidance for strategic forces deployment recommendations and appropriate asymmetric warfare toolbox applications.

**Purpose and Tasks**

In the Introduction we can read that the Strategic Concept is going to determine the directions of the Alliance’s actions during their realization. It also tries to express the Alliance’s invariable goal and character, its main defensive missions and it presents NATO’s broad approach to the defense problems and determines further ways of adapting its military forces.

The Concept has been divided into 5 parts: I – The Alliance’s goals and missions, II – The strategic perspectives, III – The approach to security in the 21st Century, IV – The instructions for the Alliance’s armed forces, V – Conclusions. 179 Paraphrasing this Strategic Concept, NATO’s main and invariable goal still is the protection of the liberty and security of all its members, using all possible political and military means, while maintaining full sovereignty for all the States Parties. In the meantime, the Alliance does not restrict itself to providing security to its members only, but also undertakes some actions aiming at creating the necessary conditions for increasing partner co-operation and dialogue with other countries sharing NATO’s political goals. Again, here we find very ambiguous statements, not addressing the important priorities to deal with the terrorist activities and other present emerging conflicts.

**Strategic Perspective and Security**

The Concept further deals with the following defensive missions, based upon the Washington Treaty and the United Nations Charter:

- Security: the assurance of a stable basis for a lasting security in the Euro-Atlantic area, based on democratic institutions and peaceful problem-solving aiming at eliminating the use of force or the threat of using it,

- Consultations: the assurance, according to article 4 of the Washington Treaty, of a transatlantic forum for consultations on all the Allies’ vital matters, such as possible threats to the state parties’ security, or the adequate coordination of actions in fields of common interest,

179 Ibid.
- Deterrence and Defense: to deter and defend each NATO member against any aggression, according to articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty.

Additionally, in order to increase security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, the Concept continues with further statements:

- Crisis response: the readiness - by consensus, ad hoc, and according to article 7 of the Washington Treaty

- To participate in the prevention of conflicts and crisis response, combined with peace-keeping operations,

- Partnership: promotion of a broadly understood partnership, cooperation and dialogue with the other countries from the Euro-Atlantic area, in order to increase mutual confidence and the ability to undertake common Alliance-led operations.\(^{180}\)

The Alliance, while realizing its main defense goals, will still take into account the justified security interests of other countries and will aim at peacefully resolving all the conflicts, according to the resolutions of the United Nations’ Charter. This will promote peaceful and friendly relations between the countries, supporting the democratic institutions. It is also important to remember that the Alliance isn’t anyone’s enemy. Unfortunately, this part of the Concept does not enable a widening of the strategic scope of operations and force deployment calling for expeditionary and effective force employments nor facilitate NATO’s ability to act rapidly outside of the Treaty’s area (non-article 5 missions).

On the other hand, the new dimension of the Alliance’s functions has been stressed. To undertake these kinds of action, a mandate allowing them has been established by compromise, referring to the UN Charter’s resolutions, without directly subordinating this decision to the UN Security Council’s agreement. The need to participate in the prevention of crisis and conflicts and in war on terrorism, which is an answer to the increasing role of the Alliance’s new challenges, has not been clearly emphasized in the Concept. It has also been confirmed, that NATO’s engagement in these kinds of missions is going to be examined on a “case-by-case” basis and the decision on an eventual participation of particular NATO members will be taken individually by every country, according to its national regulations. The further development of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), based on a decision taken in Berlin in 1996, within the Alliance, is one of the key elements of this Concept. A closer cooperation between NATO and the EU and WEU is supposed to

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\(^{180}\) Alliance’s Strategic Concept, Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C, NATO Press Release, April 1999.
strengthen the effectiveness of the Allies’ European operations, and also supports the construction of a co-operative defense system on the continent, especially within the development of the second pillar of the EU (the Common Foreign and Security Policy), de facto an attempt at creating their own military and defense dimension. It is necessary, within the evolution of international relations, to remember the importance of the effective and multi-faced NATO cooperation and dialogue programs with the partner states ( PfP, EAPC, the NATO-Russia and NATO-Ukraine relations, the Mediterranean dialogue, MAP etc).

The endorsement of the continuing process of participation of NATO’s new members (the so-called open-door policy) according to article 10 of the Washington Treaty is also important for the continuous enlargement of the Euro-Atlantic stability and defense zone. The accession of new members will serve the Alliance’s political and strategic interests will improve its efficiency and closeness and will considerably help to enforce security and stabilization in Europe. Similarly, the importance of transatlantic relations, being a practical expression of the Allies’ common and effective actions to ensure the common interests and the indivisibility of European and North American security, is a key element of the Alliance’s future unity and development. Because of the new geo-strategic conditions, the Concept softly mentions the need of a new mechanism reacting to different military and non-military challenges, such as the existence of important nuclear forces outside the Alliance, the proliferation of massive armaments, terrorism, organized crime, the global development of military technologies and their illegal transfer to embargo countries, the possibility of religious, ethnical, territorial or economic conflicts, as well as the progressive degradation of the environment.

**Principles of Alliance Strategy**

The Concept also envisions approaches for crisis prevention and appropriate counter measures. With respect to this statement, recent religious conflicts and terrorist attacks proved the crisis prevention policy to be very ineffective, leading to reconsider the adoption of the prevention and pre-emptive policies.

Part IV of the Concept expresses the Alliance’s defensive character and emphasizes the fundamental importance of collective defense and its indivisibility, supposing that the Alliance still maintains the necessary military capabilities, permitting the realization of all its missions. The Alliance’s solidarity rules and strategic unity will remain extremely important for the success of all

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181 Isabelle Francois, “Partnership: One of NATO’s Fundamental Security Tasks”, NATO Review number 1, Spring-Summer 2000, p. 27.

the Alliance’s operations. NATO forces must be effective; they must be able to ensure freedom of action for the Alliance. This requirement was put on paper during the Prague Summit in the NRF Concept. After two years the present situation reveals insufficient resources in the defense budgets of all Allied countries dedicated to NRF establishment, which does not promote operational, deployable, flexible, sustainable and effective response forces.

From another standpoint, the positive element is the statement that security of all the Allies is indivisible: an attack on one is an attack against all of them. In this context of collective defense (according to article 5 of the Washington Treaty), the Alliance’s multi-national forces must be able to deter any potential aggression. If such an attack occurs, they must stop the aggressor as fast as possible and ensure the political independence and territorial integrity of the member states. The Alliance’s forces must also be prepared to participate in the prevention of conflicts and lead crisis reaction operations, beyond Article 5 provisions. They also play a major role in the development of cooperation and understanding between the Alliance and its partners and other countries.

This mainly concerns the support that can be given to the partners, in order to prepare them for participation in the NATO-led PfP operations. In our assessment, Part IV of the Concept does not provide any proposals for a new type of strategic warfare or any course of action, necessary to the Allies to face and effectively oppose challenging threats and risks in the present globalized world. Thus, we must admit, that the Concept marginally emphasizes the need for adjusting the forces to the new challenges. This means the need for increasing the Allies’ efforts when it comes to modernizing their national armed forces, as well as increasing their efficiency and mobility. The adequate resolutions in Part IV of the Concept introduce a new approach to the categorization of the armed forces, emphasizing the need to ensure the Alliance of the necessary forces that would be able to operate outside their own territory within all NATO missions. In this context, the rule of the multi-nationality of the forces, which could increase the Alliance’s solidarity and the practical collectivity of NATO operations, seems to be a crucial element contained in the new document. The NATO Allies made firm political commitments to bring improvements in accordance with an agreed timetable, focusing on specific areas. Due to the continuous European countries’ defense budget restrictions and downwards trend, the accomplishment of the requested capabilities seems to be pretty far away from reality.

With respect to the Alliance’s nuclear strategy, the conflicts where it could have been really used cannot be underestimated and the strategy should unanimously reflect the changes that have occurred over the last years in the geo-strategic environment. In order to keep the peace and

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183 See I. Francois, Ibid.
184 See The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C, NATO Press Release, April 1999.
prevent war and stop any potential opponent from using pressure, NATO will keep its strategic nuclear forces, fulfilling a separate deterrence function and increasing its security. The nuclear weapons will still play an important role, creating uncertainty in the aggressor as to which way the Alliance will respond to its military aggression.

**Concept Evaluation**

In summary, the Strategic Concept only partially confirms the unchangeable goals of the Alliance and outlines its main defensive missions but does not indicate the clear strategic objectives that need to be accomplished. Consequently, the Strategic Concept limits NAT influence on the changing hostile environment which does not respect democratic values or peaceful rules and attempts to break up security and stability.

It is also important to stress that NATO needs a military strategy where all members of the Alliance are both consumers and producers of security. The Alliance, in other words, cannot tolerate “free riders.” It must put a premium on genuine partnership and reject the type of logic found in slogans such as “The US fights, the UN feeds, and the EU funds.”

The Alliance additionally needs a military strategy that preserves the positives of the “toolbox” idea and avoids its negatives, a strategy that permits member nations to act on an ad hoc, partial basis without having that approach contribute to the creeping enfeeblement or fragmentation of NATO.

In fact, NATO needs a strategy that integrates and compounds the benefits of “hard” military power with “soft” power, which can include targeted trade restrictions, legal/moral declarations, transportation restrictions, and much more.\(^\text{185}\) Today’s power does not necessarily come “out of the barrel of a gun.” Soft or demilitarized power, for example, is especially effective in setting agendas for the bottom-most chessboard. Rather than coerce others, it encourages those who operate on that particular board “to want what you want.” At the same time, a kinder, gentler NATO must never forget that the military aspects of security are like oxygen and without it, all else pales. “You cannot,” as Lord Robertson has rightfully observed, “send a communiqué” to solve a crisis or conflict.\(^\text{186}\) Right without power is impotence. The requirement, therefore, is to have a strategy that uses hard and soft power in reinforcing ways. The Alliance needs a strategy that does not make a fetish of technology that does not see it as a “magic bullet” that will solve the majority


of its security problems. Of course, improved, cutting-edge technology remains highly important to NATO’s future success, but we must never forget that “every device and mode of war carries the virus of its own technological, tactical, operational, strategic, or political negation.”

Finally, NATO needs a strategy that is more comprehensive and enduring that the current anti- and counter-terrorism one being promoted by Brussels. The latter is a debatable working paradigm that will most likely not have the needed support for long-term NATO strategic planning both within Europe and out of the area. NATO’s Strategic Concept is both outdated and inadequate and is too vague and too broad. It fails to rank in order the Alliance’s risks and threats properly; it fails to distinguish between first and second priority objectives; it has a “let’s throw everything into the kitchen sink” quality that compromises its effectiveness as a planning tool. The Strategic Concept should be a roadmap of the Alliance’s security and defense policy, its operational doctrines, conventional and nuclear forces deployment rules and collective defense policy. The current unstable world calls also for asymmetric needs other than collective defense only. The Alliance with a functional credible strategy is predicted to be a stable force in the creation of a continent without any divisions, by promoting the vision of an indivisible and free Europe. Despite its limitations, however, it appears that NATO leaders are not interested in crafting a new Strategic Concept at this time and the process is just too painful, so most believe. If not revised and updated, NATO’s Strategic Concept will not let the Alliance penetrate deep into the 21st Century fearlessly, facing all the new challenges and taking the advantage of playing a key role in the Euro-Atlantic security and defense system.

**Conflict in The Balkans and NATO’s Role**

Soon after the victory of the coalition forces in the Persian Gulf, international attention refocused on Europe. In contrast to the issues in the Gulf, the outbreak of conflict in the Balkans did not initially appear directly to threaten either NATO or the vital interests of the Allies (and of the United States in particular). Moreover, even though the breakup of Yugoslavia occurred close to NATO territory, the lack of a direct threat meant it was officially outside NATO’s defensive mandate. After the announcement by the Yugoslav Defence Minister, on 7 May 1991, that Yugoslavia was in a state of civil war, many perceived the conflict in the former Yugoslavia as ‘the hour of Europe’, a view that was shared by the Bush Administration, which encouraged the EU to deal with the crisis. NATO’s initial response, in November 1991, simply urged ‘all parties to cooperate fully with the European Community in its efforts under the mandate given to it by the

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CSCE, both in the implementation of cease-fire monitoring agreements and in the negotiating process within the Conference on Yugoslavia’.\textsuperscript{189} From the outset, managing the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia was seen not as NATO’s responsibility but rather as that of the EU. The EU chose to address the crisis through diplomacy, in the form of a series of peace missions representing the presidency, followed by civilian monitors. These diplomatic measures were complemented by agreement to contribute to an intervention force to be employed in operations for which the UN had overall responsibility. The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was set up in February 1992.

Despite European attempts to manage hostilities, the magnitude of the Yugoslav crises very quickly revealed that the EU was far from being the capable security actor that the proclamation of ‘the hour of Europe’ suggested. The Balkans represented one of the most intractable set of problems in Europe: the CFSP was still embryonic, the EU, unlike the United States, had little international standing beyond its members’ territories, its decision-making processes were incoherent, as shown by the initial failure to formulate a common policy over the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, it lacked diplomatic experience and, once a common position had been reached and a diplomatic approach initiated, the WEU did not have adequate military capability to conduct operations without the support of the United States. This last issue was very serious, as it quickly became clear that, unless diplomacy was backed by force, it would fail. A general lack of appreciation of the scale of the unfolding crisis contributed to the difficulties the EU faced. In conjunction with the weaknesses of the EU’s approach to the crisis, it became apparent that the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and the UN were also incapable of resolving the conflict. The failings of EU decision-making processes, the inadequacies of alternative institutions and the necessity of a diplomatic and military contribution from the United States meant NATO emerged as the most effective vehicle to address the conflict. Even though France initially blocked NATO’s involvement in the former Yugoslavia, because it perceived its role as encroaching on the sort of contingency envisioned for a potential European military capability, it eventually conceded that only NATO, with its capacity for facilitating joint planning and inter-operability, could manage the crisis.

In contrast to the rapid response to the Gulf crisis, these influences ensured that NATO’s involvement in the Balkans was gradual, a regrettable characteristic of the crisis.\textsuperscript{190} NATO’s involvement in the former Yugoslavia began in 1992, with NATO performing limited supporting roles to the UN. The NAC, meeting in Helsinki in July 1992, implemented Operation Maritime


\textsuperscript{190} In Retrospect, Owen comments ‘if the EC had launched a political initiative in August 1991 to address the key problem facing the parties to the dispute...if in addition NATO had been ready to enforce that cease-fire as well as provide peacekeeping forces for immediate deployment...the Serbo-Croat war would have been stopped in its tracks’. David Owen, \textit{Balkans Odyssey}, London, Victor Gollanez, 1995, p. 342.
Monitor to monitor the UN arms embargo and economic sanctions in the Adriatic. NATO’s Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) was subsequently mobilized. Operation Maritime Monitor became Operation Maritime Guard in November 1992, which indicated a shift from observation to implementation. Thus, for the first time, NATO was ready to use force to implement a UNSC Resolution. One month earlier, in October 1992, NATO air operations had begun. Operation Sky Monitor observed the no-fly zone over Bosnia and in April 1993, NATO activated Operation Deny Flight, which enforced it. Operation Deny Flight eventually resulted in NATO’s first-ever combat action, when two American F-16s shot down four Bosnian Serb Caleb aircraft. NATO’s role in the air increased in Operation Deliberate Force of August 1995, a three-week graduated campaign of air strikes against Bosnian Serb military targets.

NATO’s involvement in the Balkans began in 1992 with sea, air and ground operations carried out under the authority of the UNSC and peaked with the use of air power against Serbia in March 1999 without a UN mandate. In managing the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia through non-Article 5 missions of crisis management, peacemaking and peacekeeping, NATO “shifted from the role of a ‘subcontractor’ responding to UN requirements to a more active participant in seeking to stop the fighting and in defining its own mission and mandates.”¹⁹¹ In 2004, thirteen years after the outbreak of conflict in the Balkans, NATO retains a presence, albeit a scaled-down one, which continues to affirm the importance of its role in the region.

The 1999 Campaign

Throughout the 1990s, the UN had mandated NATO’s interventions in the Balkans. By the late 1990s, however, a lack of consensus in the UNSC caused the most controversial phase of NATO’s involvement in the former Yugoslavia. Violence in Kosovo, a Yugoslav province predominantly populated by ethnic Albanians, erupted in 1998, as a result of the Serbian government’s policy of ethnic cleansing and the expulsion of over 300,000 ethnic Albanians from Kosovo. During 1998 the violence escalated and threatened to spread throughout the Balkans.¹⁹² The Serbian government refused to comply with demands from the international community to withdraw its troops from Kosovo, end its repression of ethnic Albanians and allow refugees to return to their homes and it seemed that the ethnic cleansing campaigns that had occurred in Bosnia and Croatia would be repeated in Kosovo. The moral imperatives of intervention, springing from an awareness of the consequences of inaction, resulted in Operation Allied Force. This operation, which ran from 24 March to 10 June 1999, was an air war against Serbian targets. Its most controversial aspect was that, unlike other NATO interventions, it was self-authorized rather than UN-mandated, resulting from the failure of the UNSC to agree on the

intervention, primarily due to Russian and Chinese opposition. After 78 days, the Serbian government finally backed down, resulting in the eventual withdrawal of Serbian military and paramilitary forces and the return of ethnic Albanians to Kosovo.

Following the end of Operation Allied Force, a Kosovo Force (KFOR) arrived on 12 June 1999, to enforce and keep the peace. Unlike Operation Allied Force, the KFOR operated, and continues to operate, under a UN mandate and from a military-technical agreement signed by NATO and Yugoslav commanders. The KFOR’s objectives are to establish and maintain a secure environment in Kosovo, including public safety and order, monitoring, verifying and when necessary, enforcing compliance with the agreements that ended the conflict and to assist the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), including core civil functions until these are transferred to UNMIK.

In the early part of 2004, violence once again erupted in Kosovo. NATO responded by deploying additional troops from its operational and strategic reserves, to ensure that KFOR had the resources necessary to continue to stabilize the region. At present, KFOR’s mission is of indefinite duration, a feature that was reflected by the statement issued by NATO leaders at their meeting in Istanbul in June 2004, confirming that KFOR’s presence is still essential to enhance security and promote the political process in Kosovo.193

**NATO Missions in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia**

In addition to IFOR, SFOR and KFOR, NATO has also conducted a series of missions in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). NATO’s missions began on 22 August 2001, with Operation Essential Harvest, which, at the request of the Macedonian government, saw 3500 troops sent to the FYROM to disarm ethnic Albanian groups and destroy their weapons. Following this month-long operation, which ended on 26 September 2001, NATO began Operation Amber Fox. This operation had the specific mandate to contribute to the protection of the international monitors overseeing the implementation of a peace plan. The requirement for a continuing military presence in the FYROM, in order to minimize the risks of destabilization, resulted in Operation Allied Harmony, which was agreed on 16 December 2002. Operation Allied Harmony was taken over by the EU on 31 March 2003.

**The Implementation Force**

NATO’s involvement in the former Yugoslavia deepened after the U.S.-brokered General Framework Agreement for Peace, also known as the Dayton Peace Accord, was signed on 14 December 1995. The NATO-led multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) was subsequently created. Following UNSC Resolution 1031 of 15 December 1995, which authorized IFOR’s mission, IFOR began deploying to Bosnia Herzegovina on 16 December 1995 to implement the military provisions of the Accord. UNPROFOR handed over command of military operations in Bosnia to IFOR on 20 December 1995. IFOR’s military mission was three-fold: to secure an end to fighting, to separate the forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s two newly created entities and to demobilize their heavy weapons and forces and to transfer territory between these two entities. These three tasks were completed by 27 June 1996.

IFOR also contributed to the civilian aspects of the Dayton Peace Accord. Without a secure environment, political and civil reconstruction would have been seriously hindered, so IFOR’s implementation of the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Accord was a crucial first step. IFOR also cooperated closely with governmental and non-governmental organizations and offered support services to these bodies, including transport assistance, emergency accommodation, medical treatment and evacuation, as well as restoring telecommunications and electricity, gas and water supplies.

Although all NATO nations contributed to the IFOR, it was more than simply a NATO operation. From the outset, non-NATO forces were integrated into the unified command structure to work alongside those from NATO. By the end of the 60,000-strong IFOR mission, 18 non-NATO countries were participating; of which 14 were part of the PfP programme.194

The deployment of the IFOR and achievement of its objectives resulted in a far more stable environment. However, there was widespread recognition that the situation would continue to be unstable and there was an ongoing need for support, once IFOR’s mission had been completed. This resulted in the creation of a smaller Stabilization Force (SFOR), which replaced the IFOR in December 1996.

The SFOR’s mission contribute to a secure environment by providing a continued military presence in the Area Of Responsibility (AOR), target and co-ordinate SFOR support to key areas including primary civil implementation organizations, and progress toward a lasting consolidation of peace, without further need for NATO-led forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina’. The mission has evolved and today the SFOR is also responsible for tasks as diverse as contributing to the reform of the Bosnian

194 Of the PfP countries Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, The Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Sweden, and Ukraine contributed forces. Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia, and Morocco also participated.
military, seeking out war crimes suspects in order to bring them to justice and helping refugees and other displaced people return to their homes.

Like IFOR, the SFOR has great diversity in its composition. Although NATO has provided the majority of the forces, the number of non-NATO countries that have participated is greater than the total number of NATO countries. Participating non-NATO countries have included those that are part of NATO’s partnership and outreach programmes, as well as countries that are far removed from NATO’s territory and have no link with them, such as Argentina, New Zealand and Australia.
CHAPTER 3
SEPTEMBER 11TH AND NATO’S NEW SECURITY THREATS
Until 2001, managing the conflict in the Balkans had absorbed the vast majority of NATO’s attention. In September 2001, however, a new challenge emerged, which has since dominated the agenda. On the morning of 11 September 2001, nineteen terrorists, who were later identified as members of the al-Qaida network, hijacked, almost simultaneously, four commercial aircraft from Dulles, Newark and Boston airports. Two of the planes were flown into the World Trade Center in New York, causing its Twin Towers later to collapse, the third ploughed into the Pentagon in Washington, DC, and the fourth, which is now believed to have been heading for either the US Capitol or the White House, crashed in a field in western Pennsylvania, after resistance by its passengers. Despite conflicting reports of the number of casualties in the immediate aftermath, the sheer scale of these coordinated actions made it clear that they were by far the most devastating terrorist attacks in American history and the most dramatic since the bombing of Pearl Harbor.

In the following hours and days, countries around the world rallied around the United States and gave an unprecedented demonstration of support and solidarity. NATO’s response was particularly striking. On the evening of 11 September, the NAC met to discuss the terrorist attacks and released a statement expressing its solidarity with the United States. Most significantly, on 12 September, NATO invoked the principle of Article 5 for the first time in its history, which was an extremely rapid response, given that NATO works by consensus. The unprecedented invocation of the principle of Article 5 was not suggested by the United States. The irony of NATO’s response to 9/11 was profound on three levels: Article 5 was invoked as a response to an attack on the continental United States rather than on the territory of a European Ally, the impetus for the invocation of Article 5 came from a NATO Ally on behalf of the United States, not from the United States in defense of a NATO Ally, as had been expected throughout the Cold War and the invocation was a response to a terrorist attack by a non-state actor, rather than to a conventional military attack by a state. This was a defining moment for NATO. The only condition that was stipulated when NATO invoked the principle of Article 5 was that it would only be confirmed if and when it were proven that the terrorist attacks against the United States had been directed from abroad. The Allies agreed that this provision should be present to avoid the potentially disastrous situation of having invoked Article 5 in response to attacks that could have been carried out by nationals of a NATO member state, or even of the United States itself.

On 2 October 2001, in a statement to the press following a series of briefings by U.S. officials, the NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson announced that investigations had revealed compelling evidence that the al-Qaida terrorist network, headed by Osama bin Laden and protected by the Taleban regime in Afghanistan, was responsible for the terrorist attacks against the United States and that as such,

196 It originated from a telephone conversation between the NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson and the British Prime Minister Tony Blair. J. Medcalf, ‘NATO, a beginner’s guide’, 2005, p.32.
the attacks had clearly been directed from abroad. The invocation of NATO’s Article 5 provision of collective defense was confirmed on 2 October, for the first time in NATO’s history.

In the days following the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, DC and the invocation of the principle of Article 5 there were reports that NATO had begun planning a retaliatory military response;\(^{197}\) claims that were quickly denied by NATO officials.\(^{198}\) Once the invocation had been confirmed, however, NATO took a number of unprecedented steps. On 4 October, at the request of the United States, Lord Robertson announced that eight measures both of individual and collective nature would be taken by NATO, to expand the options available in the campaign against terrorism. The eight measures were: to enhance intelligence sharing and co-operation, both bilaterally and in the appropriate NATO bodies, relating to the threats posed by terrorism and the actions to be taken against it; to provide, individually or collectively, as appropriate and according to their capabilities, assistance to the Allies and other states which are or may be subject to increased terrorist threats as a result of their support for the campaign against terrorism; to take necessary measures to provide increased security for facilities of the United States and other Allies on their territory; to back-fill selected Allied assets in NATO’s area of responsibility that are required to directly support operations against terrorism; to provide blanket over-flight clearances for the United States and other Allies’ aircraft, in accordance with the necessary air traffic arrangements and national procedures, for military nights related to operations against terrorism and to provide access for the United States and other Allies to ports and airfields on the territory of NATO nations for operations against terrorism, including for refueling, in accordance with national procedures. In addition, the NAC agreed that the Alliance was ready to deploy elements of its Standing Naval Forces to the Eastern Mediterranean to provide a NATO presence and demonstrate resolve, and that the Alliance was similarly ready to deploy elements of the NAEW (NATO Airborne Early Warning) force to support operations against terrorism.\(^{199}\)

In what came to be a significant remark, Lord Robertson said that it should not be assumed that these measures meant that NATO would automatically be involved in collective military action but that it was ‘open to the United States to act on its own, or to do so in association with any group of states’.\(^{200}\)

On 8 October, NATO’s response to 9/11 deepened, when Lord Robertson confirmed the United States’

\(^{197}\) The most striking example of this was a report in the *Guardian* on 13 September, which described how ‘NATO is now drawing up an emergency plan for a massive attack on Afghanistan if proof emerges that Osama bin Laden, the wanted Saudi-born terrorist, sheltered by Afghanistan, was responsible for the attacks’. See Julian Borger, Richard Norton-Taylor, Ewen MacAskill and Ian Black, ‘US Rallies the West for Attack on Afghanistan’, *The Guardian*, 13 September 2001.

\(^{198}\) A NATO spokesman quickly denied the story and said that the Guardian story was based on ‘unfounded speculations’ and that ‘NATO is not planning the invasion of Afghanistan, or of any other country, as suggested by the Guardian’s article’. See NATO Press Release, 13 September 2001, p.125.


request for five AWACS and their crews to deploy to the United States to patrol the skies of New York and Washington D.C., a move that was widely assumed to enable the specialized American surveillance aircraft that had been performing this mission to be deployed elsewhere. On 9 October, two AWACS aircraft deployed to the continental United States from Geilenkirchen in Germany and three more flew to the U.S. in the following days. This response was entitled Operation Eagle Assist. In addition to these unprecedented steps, elements of NATO naval assets that had been on exercise off the coast of Spain were re-assigned to the Eastern Mediterranean. The Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED), which consisted of nine ships, from eight NATO countries, reinforced NATO’s presence in the Eastern Mediterranean through Operation Active Endeavour. From this time onward, NATO began to perform its first operational role in an Article 5 context in and around Europe, and also in the United States.

**NATO’s Central Role After 9/11**

In the weeks following 9/11 there was neither resistance to the measures NATO took nor great concern about the way in which the United States initially dealt with the crisis. NATO’s bold steps seemed to indicate that it was more robust than ever and that the Allies had perhaps found the unity of purpose and vision that had arguably been weakened since the loss of its raison d’etre. As the war against terrorism progressed, however, this positive reading of NATO’s role was revealed to be misleading.

The United States responded to the attacks by launching Operation Enduring Freedom on 7 October 2001. Operation Enduring Freedom was a series of military strikes against the Taleban leadership and al-Qaida forces in Afghanistan, conducted with support from the United Kingdom. It was expected that the United States would take the lead in responding to the terrorist attacks because it was they who had been attacked and few were surprised that only the United Kingdom operated in a supporting role from the outset. This was not simply due to the ‘special relationship’ between the UK and the U.S. but also because the UK was the only country with military assets that the U.S. could use and because of its comparatively rapid politico-military decision-making process. However, it soon became clear that, in spite of the virtually unconditional nature of the remaining Allies’ offers of military assistance, the United States would initially pursue an essentially unilateral military campaign. The U.S. concentrated its requests for help from the NATO Allies to information-sharing and intelligence. When the United States did request military assistance, it only asked some NATO Allies for limited and very specific tasks and some for nothing at all. The U.S.’ reluctance to engage

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201 On 4 February 2003, Operation Active Endeavour was extended to include escorting non-military ships travelling through the Strait of Gibraltar and to secure the safe transit of selected NATO ships. The operation was expanded to the whole of the Mediterranean on 16 March 2004.

202 See, for example, Antony J. Blinken and Philip H. Gordon, ‘NATO is Ready to Play a Central Role’, *International Herald Tribune*, 18 September 2001.
NATO as an institution in the first months of the war against terrorism was perceived by many as being highly problematic. One analyst suggested: ‘in the elaborate dance being conducted over European participation in the U.S. war in Afghanistan the steps are as follows: the Europeans pretend that they want to send troops to Afghanistan, the Americans pretend that they want them there and all participants have to pretend that the dance is taking place to the music of NATO [...] If NATO were revealed to be completely irrelevant to the greatest security crisis of the era, some wicked dissidents might really begin to wonder why it is still around’.\textsuperscript{203} Colin Powell’s comment that ‘not every ally is fighting but every ally is in the fight’\textsuperscript{204} was not sufficient to address the concerns that had been raised. By early November 2001, the NATO Allies were playing a more active role in the operation in Afghanistan, partly as a result of British lobbying of the United States, yet their contribution remained limited. Significantly, their participation did not adequately address some of the questions that had been raised about NATO’s peripheral role, its apparent inability to respond to the security threats highlighted by 9/11 and the subsequent implications for its relevance and long-term vitality.

The answer of many of the above problems was provided for NATO by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on New York and Washington. Collective self-defense, the traditional task of the Alliance for which it was created, moved centre stage again, or so it seemed. Before September 11, fighting terrorism, if ever it was mentioned,\textsuperscript{205} had never been considered a main task of the Alliance. Immediately after this date, however, it became central,\textsuperscript{206} and the Alliance enacted eight measures in support of the United States.

NATO’s presence in the Mediterranean to guard against terrorist attacks on commercial shipping (Operation Active Endeavour) manifests that the reaction to September 11 continues to this day. The operation was extended to cover the whole Mediterranean after the Madrid terrorist attacks of 11 March 2004\textsuperscript{207} (previously it had covered only the eastern half). NATO claims that it has, inter alia, reduced the cost of maritime insurance in the Mediterranean by 20 per cent.\textsuperscript{208} Other similar initiatives, for example against the transport of WMD material along the tines of the U.S. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), are not ruled out.\textsuperscript{209}

\textsuperscript{204} Cited in Robin Wright, ‘NATO Promises Cohesive Stand Against Terrorism’, \textit{Los Angeles Times}, 7 December 2001.
However, there are many signs that using it to combat terrorism was a rather untypical case of self-defense\textsuperscript{210} owed to a unique set of circumstances.\textsuperscript{211} Its invocation in response to September 11 has even on occasion been called ‘a mistake’.\textsuperscript{212} Indeed, for the main campaign against the Taliban in autumn of 2001, the U.S. did not need NATO resources at all, and it chose not to employ them, because it wanted to avoid repeating the Kosovo experience of waging a ‘war by committee’.\textsuperscript{213} When a useful role for NATO in Afghanistan was eventually found, it was in peacekeeping, after the hardest part of the fighting had been done by U.S. forces. This, however, is precisely not an Art. 5 task.\textsuperscript{214} The idea promoted by the United States and the United Kingdom that NATO should have the ability to intervene in cases of Art. 5 anywhere on the globe\textsuperscript{215} cannot detrxact from the fact that, apart from some very restricted tasks, NATO was not used under Art. 5, in Afghanistan, nor anywhere else, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11.

Prague Summit and NATO’s Commitment to Transformation

The NATO heads of state and government met for a summit in Prague, November 21, 2002, which naturally had been scheduled far in advance. The summit was initially thought of as an enlargement summit because the question of whom to include as new members had aroused much suspense. However, in the long run-up to the Prague summit, through 2002, the enlargement issue lost significance as it became obvious to most observers that the United States would favor a large enlargement with seven countries, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, and the three Baltic states, and that NATO as a whole would back this policy.\textsuperscript{216} Instead Prague became known as the “transformation” summit, providing an occasion for NATO members to do away with the very broad and multifaceted organization that had developed through the 1990s, and which had come to dominate the Strategic Concept from April 1999, and instead focus the organization on the combat against new asymmetrical threats, terrorism notable among them. At Prague, NATO was about to broaden its geographical scope but more importantly, it was about to transform itself from a blunt to a sharp military instrument.

The specific items on the menu for change is examined in the discussion below; here we simply focus on the fact that NATO managed to muster the political will to endorse the transformation


\textsuperscript{213} H. Neuhold, \textit{Transatlantic Turbulences: Rift or Ripples?}, 8 EFAR, 2003, p. 457 at 464.


\textsuperscript{215} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 241-2.

\textsuperscript{216} European Union, \textit{European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defense}, see paragraph 1 of this annex III to the Presidency Conclusions from the Cologne summit, June 3-4, 1999.
agenda. The first paragraph of the Prague Declaration contains the following: “Bound by our common vision embodied in the Washington Treaty, we commit ourselves to transforming NATO with new members, new capabilities and new relationships with our partners.” The three aspects of transformation were more specifically:

1. New members: this consisted of inviting the seven aforementioned countries to join the Alliance. They were all participants in the Membership Action Plan (MAP) for potential candidates that NATO had established in 1999 as part of its “open door policy” although, naturally, decisions to enlarge would be made by consensus and on a case-by-case basis.

2. New capabilities: this was the key to transformation, and the transformation agenda consisted of seven items (which will be enumerated here and assessed further below):
   - A rapid and advanced NATO Response Force (NRF);
   - A streamlined command structure;
   - A new force planning mechanism, the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC);
   - A military concept for defense against terrorism;
   - Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons initiatives;
   - Strengthened capabilities against cyber attacks;
   - Missile defense.

3. New partners: this was an invitation to a range of countries—from Albania, Macedonia, and Croatia to the Ukraine and Central Asian states—to cooperate closely with NATO. Of critical importance was the relationship to Russia, which in May 2002 was upgraded with the creation of a NATO-Russia Council that replaced the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) of 1997 and in which Russia would be seated among NATO nations (“NATO at 20”), rather than at the other side of the table (“19 plus 1”), and in which NATO nations would deliberate with Russia rather than presenting it with an already agreed-to NATO position. The new Council did not have competences to examine territorial defense issues and issues related to NATO’s military structure but its competences were broad and more substantial than those of the PJC. In relation to its full range of partners, NATO decided to strengthen the EAPC, adopting recommendations following a “comprehensive review”

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presented at Prague. The renewed EAPC now includes, in addition to the instruments enumerated in chapter 3, Partnership Action Plans (PAP), the first two of which focus on terrorism (PAP-T) and defense institution building (PAP-DIB). These issues, as well as the effort to emphasize liaisons and individual partnership programs, reflect the changing geographical focus of NATO’s partnership program: away from Eastern Europe (now NATO members) and toward the diverse nations of the Caucasuses and Central Asia.  

The Prague summit was meant to display political unity and the United States did manage to obtain a substantial endorsement of its transformation policy because no one could be in doubt that the agenda was an American one and that European allies militarily were challenged to catch up in terms of budgets, organizational reform, and political focus. However, the Prague summit did not efface an underlying concern about whether the United States really wanted to invest in the alliance whether it believed it was worthwhile to invest in European reforms and whether the endorsement of it was serious or symbolic. Some in Europe feared that Washington was marginalizing NATO politically and that the reforms introduced in fact would make it easier for the United States to pick-and-choose military assistance in Europe, again undermining the cohesion of NATO; others believed that the transformation agenda represented Europe’s only chance of securing Washington’s serious interest in the Alliance because in the absence of transformation, Washington would consider NATO irrelevant. Prague was therefore above all a promise of unity and it was left to the future to show whether the will to unite was strong enough to anchor coalitions in a common political and organizational framework in which national decisions are guided by common visions and operational implementation take place via renewed (transformed) collective mechanisms for action. In other words, the promise of Prague was not so much that NATO would act in unison but that coalitions would be tied into a common framework.

The Prague promise could be seen optimistically to involve a change of track in U.S. policy: that the United States henceforth would act as a “framework nation” rather than as a “lead-nation” providing the muscle in terms of troops and command infrastructures to implement collectively arrived at policies and to substantiate important but insufficient collective capabilities. However, the United States has preferred the lead-nation model, making decisions in Washington and using a U.S. military infrastructure that willing allies could plug into, and sometimes they could not plug into it even when they tried to. This conception of cooperation tended to clash with the conception espoused by some allies, France and Germany notable among them. These countries defined flexibility in tactical terms, thus granting that the execution of policy could take place in

220 Hubert Vedrine, “France: le piano ou le tabouret?,” Le Debat. no. 95 (May August), p. 165-182.
221 Tony Blair, Prime Minister’s Speech at the NATO 50th Anniversary Conference, March 8, 1999.
222 Cogan, The Third Option, 119 and 134.
coalitions, but insisted on unity at the strategic level where decisions were made. Thus, the United States should work through the UN Security Council and the NAC before its unrivaled military might could be legitimately unleashed. It was, as Robert Kagan noted, a clash of multilateral conceptions, and it harmed NATO in several ways.

The 2003 Iraq War and Transatlantic Crisis

The 2003 Iraq War raised additional questions about NATO’s future vitality. This war was the ‘perfect storm’ for transatlantic relations, as it combined many of the issues that have divided the Allies, including the use of military force versus diplomacy, strategies to deal with ‘rogue’ states and the role and influence of the UN. Moreover, whilst after Operation Desert Storm there had been a consensus about how to deal with Iraq; gradual policy divergence among NATO Allies emerged during the 1990s. A transatlantic dispute over Iraq was inevitable.

Even before 9/11, the Bush Administration’s more robust stance toward Iraq had been identifiable. Following 9/11, however, the challenge of dealing with Iraq became ever more pressing. The diplomatic build-up to the Iraq War, which lasted over a year, revealed serious differences in policy preferences and strategies between the Allies and members of the wider international community. The divisions among the NATO Allies were often portrayed as a breach between the United States and others, when in fact the real split was within the transatlantic community as a whole. The letters written by those countries in favor of the Iraq War illustrate this. The leaders of the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom sent a letter to the Wall Street Journal in January 2003, expressing their support for the United States, without consulting other European countries such as France and Germany.223 One week later, Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia did likewise.224 This demonstrates not only the divisive nature of the Iraq War but also the fact that the divisions caused were not a simple split between the United States and other existing and some soon-to-be NATO members.

As in the 1991 Gulf War, NATO was not directly involved in the 2003 Iraq War. However, a parallel to the 1991 Iraq War was that NATO would have to respond to the prospect of war in Iraq because of the potential defense implications for Turkey. This issue provoked a crisis in the Alliance and paralyzed NATO.

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In February 2003, Turkey officially requested that NATO begin preparation for its defense in the event of a war with Iraq by providing AWACS, Patriot anti-missile batteries and anti-biological and anti-chemical warfare units. This request provoked a crisis in NATO, as France, Germany and Belgium refused to agree to Turkey’s request. Their reason was that they held the view that beginning to provide support to Turkey before discussions in the UNSC had been concluded would pre-judge their outcome. Without consensus between the Allies, NATO was unable to begin taking defensive measures for Turkey. On 10 February 2003, Turkey requested the invocation of the Article 4 provision of consultation, in the hope that it would resolve the situation, yet there was still no agreement among the Allies. The disagreement about the appropriate response policy coordination beyond collective defense matters, the disappearance of the specific threat that triggered the Alliance’s formation, the Soviet Union, did not lead to its atrophy.  

Operation Desert Storm, for example, showed that NATO’s traditional role of collective defense was still relevant, in spite of the end of bipolar confrontation and even though the circumstances in which NATO responded were very different to those that had been expected during the Cold War. More importantly, NATO’s ability to transfer its diverse non-defensive competencies to a non-European context through helping in the co-ordination of a military operation in the Gulf added weight to the arguments of proponents of an ongoing role for NATO in the post-Cold War world. Fear of losing the benefits of NATO’s formal and virtual roles was a key factor in ensuring its survival. More than a decade of conflict in the Balkans has re-emphasized this result. Although NATO was not initially perceived as the obvious choice of military instrument, it eventually proved to be crucial for managing the conflicts and indeed to be the only institution that could stabilize the Balkans.

The Weaknesses of NATO’s Post-Cold War Interventions

Despite the strengths NATO demonstrated in the Gulf and the Balkans, an important point is that the conflicts that consolidated NATO’s role exposed some of its internal weaknesses, which can be demonstrated in three areas: the difficulties of defining NATO’s strategic priorities, the increasing complexity of the decision-making process and, once a consensus has been reached, the weaknesses of NATO’s collective military capabilities.

The first internal weakness has been the impact of the progressive decline in the commonality of shared risks and, as a result, an increasing gap in the strategic priorities of the Allies. The conflict in the Balkans was particularly indicative in this respect. Yugoslavia provides the first genuine example of a European crisis in which the Europeans wanted to take action and the United States

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did not.\textsuperscript{226} This not only showed that there was no longer a guarantee of American underwriting of and intervention in European security but also that the main reason for this was that, post-Cold War, European security problems no longer affected the North American Allies in the same way nor to the same extent as the remaining European Allies. There was obviously a difference in the vulnerability of the Allies to the Soviet threat during the Cold War, yet the removal of this threat, in conjunction with the outbreak of conflict in Europe, widened the existing gap. As the following chapter will show, this trend has had important implications for the debates surrounding the development of NATO’s non-Article 5 missions.

The impact of 9/11 and the conclusions that have been drawn by the Allies are perhaps more encouraging, and it is possible that 9/11 reversed the trend of increasing strategic divergence by presenting a threat that will perhaps unite the Allies. The publication of the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States in 2002 and the EU’s response in the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003 demonstrated that there is an increasingly common assessment of the threats facing the Allies. However, it is far from certain whether the NATO Allies see themselves as being affected in the same way and to the same extent as the United States, given the reality of a post-9/11 United States ‘at war’ as opposed to other Allies, who perceive themselves as less affected by international terrorism. Broadly convergent threat perception - even though it has never been total convergence - has traditionally been the foundation of NATO. If the threat perception becomes too wide, then NATO faces considerable potential problems.

Even if the threat of international terrorism represents a new unifying force for the Allies, there remains a lack of consensus about the precise role NATO could and should play in addressing this threat and indeed about the strategies that should be employed. The conclusions of the NSS and the ESS are revealing, as they appear to take different approaches. Moreover, as tackling international terrorism requires a multifaceted response, including accurate intelligence and vigilant law enforcement and immigration services, as well as other methods, such as border patrols, many argue that NATO’s largely military competencies are ill-suited to a campaign in which military force is a component of a solution rather than a solution in itself.

Reaching a consensus about the nature and extent of the threats facing NATO and agreeing on the appropriate response, as well as minimizing the damage to NATO when such consensus is difficult to reach (as during the 2003 Iraq War), are important hurdles for NATO. Once agreement has been reached a further internal weakness that has been evident in NATO’s post-Cold War operations is its military capabilities. As noted in the introduction, a military capabilities gap existed throughout the Cold War but its operational impact was minimal, because NATO was

\textsuperscript{226} Ibid., 125.
never called upon to act. However, the operational demands placed on NATO since the end of
the Cold War have caused this issue to become one of its central challenges.

Military capabilities were the most important influence in NATO’s limited response to 9/11. Much
discussion of the United States’ response to the invocation of Article 5 has focused either on how
the U.S. did not wish to conduct a ‘war by committee’ by having to reach a consensus of
eighteen Allies before acting, or on how the necessity of avoiding adding substance to claims of a
‘clash of civilisations’ between the Islamic world and the West ruled out a NATO role. These two
elements partly explain the United States’ response. However, the most important influence on
the U.S. decision not to engage NATO, beyond defensive measures in and around Europe and in
the continental United States, was the disinclination to be tied down in decision-making processes
with eighteen Allies whose military capabilities were simply not useful, thereby running the risk
of restricting the United States’ room for maneuver and wasting valuable military planning time.
Whilst they did not wish the invocation of Article 5 to be an empty gesture, American officials
indicated that there was no great enthusiasm to conduct retaliatory military operations
through the NATO integrated command structure when there were alternative - and more
effective - ways to work.

Military capability has not only brought into question the role NATO can play in the future but
it has also caused serious disputes among the Allies on the course and conduct of NATO
operations. For example, the military inadequacies of the Allies during NATO’s Balkan
interventions caused the United States’ contribution to be disproportionately large. One
implication of this was that the US assumed that it would enjoy a degree of political authority
matching its military commitment. As one American commander has commented during the
Kosovo campaign: ‘It’s my evaluation that NATO cannot go to war in the air against a competent
enemy without the United States. If that’s the case, and we’re going to provide 70 per cent of the
effort [...] then we need to have more than one of nineteen votes.’ The remaining Allies
robustly disputed the United States’ assumption of leadership, which provoked damaging
disputes about the course and conduct of Operation Allied Force. This led to claims by the United
States of a ‘war by committee’ and by the remaining Allies of American dominance. NATO’s
interventions in the Balkans raised significant questions about the sustainability of the military
imbalance in NATO and the impact of this on the cohesion of the Alliance.

NATO Goes Outside Europe

227 ‘General wanted to call the shots in Kosovo’, Public Information Office, Regional Headquarters AFSOUTH, 27 January 2000.
Apart from the very large operation in Kosovo, smaller elements left in the EU’s peacekeeping mission *Althea* in Bosnia after its hand-over, and the occasional AWACS protection for international sporting events such as the Greek Olympics in September 2004, NATO’s activities on the ground are all outside Europe today. In Afghanistan, the Alliance continues to conduct a demanding peacekeeping operation with many different elements, including some contingents of the NRF. ISAF remains ‘the Alliance’s key priority’ today. In post-war Iraq, it has supported the Polish occupation sector, and started to train Iraqi security forces after its Istanbul Summit 2004. Even an engagement in the Middle East is occasionally discussed in public. Viewed from the historical perspective of the Cold War, when out-of-area was out of the question, to the 1990s when it became an imperative but constrained to Europe, to post-September 11, when the Alliance mostly operated outside of Europe, this is a remarkable transformation. Indeed, there are reasons to assume that meeting this ‘extra-European challenge’ will be the key of NATO’s long-term vitality.

During the Cold War, the battleground was Western Europe, yet post-Cold War, the challenges that are likely to threaten NATO’s security are no longer principally found within its traditional borders but are spreading outwards. The nature of the post-Cold War threats has caused the delineation of theatres of conflict to become increasingly blurred. As a result, developments beyond NATO territory are increasingly likely to affect its security. Geographic distance, as a means of security, is being eroded, a conclusion that applies as much to the implications of WMD as it does to the spill-over effects of conflict resulting from political, religious and ethnic enmity or international terrorism. The Allies’ increasing vulnerability to threats originating from beyond its borders is one of the most significant lessons for NATO.

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235 Ibid., p. 249-250.

236 As Lesser comments, ‘the geopolitics of NATO’s southern periphery at the opening of the 21st century suggest a future dominated by security challenges that cut across traditional regional lines. European, Middle Eastern, and Eurasian security will be increasingly interwoven, with implications for the nature of risks facing the Alliance’. Ian O. Lesser, *NATO Looks South. New Challenges and New Strategies in the Mediterranean*, Santa Monica, RAND, 2000, p. 4.
The diversity of the out-of-area concerns that have demanded NATO’s attention in the post-Cold War world has presented a dilemma that did not exist during the Cold War. Because the *raison d’etre* of NATO is no longer found in the shared perception of the monolithic threat of the Soviet Union to the Atlantic and specifically West European, area, prioritizing the threats to the Alliance’s security has become problematic, particularly when the Allies are no longer all affected in the same way or to the same extent.
CHAPTER 4
THE ORIGINAL OBJECTIVES AND HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
Although the European Union has evolved mainly as an economic organization, political and security considerations were of primary importance in its formation. In the aftermath of World War II, many Europeans viewed economic and political integration as a means of ensuring that future war and conflict among the nations of Europe would be impossible. Of particular importance was the need for reconciliation between Germany and France, the two main continental powers and the primary antagonists in three European wars within the previous century. At the same time, integration and the construction of supranational institutions were seen as the best means for integrating into capitalist and democratic Western Europe the new Federal Republic of Germany, which had been formed in 1949 through the fusion of the U.S., British, and French zones of occupation. In this manner, France and the Federal Republic's other neighbors could be sure that a reconstructed and strong Germany would pose no threat to them in the future. This became a particularly important issue with the heating up of the cold war after 1949 and the consequent realization that German economic and military power was needed to bolster the Western security alliance. For the most part, these views were shared by leaders of the new Bonn republic, including its first chancellor, Konrad Adenauer. In addition, German leaders favored integration into Western structures as a means of providing external support for the development of fledgling democratic institutions at home, which otherwise lacked a strong basis in national traditions and political culture. Finally, the efforts of the European countries to integrate and forge supranational ties were strongly supported by the United States, which saw these ties as a way to strengthen the alliance against Soviet expansionism while at the same time providing a more prosperous business and trading partner across the Atlantic.

The Establishment of First Institutions of EU

The institutional development of the present-day EU began with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951. At this time six countries the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, and the Benelux countries, the Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, agreed to place their coal and steel industries under supranational control. In the immediate term this agreement provided an acceptable means for phasing out Allied control of the German coal and steel sectors exercised through the International Ruhr Authority. In the longer run, the agreement was a key step toward achieving broader political goals. Since these industries were generally considered to be the primary basis of national war making power, subjecting them to supranational control would make future war among member countries virtually impossible.

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237 The Treaty of Paris establishing the ECSC was signed in April 1951. After being ratified by the national parliaments of each of the signatory countries, the ECSC came into effect in July 1952.
Through the ECSC, the integration of a rebuilding Germany into the Western community of democratic states could begin, and German industrial power could be harnessed to the anti-Soviet cause. The ECSC also represented an important gesture of solidarity and reconciliation between Germany and France. Finally, it was widely viewed as the basis for further supranational integration, leading to an eventual European political union. A disappointment connected with the establishment of the ECSC was Britain's decision not to join. The London government wanted to preserve national sovereignty and British separateness from the Continent and also saw Britain's interests linked more closely to the United States and the Commonwealth system.

Even more ambitious than the ECSC was the parallel attempt to forge a European defense community. The EDC initiative, initially proposed in October 1950 by France—only months after French foreign minister Robert Schuman's May 1950 announcement of his plan for the ECSC called for the integration of national defense forces and the creation of a common army under a unified command. This proposal was primarily a response to the recognition, in the wake of North Korea's invasion of the South, that German rearmament as a means of bolstering Western defense against the threat of communist expansionism was both necessary and inevitable. Through the EDC, German rearmament could take place within an international framework that would make it more acceptable to France and other European countries. Since defense is a basic function of the state and a key aspect of national sovereignty, the EDC meant, in effect, a fairly significant move in the direction of political union. This, as it turned out, was too big a step for some to take. The EDC treaty was actually signed in 1952 by the six member countries of the ECSC and thereafter ratified by the national parliaments of all but France. It died in August 1954, however, when the French Assembly refused to approve it, reflecting growing sentiment in France that the treaty involved the surrender of too much national sovereignty and independence. In the wake of the EDC's failure, German rearmament was made possible through the integration of the FRG into both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Western European Union (WEU). The latter was a much looser intergovernmental organization for European defense cooperation that had originally been established in 1948; it would, however, prove to be of only limited importance until its revival in the 1980s.

The failure of the EDC convinced proponents of European Union that integration could not take place through ambitious political leaps in sovereignty-sensitive areas but instead had to proceed in a more gradual or incremental fashion, beginning with cooperation in relatively less controversial and visible low politics spheres such as economics. As a result, at a June 1955 conference in Messina (Italy) the six members of the ECSC decided to expand the integration of their economies beyond the coal and steel sectors and create a Common Market through the elimination of all internal tariff barriers to trade between member countries and a customs union for trade with nonmembers. This was the essence of the 1957 Rome Treaty, which established the European Economic Community (EEC). Also signed at this time by the ECSC six was a treaty creating
the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), which was to pool nuclear resources and technology and exercise supranational control over this emerging industry. The institutions of the EEC mirrored the tripartite structure of the ECSC and included an executive commission located in Brussels, a council of ministers representing each of the member states, and a legislative assembly the European Parliament, located in Strasbourg. The EEC, which formally came into existence in 1958, was primarily an economic organization, but it also embodied long-term political goals, with the preamble of the Rome Treaty calling for the creation of an ever closer union” of European states. Once again the government of Britain, opposed to the political union goals of the EEC and favoring instead a looser free trade arrangement, decided not to take part in the negotiations or sign the treaty, opting instead to remain on the outside.

For all of the EEC’s importance as a step toward European Union, it was essentially an exercise in “negative” integration, linking member countries through the joint elimination of barriers to the movement of goods across national borders. With the exception of a common external trade policy, the EEC entailed little in the way of “positive” integration, or the formation of true common policies and supranational institutions. Generally speaking, this remained the case until the early 1990s, with the Maastricht Treaty representing a major departure from this pattern. There was one significant exception to this rule, however, and that was the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Formally established in 1964, although under negotiation since 1958, the CAP was a system for protecting and subsidizing agriculture and involved both a common external tariff and the central determination of prices for European farm products. It is commonly accepted that the CAP was part of the basic bargain struck between Germany and France, the Community’s two largest and most important states, which allowed the formation of the EEC to take place. In return for permitting Germany’s powerful manufacturing industries open access to the French domestic market, where they could compete with France’s generally less efficient manufacturers, the French government gained Bonn’s agreement to help support France’s large and politically important agricultural sector. The CAP, then, is of great significance in the historical evolution of the EC for two reasons: Not only is it a rare example of positive integration in the EC, but it is also one of the core interstate bargains underlying the foundation and existence of the Community.

With the establishment of the EEC, the European movement reached a temporary high point. In the early 1960s, the fledgling Community began to experience a number of problems that slowed down its continued evolution and inhibited progress toward further integration. Chief among these was the assertion of national interests and prerogative by France and its president, Charles de

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239 See, for instance, Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign Policy, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1989, p. 16.
240 Until Maastricht Treaty today’s EU was EC (European Community).
Gaulle. This dynamic began with de Gaulle's veto of Britain's first attempt at entry into the Community in 1963. In the following year, crises erupted over the question of the commission's powers and the issue of majority voting in the Council of Ministers. Basically, de Gaulle objected to any strengthening of the Community's supranational institutions, viewing this as an infringement on the fundamental sovereignty of the French state. Rather than a supranational Community, de Gaulle's vision of European Union was a more loosely structured “Europe of nation-states,” in which individual countries retained their basic identities and sovereignty. To resist enhanced powers for the commission, and to block the planned transition to a system of qualified majority voting within the Council of Ministers, de Gaulle seized on the opportunity presented by a dispute with Germany over CAP grain prices and in July 1965 withdrew French representatives from Community decision-making institutions, the so-called empty chair policy. French participation only resumed with the “Luxembourg compromise” of the following year, whereby member states would retain the right to veto Community policies that threatened what they perceived to be vital national interests. This decision, in effect, preserved the system of unanimity voting within the Community and blocked the EEC's evolution into a more supranational organization.

After the mid-1960s, the Community entered a period of relative stagnation and malaise; despite this, however, important institutional innovations were to occur in the 1970s. By 1968 the transition to the Common Market was completed. The Community also consolidated the parallel institutions of its heretofore three separate organizations—the EEC, the ECSC, and EURATOM; from this point there was the single European Community, with one executive commission, a council of ministers, and the European Parliament. In 1970 the European Political Cooperation (EPC) was launched as a mechanism for foreign policy coordination among EC states. The formation of EPC was to a great extent the result of Germany’s new policy of detente with Eastern Europe and the USSR (“Ostpolitik”) and was intended by both the Federal Republic and its neighbors to ensure against too much German independence in the future. Another new institution created in the 1970s was the European Council, the name given to the regular meetings (summits) of EC heads of government that began in 1974. The council was intended primarily to provide high-level leadership and direction for the Community. Both the European Council and EPC were established outside the EC’s normal (Treaty of Rome) governmental framework, which only served to reinforce the Community’s movement in an intergovernmental direction. Also in the early 1970s, the EC completed its first enlargement. After being vetoed a second time by de Gaulle in 1967, Britain finally gained entry into the EC and along with Ireland and Denmark formally joined the Community in 1973.

The European Monetary System
An important development in the history of the Maastricht Treaty was the establishment of the European Monetary System in 1978-1979.\footnote{For an account of the ten-year process leading from the creation of the EMS to the Maastricht Treaty in 1991, with an emphasis on technical and policy issues, see Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, *The Road to Monetary Union in Europe: The Emperor, the Kings, and the Genies*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994.} This framework for monetary cooperation stabilized economic relations and enhanced integration among EC states, thereby providing the economic and institutional bases for future efforts at full monetary union. Equally important, the EMS signaled a shift in the political balance of power among EC states, particularly between France and Germany. In each of these respects, the creation of the EMS laid the groundwork for the more dramatic initiatives on European economic and monetary integration in the 1980s.

The creation of the EMS followed an earlier unsuccessful attempt by the Community to achieve monetary integration.\footnote{For an account of the EC’s first attempt at EMU, see Loukas Tsoukah’s, *The Politics and Economics of European Monetary Integration*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1977.} At a December 1969 summit, EC leaders, led by German chancellor Willy Brandt and French president Georges Pompidou, called for the study of further steps toward economic and monetary union. This resulted in the so-called Werner Plan, named after the chairman of the working group established by the Council of Ministers, which was submitted in October of the following year. The plan proposed a three-stage process of closer monetary cooperation leading to full EMU. In the first phase, to begin in 1971, the exchange rates of national currencies were to be brought into closer alignment. The fluctuations of intra-Community rates would be limited within fairly narrow bands, with national central banks required to intervene in currency markets to keep exchange rates within the established margins. Externally, the European currencies would jointly fluctuate within a broader band against the U.S. dollar. In the second stage, the European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF) would come into existence to help manage monetary relations and provide medium-term financial assistance to countries experiencing exchange-rate difficulties. There, would also be increased efforts at the coordination of national economic policies. The third stage, to be realized by 1980, would see the creation of full EMU, including the permanent fixing of exchange rates and the establishment of a regional central bank.

The ambitious plans for EMU contained in the Werner report never really got off the ground but were instead quickly overwhelmed by the consequences of international economic and monetary disorder. The initial stage of the EMU plan, the closer alignment of exchange rates within the so-called snake,\footnote{The snake was a mechanism for maintaining narrower margins of exchange-rate fluctuations among European currencies, while European currencies as a block would float against the U.S. dollar.} was originally set to begin in June 1971, but instability in the global monetary system made this move impossible, resulting in a one-year postponement. In August European monetary plans were dealt a further blow by the unilateral U.S. decision to delink the dollar from gold, effectively ending the postwar system of fixed exchange rates (the “Bretton Woods” system).
and preparing the way for a general floating-rate regime. EC countries tried once again in 1972 to align their currencies within the snake, but this new arrangement came under immediate stress as a consequence of continued global economic instability. The EMCF was created in 1973 as planned but was never given significant powers or resources. Instead, by the beginning of 1974 European leaders had capitulated in the face of international economic disorder, and plans for EMU were officially abandoned.

The primary legacy of this first effort at European monetary cooperation was a revised version of the currency snake, which came into existence in March 1972. Initially participating in this arrangement were all nine EC member countries, plus nonmembers Sweden and Norway. Although not formal members of the system, Austria and Switzerland also chose to link their currencies to the snake. This arrangement soon proved to be unworkable, however, in the context of global monetary and economic instability. On top of the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the ensuing U.S. policy of “benign neglect” vis-a-vis the dollar, there were also the recessionary consequences of the 1973-1974 oil shock. In response to the economic crisis, the performance and policies of European countries increasingly diverged. This was due both to the varying strengths of national economies and the different policy preferences of European governments. Germany, with Europe's strongest economy and under the guidance of its independent and stability-oriented central bank, responded with restrictive monetary and fiscal policies aimed at controlling inflation and maintaining a strong national currency (the deutsche mark, or D-mark). Other European governments, however, still under the sway of Keynesian ideas or finding it politically impossible to do otherwise, chose a different course, preferring to emphasize growth and employment through expansionary economic policies.

Divergence in national economic policies and performance was quickly reflected in the path of currency values. Because of the strength of the German economy and the conservative policies of the federal government and Bundesbank, the D-mark quickly established itself as the strongest currency in the snake and steadily gained in value. The currencies of all other European countries, however, tended to depreciate. This meant that to maintain currencies within the required fluctuation bands, other members of the exchange-rate mechanism had to emulate the low-inflation and stability-oriented policies of Germany. This was something that most governments at this time were not able or willing to do, preferring instead to keep export prices competitive and

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244 The Bretton Woods system was established in 1944 as a key part of the U.S.-dominated postwar global order and was based on the U.S. dollar and U.S. economic and financial strength. The dollar was linked to gold and convertible at $35 per ounce, while other national currencies were fixed to the dollar at predetermined rates. Under this “adjustable peg” system of fixed exchange rates the value of national currencies could be moved up or down, but in practice exchange rates remained fairly rigid. Although the Bretton Woods system was certainly not perfect and was rife with internal contradictions and structural flaws that eventually led to its demise, it nevertheless provided for almost twenty-five years a fairly stable institutional framework for international monetary relations, keeping exchange rates relatively constant and creating an atmosphere conducive to the expansion of global trade and economic interdependence.
create more scope for expansionary economic policies. In addition, leaving the snake would avoid the need to deplete precious currency reserves in the effort to defend exchange rates. As a result, throughout the mid-1970s there was a gradual defection of countries from the system. Britain was the first to withdraw in 1972 and was soon followed by Italy and Ireland. In early 1974 France also decided to pull out of the snake. It attempted to rejoin in 1975, only to withdraw once again the following year. By 1977 the snake had contracted into what was essentially a D-mark bloc, the remaining group of small northern European countries being too closely integrated with the German economy to permit a floating of their currencies against the D-mark.\footnote{Marcello De Cecco, "The European Monetary System and National Interests," in Paolo Guerrieri and Piercarlo Padoan, eds., \textit{The Political Economy of European Integration}, New York, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989, p. 88.}

Despite the failure of this initial attempt at EMU, by the late 1970s there was a renewed interest among European governments in monetary cooperation.\footnote{For a detailed study of the events leading to the creation of the EMS, with a particular emphasis on the politics, see Peter Ludlow, \textit{The Making of the European Monetary System}, London, Butterworth, 1982.} A key reason was continued global economic instability. Of particular concern to Europeans, were the effects of unstable and, as they saw it, irresponsible U.S. monetary and economic policies. These had led to a rapid depreciation of the dollar and a fully fledged “dollar crisis,” which in turn generated considerable inflationary pressures for the world economy and volatility in international currency markets. The resulting exchange-rate instability among European currencies posed a real threat to trade relations among the interdependent EC economies. In particular, the German government was concerned about the impact of U.S. monetary policy on the relationship between European currencies; while the D-mark appreciated sharply in response to the dollar crisis, other national currencies declined in value as they tended to follow the course of the dollar. This led to a growing divergence in the values of the D-mark and other European currencies, posing a severe threat to German exports in an area where Germany conducted more than half of its trade. As a result, there was a growing German interest in forming a regional zone of monetary and economic stability that would shield, to the greatest extent possible, intra-European trade relations from the disruptive effects of U.S. policies and global instability.\footnote{Hanrieder, \textit{Germany, America, Europe}, p. 299-306.}

A second major development favoring European monetary cooperation in the late 1970s was the emergence of a new transnational consensus on economic and monetary policy. Basically, there was a growing acceptance by other EC governments of the German preference for low inflation and stability over growth and maximization of employment. While the conversion to German economic and monetary norms was taking place throughout Europe, of particular importance was the change of attitude in France, where traditional growth-oriented policies were giving way to a more conservative monetarist outlook. Beginning in 1976, under the leadership of President Valery Giscard d’Estaing and his prime minister, Raymond Barre, the French government reversed the
expansionary policies of the previous two years, which had weakened the franc and forced it out of the snake, and instituted a program of economic austerity. This shift in French policy, and the conversion of French political authorities to a German-type monetary philosophy, in turn helped pave the way for close Franco-German cooperation in forging a new institutional framework for European monetary coordination.

The renewed effort to achieve monetary integration began in October 1977, with proposals made by European Commission president Roy Jenkins. Jenkins appealed specifically to Germany for leadership, citing the exemplary character of German policies and institutional arrangements. The initial response to this plea was generally negative among officials of the Bundesbank and Finance Ministry; Chancellor Helmut Schmidt remained cautious and noncommittal. By early 1978, however, Schmidt had decided to move and communicated to both Jenkins and French President d'Estaing his own ideas on European monetary cooperation. These were then endorsed by Giscard at a bilateral summit on April 2, leading to a joint Franco-German proposal on European monetary cooperation at the EC's Copenhagen summit only several days later. After months of negotiation, a formal agreement on establishment of the EMS was reached in December 1978 at the European Council meeting in Bremen. In the resolution establishing the EMS, EC leaders cited as their avowed objective the creation of a “zone of monetary stability in Europe.”

At the core of the EMS was the European Exchange-Rate Mechanism. Under this system of fixed exchange rates, currency values were permitted only a limited fluctuation, within 2.25 percent of the official established rate. A wider band of 6 percent was created for the Italian lira as a concession to the relative weakness of that country's economy. At the limits of the fluctuation bands, central banks would be required to intervene to maintain currency values at the fixed rate. Although all EC countries joined the EMS, not all participated in the ERM. Greece initially did not, and Spain and Portugal delayed their membership as well. The most notable nonparticipant in the ERM, however, was Britain, which cited considerations of national sovereignty and differences of economic and monetary philosophy as its reasons for remaining outside this agreement. The British pound was to eventually enter the ERM in October 1990, with a 6 percent band.

Among the main differences of the EMS from the earlier snake was the creation of the European Currency Unit (ECU) as an accounting currency or credit instrument. The ECU was composed of a basket of national currencies whose value was weighted to reflect the relative economic size and strength of the EC member countries. The EMS also differed from the snake in terms of its enlarged credit mechanisms. These included short- and medium-term facilities to be used for balance-of-

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payments problems and very-short-term facilities for the purpose of currency market interventions, each housed within the EMCF.

As originally planned, the EMS was to initiate a phase of institutional reform in 1981, thus making it into a more permanent structure. This reform would involve the transformation of the EMCF into the European Monetary Fund and the transfer to it of some national monetary reserves and authority, thus creating a form of European central bank. This phase would also involve an upgrading of the ECU and its full utilization as a reserve asset and a means of settlement. These steps were never taken, however, owing to the persistent divergence of national economic and monetary developments, as well as the continued lack of political consensus. At a December 1980 summit, Community leaders indefinitely postponed the move to the institutional stage, declaring that the transition would take place “at the appropriate time.”

Unlike the snake, the EMS held together. It also proved successful, at least in terms of its stated goal of promoting economic and monetary stability. Early on there was a period of considerable fluctuation in currency values and frequent realignments of exchange rates. By the mid-1980s, however, currency values had stabilized, and realignments were rare. There was also a convergence of national inflation rates at a low level. Between 1980 and 1988, the average annual inflation rate of ERM states decreased from 12 to 3 percent. The difference between the highest and lowest rates in the system, meanwhile, decreased from 13.6 percent in 1980 to only 4 percent in 1988. Not all credit goes to the EMS for the decrease in inflation, however, since this was a general trend among members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development during this period.

One can debate whether the institutional mechanism of the EMS or the change in domestic policy commitments is more responsible for the low inflation performance of EC countries since the early 1980s. Even if it is the latter, the constraints of the EMS have nevertheless played a key role in strengthening the low-inflation resolve of national policymakers. A further positive consequence of the EMS is the strengthening of habits of cooperation in monetary and economic affairs within the Community. Since 1983 there has been a growing tendency toward collective action in the setting of exchange rates and monetary targets among EMS countries, which has helped prepare the ground for further steps toward economic and monetary union.

On the negative side of the ledger, economic growth rates in EMS countries declined or remained stagnant throughout the 1980s, especially in comparison to countries outside the system, such as

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252 Woolley, "Policy Credibility and European Monetary Institutions," p. 187-188.
the United States and Japan. Europe’s slow economic growth in the 1980s has led to the charge that the EMS has a built-in deflationary or antigrowth bias.253 A key reason for this bias, some argue, is that the EMS is an “asymmetrical” system dominated by German monetary policy priorities. The main source of this asymmetry is Germany’s relative strength, deriving from the overall weight of its economy, its persistently low levels of inflation, and the international role and importance of the D-mark. Under the system, Germany dominates EMS monetary policy, yet is under no obligation to intervene in currency markets or otherwise act to defend fixed exchange rates, this task falling instead to weaker countries. Instead, the Bundesbank is free to focus exclusively on national economic conditions and interests in making its policy decisions. At the same time, Germany dominates the system’s external monetary policy, focusing on the dollar-mark relationship and pulling other countries within the EMS along with it. The result has been, according to one analyst, an “implicit division of labor in terms of exchange-rate interventions between different central banks.”254 In addition to economic objections to the EMS, its asymmetrical nature has also been the source of considerable political resentment and unease among other European governments.

For Germany, however, the EMS experience has been almost wholly positive. To begin with, the EMS has not interfered with Bundesbank monetary sovereignty, as was originally feared by the bank and its supporters, but has instead imposed few constraints on German policies.255 Nor has the EMS proved to be inflationary, another original concern of German monetary and financial authorities. Rather than importing inflation from other European countries, Germany has instead exported monetary stability through the system to other EMS participants. The Bundesbank itself has lauded the accomplishments of the EMS in promoting exchange-rate stability, citing the ERM in 1989 “as an example of successful [international] cooperation” at a time of turbulence in international monetary relations.256 Exchange-rate stability, in turn, has generated substantial trade advantages for Germany, as indicated by a booming trade surplus with other EMS countries.257 Competitive advantages for German industry have also been created by a persistent undervaluation of the D-mark within the system, due to the inability of currency readjustments to fully compensate for continued differentials in the inflation rates of Germany and other member countries.258 As a result, by the late 1980s Germany was generating close to three-quarters of its overall trade surplus in exchanges with other EC states, even though these accounted for only one-

254 Ibid., p. 65.
255 Ibid., p. 70.
257 By 1988 Germany’s trade surplus with other EMS countries had reached DM 46 billion, eight times greater than what it was in 1983. Economist, June 3, 1989, p. 17.
half of total German trade. If one includes non-EC countries that are nevertheless closely linked to the D-mark, the “zone of stability” created by the EMS represents about two-thirds of all German trade. In many respects, then, the EMS has given Germany the best of both worlds, enhancing its economic power and advantage without imposing much in the way of responsibility or constraints.

Despite the costs of the EMS in terms of reduced growth and employment, and its obvious asymmetry in favor of Germany, other European countries have remained in the system, largely because they felt they had little choice. According to one student of European monetary politics, authorities in countries such as France and Italy were gradually forced to recognize and bow to the severe external constraints on national policies that stemmed from increased international economic and financial interdependence. Under these conditions, the negative consequences of pursuing inflationary or expansionary policies that were out of step with the rest of the world economy were simply too great, as France was to find out in 1981-1983. Given this fact, these traditionally high-inflation countries hoped that tying their currencies to the D-mark would provide the external discipline needed to bring their own monetary and economic policies into line with international realities. Beyond this reason is the European factor: Since the EMS had become a visible symbol of Europe and progress toward European integration, in countries such as France and Italy the debate about participation in the EMS became “synonymous with the debate over abandoning other spheres of cooperation in Europe.” To leave the EMS, in other words, was to leave Europe. Nevertheless, by the late 1980s resentment about the asymmetry of the EMS had grown. Rather than prompting considerations of withdrawal, however, this resentment strengthened the determination of other EC countries to dilute German monetary dominance and regain some control over monetary policy by transferring authority in this realm to European-level institutions.

The formation of the EMS was also significant for other reasons. For one thing, it signaled the renewal of the Franco-German partnership as the motor of European integration. Indeed, this was reportedly a key objective of Chancellor Schmidt in promoting the EMS initiative. Nevertheless, the primary driving force behind the creation of the EMS was Germany. This role was a reflection of Germany’s increased economic and political power, as well as its growing self-confidence as a European and international actor. According to one observer, “The EMS was arguably the first major act of German leadership in the history of the European Community.”

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259 Deutsche Bundesbank, “Exchange Rate Movements,” p. 34.
262 On Schmidt’s reasons for promoting the EMS, see Ludlow, The Making of the European Monetary System, p. 63-87.
263 Ibid., p. 290.
partner. At the same time, Germany’s position of dominance within the Community was only further reinforced by the functioning of the EMS. The political consequences of this altered balance of power would be a key factor in subsequent efforts to promote monetary union in the 1980s and 1990s.

**Europe Relaunched: The 1992 Project and SEA**

Despite the establishment of the EMS, the Community found itself in the early 80s afflicted by a deep sense of malaise. Popularly referred to as “Europessimism,” this mood of despair was generated by both the perception of stagnation in the development of EC institutions and the reality of economic recession and growing unemployment throughout the Community. Also contributing to this mood was the widely held view that, in competitive terms, Europe was readily falling behind the more dynamic economies of Japan, the United States, and the East Asian “newly industrializing countries,” especially in the cutting edge realms of high technology. In an effort to counter this mood of Europessimism, and simultaneously impart new dynamism to both the European economy and the project of regional integration, EC leaders united in the mid-1980s around the idea of completing the Community’s internal market via the “Europe 1992” project.

The decision to launch the 1992, or “Single Market,” project resulted from a number of factors. Of central importance was the convergence of national economic philosophies and policies around monetarist, market-oriented ideals. To some extent, this convergence was promoted by the discipline and constraints exerted by the German-dominated EMS. A key moment in this regard came in 1983 when the Socialist government of French president Francois Mitterrand was forced to abandon its inflationary, growth-oriented economic policies in order to remain within the exchange-rate framework of the EMS. France’s Socialist government was among the last converts to a more market-oriented philosophy, however, and most European governments had by this point come to accept the argument of “Euro sclerosis,” which held that economic growth and competitiveness in Europe were being hampered by excessive government regulation and control of the economy. For this reason, these governments were prepared to accept the liberalizing and deregulatory prescriptions of the Single Market project.

In addition to this general consensus on economic policy, the Single Market project was also favored by the political interests of the Community’s key member states. A primary lesson that the French government drew from its forced reversal of policy in 1983 was that in an era of increased

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economic and financial interdependence, national economic goals could not be achieved in isolation but instead had to be pursued through international and regional cooperation. As a result, the Mitterrand government turned away from nationalistic approaches to economic policy and increasingly focused its attention on European policies and institutions. This French reorientation toward Europe would prove to be a key development preparing the way for new steps toward further EC integration.266

The Single Market initiative was also favored by the German government. Beyond Germany's economic interests in a more open European market, the 1992 project also coincided with the foreign policy goals of Germany's new Christian Democratic chancellor, Helmut Kohl. A convinced Europeanist in the tradition of Konrad Adenauer, Kohl was also a strong proponent of close Franco-German relations. He thus made renewal of this crucial bilateral partnership a central objective after taking office in 1982. While he favored this goal for its own sake, Kohl also viewed it as the cornerstone of a revitalized Westpolitik, which he viewed as necessary to counterbalance the groundbreaking initiatives in Eastern Europe of previous Social Democratic governments. Kohl's Europeanist views converged nicely with the new European orientation of the Mitterrand government after 1983. As a result, under the leadership of the unlikely collaboration of the Socialist Mitterrand and the Christian Democrat Kohl, the Franco-German axis was revived in the 1980s and became a key factor promoting new initiatives for further integration.

Also facilitating the Single Market project were the positive attitude and role of the British government. The idea of liberalizing the internal European market, with implications for deregulation and elimination of government controls on economic activity, was tremendously appealing to the neoliberal government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Liberalization also accorded with traditional British preferences for a Community that was more an open free-trading area than an exclusionary political union. Viewing Europe 1992 as an exercise in market-oriented negative integration, the Thatcher government was fully supportive of the project, a position that diverged considerably from the usual British intransigence regarding new initiatives on European integration.

Another key factor in the relaunch of European integration in the 1980s was the active and skillful leadership of the president of the European Commission, Jacques Delors.267 As a French Socialist and former finance minister under President Mitterrand, Delors reflected the new Europeanist orientation of the Paris government after 1983. He went considerably beyond this, however, in his federalist ambitions for a more politically integrated Europe. On assuming the office of commission

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president in 1985, Delors immediately seized on the Single Market idea as the vehicle for advancing his goal of European Union, and he played a key role in facilitating intergovernmental agreement on the 1992 project and accompanying institutional reform. Given the considerable amount of consensus among national governments on the Single Market idea by this point, this facilitation was perhaps not so difficult. His greatest challenge would come in later attempts to move the Community toward the more controversial and problematic objectives of monetary and political union.

The 1992 project was initially spelled out in a 1985 commission report prepared under the direction of Britain's Lord Cockfield. The report proposed some three hundred measures aimed at eliminating remaining national barriers to the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor within the Community by the end of 1992. Although the removal of formal tariffs on trade between EC countries had been achieved with the establishment of the Common Market after 1958, a significant number and variety of nontariff restrictions on transborder economic activity continued to exist and had increased in number and importance since the mid-1970s because of the protective responses of national governments to economic crisis and recession. As a result, the emergence of a true single market in Europe had been frustrated. The continued fragmentation of the EC economy in turn was widely regarded as something seriously limiting the efficiency, competitiveness, and growth potential of European firms while at the same time contributing to an overall perception of economic stagnation and decline in the Community.

The commission's proposals for liberalizing the internal market were subsequently endorsed by national leaders at a June 1985 Milan summit. Nevertheless, it was apparent that the goals of the 1992 project could not be realized under current Community decision-making procedures. Since the move to majority voting had been frustrated by the resistance of de Gaulle in 1965-1966, decision-making in the Council of Ministers had been by consensus, with individual countries retaining a veto right in matters affecting vital national interests. The rule of unanimity would quickly frustrate attempts to pass legislation necessary for the Single Market project, given the variety of national, sectoral, and other interests affected by the proposed measures. What was needed, therefore, was the reform of EC decision-making procedures.

Such reform was achieved through the Single European Act, which was approved by EC leaders and ratified by national parliaments in 1986 and came into effect in 1987. The SEA committed member countries to the goal of completing the internal market by January 1993. It also amended the 1957 Rome Treaty to provide for qualified majority voting within the Council of Ministers on matters pertaining to the Single Market project. In addition, the SEA expanded Community

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269 On the SEA, see Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European Act."
authority in some policy areas related to the Single Market, such as environment and competition policy, and increased the European Parliament's voice in the legislative process somewhat. Most significantly, however, by removing the unanimity rule for all EC legislation, the SEA made possible the realization of the 1992 project.

The 1992 project and SEA breathed new life into what many had believed was a moribund or stagnating European Community. In material terms, creation of the single market was widely expected to have significant benefits. By removing barriers to cross-border economic activity, European companies would enjoy greater economies of scale and become much more efficient and profitable, thus enabling them to compete more effectively with U.S. and Japanese multinationals. The 1992 project would also result in increased economic growth and employment. The most well-known study of these effects is the commission's own “Cecchini report.” This concluded that even without accompanying government measures to stimulate demand, the completion of the internal market should lead, in the medium term, to a 4.5 percent increase in Community gross domestic product (GDP) and the creation of 1.8 million new jobs. With accompanying expansionary measures, these gains could be as much as 7.5 percent in GDP and 5.7 million jobs.270 Perhaps even more important than the economic benefits of the 1992 project, however, was the psychological boost it gave the Community, thus helping it overcome the mood of Europessimism that had predominated in the early 1980s. Instead, by the end of the decade the EC was on the move again, and the project of European integration appeared to be back on track with plenty of momentum. The renewed movement toward European integration provoked both admiration and concern among the EC’s trading partners, which feared the possibility of an economically powerful but protectionist “Fortress Europe,” while within Europe this renewal prompted consideration of further steps toward economic and political union.

The Delors Plan for Monetary Union

By 1988, with the Single Market project well under way, attention had begun to focus on the next steps for EC integration. The most important of these was monetary union. For many, this was the logical sequence to the 1992 project since the existence of different national currencies and monetary policies was a significant barrier to economic activity across borders. To some extent, there had already been a convergence of national monetary policies and a stabilization of exchange rates since the creation of the EMS in 1979. Even so, recent studies had shown that the cost of economic transactions across borders was increased simply through the need to exchange

For this reason, the sentiment had grown within the business and economic communities, and among some political leaders, that, if Europe was ever to achieve true economic integration and enjoy the efficiency and dynamism that would result from a single market, complete monetary union was necessary. In addition, central bankers and national governments recognized that in a unified Community market without any exchange or capital controls something that would become a reality with the 1992 project, the conduct of strictly “national” monetary policy would become difficult, if not impossible.

For many, monetary union was simply a logical and necessary complement to the 1992 project, but for others it was a major step toward the ultimate goal of a politically united or federal Europe. Commission president Delors, among others, belonged in this camp. Nevertheless, despite the considerable level of integration and the pooling of sovereignty that had already been achieved, the EC remained a grouping of independent nation-states, and conventional national interests would be the primary driving force behind the new initiative for monetary union.

The main source of interest in monetary union for many EC countries was the asymmetrical nature of the EMS and the economic and monetary dominance it allowed Germany. This was a sore point for France, which had been forced to bow German monetary priorities and abandon expansionary economic policies in the early 1980s to stay within the ERM. From this moment a key goal of the French government had been to undermine German monetary hegemony through the transfer of Bundesbank authority to European institutions. Since within European institutions Paris would presumably have some voice, it would thereby regain a certain degree of control over monetary policy. At the very least, the French government wanted to ensure that in the future German monetary authorities would act more responsibly by being compelled to take European, not simply German, economic needs and interests into consideration when making their policies. These views were shared by most other EC countries, except Britain, which still remained outside the exchange-rate mechanism of the EMS and in general opposed any further moves toward monetary integration as a threat to national sovereignty.

As might be expected, Germany was more ambivalent about the idea of monetary union. Among

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271 See, for instance, the results of a 1988 Belgian study. For a person starting out in Belgium with a given amount of money and traveling to ten other EC countries, the requirement of changing currencies consumed 47 percent of the cash. *Economist*, July 16, 1988, p. 44.
German monetary and financial authorities, there was widespread opposition to such plans. In addition to objecting that the EMU would undermine Bundesbank sovereignty, these authorities felt that monetary union was simply not workable given the still considerable divergence of economic conditions among EC countries. Any precipitous moves toward monetary union, they believed, would only be inflationary while threatening the hard-won achievements of German monetary stability. Similar concerns had been voiced about the EMS. By now, however, German monetary authorities had become strong supporters of the EMS and the monetary status quo.276 German political authorities were also skeptical about the economic consequences of monetary union but were willing to consider it for other reasons, including an ideological commitment to the goal of European union and a desire to maintain positive relations with France.277

As a result, a new initiative on monetary union was launched in January 1988 with the French government's proposal for the creation of a European central bank, an idea that also had the strong support of Delors.278 Although the German government was initially cool to the idea of a European central bank, it was willing to discuss improved mechanisms for monetary cooperation with France, mainly as a means to achieve other policy objectives. In particular, the Kohl government was seeking more bilateral cooperation on foreign and defense policy to counter the growing instability and uncertainty in Eastern Europe and a perceived decline in the U.S. commitment to European security. In reaction, French officials indicated a willingness to discuss greater defense cooperation but only on the condition that Germany make a similar commitment in the area of economic and monetary policy. The result was a policy trade-off, which led to the signing on January 22, 1988, of agreements establishing two bilateral councils, one for economic policy and one for defense and security cooperation.279 In addition, the French made it known that they wanted further steps toward the creation of European monetary institutions.

Considerable suspicion about the new bilateral Economic and Finance Council was expressed by Bundesbank authorities, who feared that it could exert political pressure on the Bundesbank for more expansionary monetary policies, thereby undercutting its anti-inflationary mandate and threatening its institutional autonomy. Bundesbank officials were also unhappy with having been left out of the decision-making process; they had not been notified by government authorities about the full nature and potential consequences of the council until only hours before the agreement was signed. This, they felt, was much too reminiscent of the Bundesbank's exclusion from the secretive discussions between Chancellor Schmidt and President d'Estaing in early 1978 that had laid the basis for the EMS. The Bundesbank claimed that the decision to create the council

276 Economist, February 13, 1988, pp. 76-77.
278 Economist, January 30, 1988, p. 35.
was yet another example of the federal government making faulty economic policy decisions for essentially political reasons. Most worrisome for the Bundesbank, however, was the possibility that the council might be a precursor of further steps toward European monetary union and the creation of a regional central bank, something to which German monetary authorities remained adamantly opposed.280

Despite Bundesbank objections, discussion of European monetary union continued. At a June 1988 EC summit in Hannover, national leaders established a commission to study ideas on monetary union and make concrete proposals for achieving it. This group, chaired by Delors, consisted of the central bank governors of each of the EC countries and three independent experts. In April 1989 the commission made public the results of its work. The “Delors Plan” for EMU envisaged a three-stage process leading to full monetary union. In the first stage, which was set to begin on July 1, 1990, closer coordination of national monetary policies would begin, and all controls on trans-border capital movements within the Community would be terminated. By this point as well, those EC countries still outside the ERM at that time Britain, Spain, Portugal, and Greece would become members of the system. In stage two, for which no starting date was proposed, the margin of fluctuation for national currencies within the ERM would be tightened, and a European system of central banks, the precursor of a single regional bank, would be established. In addition, EC authorities would begin to formulate economic targets for member countries and set rules on such matters as the size and financing of budget deficits. In the third stage, a single currency would be created and managed by the European central bank, and the EC would assume greater powers to direct the economic and financial policies of member states.281

The contents of the Delors Plan were endorsed by EC leaders at a June 1989 summit in Madrid, although Britain's Prime Minister Thatcher expressed strong reservations. In addition to approving the July 1, 1990, date for the beginning of stage one, leaders decided to convene a special intergovernmental conference to discuss the implementation of EMU and the necessary revisions to the Treaty of Rome. Although no specific date was set, the general consensus was that this conference should begin sometime in the second half of 1990, after stage one had been initiated. A final decision on the starting date for the conference, it was agreed, would be made at a December EC summit in Strasbourg.282 In addition, the Strasbourg summit would consider the controversial proposal for a Community “Social Charter” aimed at guaranteeing the rights of workers in the European Single Market. This charter had been strongly pushed by labor unions as a necessary counterpart to the 1992 project and had also been endorsed by Delors and many

280 Economist, February 13,1988, pp. 76-79.
national governments. As with EMU, however, the strongest opposition to the Social Charter came from the Thatcher government.

Although the German government publicly supported the Delors Plan and the goal of monetary union, opinion among political and economic elites was highly divided.\textsuperscript{283} The chief supporter of monetary union in the federal government was Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who saw it as important for improving Franco-German relations and realizing the broader goal of European political union. In a speech delivered on May 5 in Davos (Switzerland), Genscher indicated his belief that full monetary and currency union could be achieved by 1995, much sooner than was commonly assumed. At any rate, he urged EC leaders to approve a firm timetable for EMU at their upcoming December summit. A close friend of French foreign minister Roland Dumas, Genscher also declared that any disagreements in negotiations over the nature of monetary union, such as the independent status of the European central bank, could be easily worked out, since the issue was “in the end zone between Bonn and Paris.”\textsuperscript{284} Also sympathetic to the idea of monetary union was Chancellor Kohl, who, like Genscher, was motivated by deeply felt Europeanist views. In addition the main opposition party in Germany, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), was generally supportive of the goal of monetary union.\textsuperscript{285}

Not surprisingly, the biggest critic of monetary union was the Bundesbank.\textsuperscript{286} This, despite the fact that its president, Karl-Otto Pohl, had been on the Delors commission and played a prominent role in drafting the final report. In general, the Bundesbank believed that a common central bank and monetary policy for Europe should only follow the achievement of greater economic convergence (at low, German levels of inflation) among EC countries. Beyond this, the bank emphasized that to be acceptable, a future European central bank would have to be closely modeled on the Bundesbank; that is, it must be politically independent, possess total control of monetary policy, and have a statutory mandate to keep inflation low. It also went without saying that a common European currency would have to be every bit as strong and stable as the D-mark.\textsuperscript{287} The view that EMU should only take place according to the German model and standards was also accepted by the supporters of monetary union in Germany; the differences centered mainly on the question of how soon monetary union might be possible. On the whole, the skepticism of the Bundesbank about monetary union was shared by much of the German business and financial community.

There was also opposition to monetary union within the governing coalition parties in Germany.


\textsuperscript{284} \textit{Economist}, May 13,1989, p. 53.


\textsuperscript{286} For a discussion of the Bundesbank’s views on EMU, see Smyser, \textit{The Economy of United Germany}, p. 274-277.

\textsuperscript{287} \textit{Financial Times}, July 1,1989, p. 1.
This included the chairman of Genscher’s own Free Democratic Party (FDP), Count Otto Lambsdorff, who shared many of the objections of the Bundesbank and German financial authorities. At the same time, within Kohl’s own party there was concern that government support for EMU might be politically unwise since it would play into the hands of emerging right-wing parties by giving them further ammunition for their claims that the Kohl government was not assertive enough of German national interests. Despite the existence of such strong doubts about monetary union, however, these were not generally expressed in public because in the mainstream parties of Germany, even among opponents of monetary union, there was a keen desire not to be perceived as “bad Europeans.”

By fall 1989, the European Community had generated considerable momentum toward deeper economic, and possibly political, integration. In ten years of existence, the EMS had proved to be a success in terms of keeping currency exchange-rates stable, promoting lower levels of inflation, and fostering new habits of cooperation among the governments and economic authorities of EC countries. This success had prepared the ground for further steps toward economic integration. In the mid-1980s, the Community had decided to complete the construction of its internal market, and by 1989 the Europe 1992 project was well under way. With the launching of the Single Market project, attention was focused on plans for monetary and currency union, with an intergovernmental conference on EMU tentatively scheduled to begin in late 1990. As a result of these developments, the mood of Europessimism that had pervaded the Community in the early 1980s had been swept away, and there was considerable optimism about the future of European integration. It was against this background that the opening of the Berlin Wall and the revolution in Eastern Europe took place. These developments would not only put in doubt the progress toward EC integration that had been made to this point but would also present the Community and its member countries with a new set of challenges for the future.

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CHAPTER 5
THE MAASTRICHT TREATY AND BEYOND
With the Maastricht Treaty, which was signed on February, 7th, 1992 and came in effect on November 1st, 1993, Europeans made the first step towards determining Europe’s role in defense and security matters at a statutory level? Before that NATO’s new strategic concept had been adopted, in which it was pointed out that there would be a future European security and defense identity through the framework of NATO. At the prelude of the agreement the members of EU stated their determination to apply a common foreign and security policy, including the future formation of a common defense policy, which, in a given time, may lead to common defense. This Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was enacted with article. J Title V of the Treaty. The establishment of a systematic collaboration among members, the adoption of common positions and the gradual application of common actions in fields of important common interests for the member states would be necessary to materialize the CFSP, (article J.2, J.3). As for matters concerning defense, it was decided that the Western European Union (WEU) constitutes the appropriate statutory framework within which the development of the defensive dimension of CFSP would evolve. Specifically, in the article J.4.2 it is mentioned: “the Union requests the Western European Union, which is an integral part of the development of the European Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense implications.” Furthermore, in a relevant Declaration annexed to the Treaty, it is stressed out that the development of an authentic European security and defense identity will be promoted in a complementary to NATO approach.290 The signing of the Treaty would have been a unique moment in European history if the outbreak of the Yugoslavian crisis and the failure of the 12 members of EU to apply consistent and common policy while confronting the crisis had not occurred.291 While the Intergovernmental Conference was in progress, in order to adopt the definite plan of the Treaty, it was assessed that the Yugoslavian crisis was an opportunity for EU to prove its capability to handle a crisis that constitutes a threat for its stability and security. The facts did not confirm these expectations. On the contrary, the facts proved the European states’ inability to agree on a common strategy in order to confront the crisis, bringing to surface the lack of political will for harmonization of national choices for defense and security matters.292 With the absence of substantial politics for convergence of opinions, the June ’91 declarations concerning the Yugoslavian crisis composed a major blow to EU’s future credibility. As stated by Henry Kissinger “The Western democracies, with the best intentions, made the likely inevitable”.293 Two years later, the newly formed EU found itself in the difficult position to account for an unsuccessful CFSP, just after the Maastricht Treaty

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290 Declaration on The Role of the Western European Union and its Relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance, Maastricht, 10 December 1991, Source: official website of WEU. For WEU’s role in European security according to the Maastricht Treaty see below.


The EU-NATO Relations in Post-Cold War Era
came into effect. Furthermore, Europe has shown that, from the moment the United States avoids involvement, as in the case of the first stages in the Yugoslav crisis, its military means of action remained limited. It was not even ready to group the forces of WEU member states under a single command even in application of measures decided by the United Nations. It was not only that negative situation which was undermining the future of the European CFSP, but also the provisions of the Treaty itself that described the aims and the means of materialization in a vague way, reflecting the confusion prevailing during the works of the Intergovernmental Conference and the inability of the members to adopt a common vision of Europe’s future. The period between the summit in Maastricht and the time that the Treaty became effective, was characterized by uncertainty concerning EU’s future.\footnote{Hans Arnold, “Maastricht-The Beginning or End of a Development?”, Aussen Politik, Vol. 44, (3/93).} In the following years until the revision of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU members, in some cases, succeeded in harmonizing their policies and applying common actions through CFSP. For example, in 1994-95, one of the first joint actions by the European Union in the framework of the CFSP concerned the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. During the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference in April-May 1995, the country members of the Union played an essential role in ensuring the indefinite extension of the NPT, although the European too often appeared divided during the discussions.\footnote{Baun J. Michael, An Imperfect Union, Westview Press, 1996, p. 87.} What became obvious during the following years were the radical disagreements among members about Europe’s role in security and defense matters. The Maastricht Treaty provisions concerning CFSP were the product of a compromise between the so-called “Atlanticists”, led by the UK, and the so-called “Europeanists”, led by France and Germany, as well as their disagreement whether Europe should claim an autonomous security and defense identity. At the same time, the evolution of Franco-German collaboration\footnote{Christopher Hill and Michael Smith, International Relations and the EU, Oxford University Press, 2005, p.237.} gave the impression that the breach between the two approaches was becoming wider and that the cohesion of the two countries could be disturbed easily since their opinions contradicted. As a result there was an increased confusion about what Europe’s role was going to be. It has been written that “The Maastricht Treaty of December 1992 marked the striking of a relatively fragile security bargain among the Europeanists and the Atlanticists: in the short term recognizing NATO’s primacy but clearly defining the path for future independent Europeanist evolution.”\footnote{Ibid.} In the middle of this security bargain there was WEU and the question of how its future role would evolve.
The TEU Amendments and ESDP

The members of the European Community,²⁹⁸ in 1992 decided and signed in Maastricht, the Treaty of the European Union TEU, after realizing that finally the economic power of the Union must be articulated to a stronger sense of collective political and cooperative security purpose.²⁹⁹

The TEU with its turn, introduced the Common Foreign Security Policy CFSP, as one of the three pillars of the European Union,³⁰⁰ representing an attempt to create and provide the conditions for proactive foreign policy making, that is, provision of strategic direction, greater overall policy coherence and assured access to external policy instruments, in the previous foundations of the EPC.³⁰¹ In practice the TEU ‘proved disappointing’³⁰² because on terms of strategic direction the objectives of the CFSP were very broadly stated (in TEU, Article 11):

- To safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter;

- To strengthen the security of the Union in all ways;

- To preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders;

- To promote international cooperation,

- To develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.³⁰³

These general objectives however, reflect the common desire and will of sharing information and responsibilities to protect the Union from negative external influences, and to develop where appropriate a foreign policy posture distinct from that of the USA. Therefore, they have also

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²⁹⁸ The European Community (EC) was originally founded on March 25, 1957 by the signing of the Treaty of Rome under the name of European Economic Community. The ‘Economic’ was removed from its name by the Maastricht treaty in 1992, which at the same time effectively made the European Community the first of three pillars of the European Union, called the Community (or Communities) Pillar.
³⁰⁰ The first or ‘Community’ pillar concerns economic, social and environmental policies. The second or ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’ (CFSP) pillar concerns foreign policy and military matters. The third or ‘Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters’ (PJCC) pillar concerns co-operation in the fight against crime. This pillar was originally named ‘Justice and Home Affairs.’
³⁰¹ European Political Cooperation was introduced in 1970 and was synonym for EU foreign policy.
³⁰² Page 167 - The European Union as a Global Actor
³⁰³ TEU Article 11: http://eur-lex.europa.eu
contributed to the formation of the EU image as a value based player, further commitment to multilateralism (UN), and to the promotion externally of the values embraced by the Union. Within the framework of the TEU objectives, the European Council provided the ‘general political guidelines’ of the EU. Identifying five initial priority areas for CFSP actions: links with Central and Eastern European Countries, support of the Middle East peace process, conflict resolution and humanitarian relief efforts in former Yugoslavia, and support for democratic process in South Africa and Russia. Rather that the Joint Actions expanded the horizon of the CFSP, the absence of an acting strategy and relations with NATO, ensured that, CFSP would remain reactive to external event.

Two years after CFSP’s operation, both the Council and Commission published their reports plainly commenting their disappointment at the failure to progress towards a more proactive and coherent external policy. The amendments’ in the TEU were unavoidable, and in the subsequent Treaty of Amsterdam, (signed in 1997, came into force 1999) substantial changes was announced, in order to increase the effectiveness and visibility of the Union and CFSP, appointed Javier Solana, (former prime minister of Spain and at the time Secretary General of NATO) as the Secretary General of the Council /Higher Representative of CFSP, in order to provide political direction and strengthen the CFSP image and recognition from NATO and USA, using diplomacy methods acquired from his previous experience and connections.

Between, at the NATO summit in Berlin a year earlier, it was agreed that the ESDI306 the forerunner policy of ESDP, carried in the 90s by the WEU and structured within NATO after the demand of the United Kingdom, using the Alliance’s headquarters and assets for possible missions or threats, preventing this way duplication between NATO and WEU. The result, was that the closest description of policy, incorporating defense and security that existed in Europe, became ‘separable but not separate’307 part of NATO. The meaning was, that once again the European plans for mutual security and defense plans, had to involve NATO.

CFSP’s lack of access to military instruments to support the policy aims of the Union was an embarrassing burden for the Union, and the urgent need for a solution, was stipulated by incorporating the WEU’s, Petersberg tasks308 in the of Treaty of Amsterdam. The Petersberg tasks review a great range of possible military missions, security and defense policies; that could deal

305 (Council 1995; Commission 1995b)
306 The European Security and Defence Identity is a term which was used to describe a European common defence and security policy in the 90s, now effectively replaced by the European Security and Defence Policy
307 Madelyn Albright speech in NATO HQ, Nov. 2000
308 The Petersberg tasks are a list of military and security priorities incorporated within the European Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. The Petersberg tasks were first formulated by the Western European Union (WEU) in 1992 during a summit in at the Hotel Petersberg near Bonn. In 1997, during the European summit in Amsterdam, the tasks were incorporated in the Treaty on European Union. Both the WEU and the EU are empowered to enforce the Petersberg tasks.
with humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacekeeping. The most important fact to this is that the range of tasks that the EU can commit is limited from NATO’s approval, since the task of territorial defense is considered the domain of NATO and there are many provisions that prevent the competition or duplication with NATO.

Following the absorption of the ESDI from NATO, and the incorporation of the Petersberg Tasks in the Amsterdam Treaty revisions, at the Anglo-French summit at Saint Malo in 1998, the British finally accepted and agreed with the rest European member states that any operations attempt by the WEU had to be within the whole EU Framework. The Saint Malo summit, which is described by scholars and commentators, to be of far greater significance than Amsterdam summit, amounted to a military revolution. The result was formalized in a declaration following the meeting of the British Prime Minister Tony Blair and the French President Jacques Chirac, decided on the shifting of the focus of the ESDI away from the WEU and within the European Union. They stated that:

“The European Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises” (Cited in Bretheron and Vogler 2006)

EU Searching Autonomy: From ESDI to ESDP

Throughout the Cold War period, the United States supported the goal of enhanced European economic, political, and defense cooperation. However, the United States had not been forced to confront directly the prospect of European defense cooperation that could actually substitute for what in the past had been done in or through NATO and that could supplant traditional U.S.-European roles in the alliance. Even though the United States has always welcomed the potential of a stronger “European pillar” in the transAtlantic alliance, it has been wary of approaches that would divide the alliance politically, take resources away from NATO military cooperation, and not yield additional military capabilities to produce more equitable burden sharing. The U.S. approach could accurately be called a “yes, but” policy, supporting the European effort but warning of the potential negative consequences.

In the early 1990s, traditional support for European integration still dominated the rhetoric of U.S. policy, but the tendency to look somewhat skeptically at U.S. support for European integration became more influential in the absence of the strong geostrategic requirement to support

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309 Cited from Andreani et al. 2001 - Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler. The European Union as a Global Actor.
European Union during the Cold War. In a “yes, but” policy environment, the “but” therefore received more emphasis.\textsuperscript{311}  

With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, traditional principles regarding European security and transatlantic relations seemed to have been rendered irrelevant overnight. The prevailing wisdom among security experts and many actors was that NATO, which had just celebrated its fortieth birthday, would not outlive the demise of the Soviet threat against which it had been forged.\textsuperscript{312} Several European leaders, and most notably French president Francois Mitterrand, assumed that the European Community (EC: soon to be renamed the EU) would now aspire toward some form of autonomous security capacity, albeit within the context of a radically restructured Atlantic Alliance.\textsuperscript{313} In March 1991, European Commission President Jacques Delors made what is often regarded as the classic speech in favor of European security autonomy.\textsuperscript{314} In June 1991, Luxembourg’s foreign minister, Jacques Poos, chairing the Council of Ministers when Serbia engaged in military hostilities against Slovenia, declared (a shade prematurely) that “the hour of Europe” had arrived. These stirrings of independence, bordering on insubordination, were sufficiently irritating to President George Bush (the elder) that, when he met his European colleagues in Rome in November 1991 to discuss a new strategic concept for the Alliance, he bluntly warned them “if what you want is independence, the time to tell us is now.”\textsuperscript{315} 

The 1991 Gulf War had made it abundantly clear to both Washington and the main European capitals that Europe was far from being in a position to move toward anything approaching security autonomy. The subsequent wars of Yugoslav succession in the Balkans drove the point home. Although there were a variety of schemes in circulation for replacing the dominant “NATO narrative”, including a Soviet bid to reestablish the balance of powers, a German/Czech bid to turn the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) into a major security actor and the French-led bid to prioritize the WEU, all of those alternative narratives failed to materialize. By 1994, NATO had risen, Phoenix-like, from its own apparent self-immolation and had reemerged as the only show in town.\textsuperscript{316} And yet it was a show that could not go on in the same old way. On Washington’s Capitol Hill, in particular, the decibel levels were rising around inquiries as to why it


was EU with a GDP equal to or superior to that of the United States and with a considerably larger population could not do more to organize and above all to fund its own security.\footnote{Stanley R. Sloan, “Burdensharing in NATO: The US and Transatlantic Burdensharing,” Les Notes de l’IFRI 12 (Paris: IFRI, 1999), p.12.}

**The Movement toward Limited Autonomy: WEU, NATO And ESDI**

In December 1991, in the wake of NATO’s new strategic concept, the members of the European Community signed the Maastricht Treaty, transforming the European Community into the European Union and setting the goal of establishing a monetary union and a common currency, the Euro. The treaty importantly included, as part of that Union, a commitment to “define and implement a common foreign and security policy” that would eventually include “framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense.” The treaty designated the Western European Union (WEU) as the organization responsible for implementing defense aspects of the European Union’s decisions on foreign and security policy. The WEU members subsequently agreed at Petersberg in 1992; they would use WEU military forces for joint operations in humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping, crisis management, and peace enforcement, the so-called Petersberg tasks.\footnote{For more informations See Christopher Hill and Michael Smith, *Internation Relations And the EU*, Oxford University Press, 2005, p.81.}

The outcomes in Rome and Maastricht appeared to resolve the conceptual differences between the United States and France about the relationship between a European defense identity and the transAtlantic alliance, but they really just papered them over. This became patently clear in the first half of 1992, when the United States issued strong warnings to the German and French governments concerning their plans to create a Franco-German military corps of some 35,000 troops. American officials reportedly expressed reservations about the degree to which the corps would displace NATO as the focus of European defense efforts and undermine domestic support in the United States for a continuing US presence in Europe. National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft was said to have sent a strongly worded” letter to the German government suggesting that the Germans were not taking a strong enough position against what Scowcroft interpreted as French efforts to undermine cooperation in NATO.\footnote{Frederick Kempe, “US, Bonn Clash over Pact with France,” *Wall Street Journal*, May 27, 1992, A9.} The controversy reflected continuing differences between the US and French governments about the requirements for future European security organization.

Since the late 1980s, when European political leaders began to think seriously about enhanced coordination of EC/EU security policy, the solution to the conundrum seemed to be optimally sought via the WEU. Hence, the enormous profusion of policy papers, analytical studies and
institutional blueprints that dominated the attention of actors and analysts from 1987 (Platform of The Hague) to 1997 (AFSouth crisis and U.K. veto on EU-WEU merger proposals). The potential of WEU to offer the solution to the conundrum seemed self-evident to most experts. WEU had a long (if not glorious) history. It was the only dedicated European security and defense institution common to most EC/EU member states. It succeeded, progressively, in associating with its activities most other European states, although this is considered to have exacerbated the awkwardness of its procedures.\(^\text{320}\) It had begun to work increasingly effectively with NATO. And it avoided the apparent political minefield of introducing defense and security issues directly into the EU, a proposition to which the U.K. (Europe’s most efficient military power), in particular, was unutterably opposed.

The mid-1990s proposals for an ESDI and for the development of CJTFs flowed directly from the WEU logic. The fact that ESDI was about identity, within NATO, rather than about either policy or capacity indicated its limited ambitions. ESDI was unofficially launched at the North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting in Brussels in January 1994. It was initially conceived largely as a technical-military arrangement that would allow the Europeans to assume a greater share of the burden for security missions that is, “strengthen the European Pillar of the Alliance”, by providing the WEU with access to those NATO assets and capabilities that European member states did not possess. But it also had a transformative political dimension in that it posited a willingness on the part of NATO as an institution, and on the part of the United States as the foremost NATO member state, to countenance a greater security role for the EU. Ultimately the political message of ESDI that a clearer, bigger European role was both acceptable and desirable and was of more importance than the technical-military arrangements designed essentially to provide access to NATO/ U.S. assets.\(^\text{321}\)

\(^\text{320}\) Non-EU NATO members were known as “associate members.” Non-NATO EU members were offered “observer status”, and EU/NATO accession candidates from Central and Eastern Europe were offered “associate partnership.”


\(^\text{322}\) Ibid., p.24.
arrangements allowing given operations to be manned by appropriate forces drawn from a range of services and a number of different countries. This allowed total flexibility in the designation, from within NATO, of air, naval and land elements from a range of European countries, under the pre-designated European command chain. These would be drawn up via WEU/NATO consultation procedures. A key feature was the transfer to an EU-led force of certain U.S. military assets and capabilities.

In theory, the political-military potential of the Berlin agreement was substantial. However, the Berlin formula for ESDI proved to be a double illusion. First, what became known as the “Berlin Plus” process the post-Berlin discussions intended to put ESDI/CJTFs on solid procedural ground by providing assured access to NATO planning facilities, presumed access to NATO assets and capabilities, and the identification of a distinct European chain of command failed to make much headway, despite repeated official Alliance assurances to the contrary. Most important, the U.S. military produced objections to allowing the Europeans access to crucial but sensitive American assets. Second, at the first real test of “Europeanization” of the Alliance structures, the French bid for NATO’s Southern Command (AFSouth), the whole house of cards came tumbling down.323

Despite the mishandling of this crisis by Paris, the AFSouth incident also revealed the real limits of U.S. political flexibility over transatlantic leadership. Task sharing in the field (risking U.S. equipment and European lives) was one thing. Sharing leadership, especially in an area as sensitive for U.S. policy as the Eastern Mediterranean, was quite another. The Europeans had already experienced the U.S. approach to leadership in the 1995 resolution of the Bosnian War. U.S. bombers and Richard Holbrooke's strong-arm tactics at Dayton achieved in a few weeks what the Europeans had failed to achieve in three years. The European delegations at Dayton were shocked by the brutal unilateralism of the U.S. “negotiators.”324 The final straw seemed to come at the European Council meeting in Amsterdam in June 1997 when, citing NATO primacy, the newly elected Blair government, in its first major security policy decision, vetoed a proposal by nine EU member states to merge the EU with the WEU, as a means of conferring upon the former some of the military attributes of the latter. The explanation offered by London was that the EU-WEU merger proposal would weaken NATO.

Intriguing though it seemed for a time, the WEU “solution” thus proved to be an impasse. By 1997, WEU was perceived by many key analysts as part of the problem, rather than as part of the solution.325 Politically, it perpetuated the unhealthy imbalance between the EU and the United

States, the rectification of which was at the heart of the European security conundrum. Institutionally, it still left the EU impotent in terms of decision making. Militarily, it enshrined the EU's dependency on NATO/U.S. assets and capabilities without offering any long-term guarantees that such assets and capabilities would actually be available in the event of a crisis. The crises in the Balkans in the early 1990s, rendered even more dramatic by 1997-1998 with the looming conflict in Kosovo, had demonstrated to the EU the unsatisfactory nature of such a series of handicaps.

In June 1997, the members of the European Union, in the process of updating and strengthening the Maastricht Treaty, approved the Treaty of Amsterdam. In the area of common defense policy, the Treaty of Amsterdam included a reference to the Petersberg tasks and authorized the adoption of EU common strategies. It also created the position of high representative for common foreign and security policy, one that was not filled until September 1999, when former NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana took on the job. Solana had performed well as NATO secretary-general and had won admiration in Washington—no small accomplishment for a Spanish socialist who had opposed his country’s membership in NATO in the early 1980s. Solana’s selection clearly was intended to reassure the United States. In retrospect, the question may be whether Solana’s new job was more important than the one he gave up. In fact, it probably was. It would be important for the European Union to move into NATO’s exclusive reserve in a way that did not create too much choppy water across the Atlantic, and Solana had a reputation not only being hardworking, but also for his diplomatic skills that he surely would need in his new job.

**An “Autonomous” European Security and Defense Policy**

In the autumn of 1998, the shape of the discussion on European defense was changed profoundly by British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s decision to make a major push for an EU role in defense. Blair first tried out his ideas at an EU summit in Portschach, Austria, in October 1998 and then reaffirmed his approach on November 3 in a major address to the North Atlantic Assembly’s annual session in Edinburgh, Scotland. Blair bemoaned the fact that Europe’s ability for autonomous military action was so limited and called for major institutional and resource innovations to make Europe a more equal partner in the transatlantic alliance. Blair’s initiative may also have betrayed some uncertainty concerning NATO’s future.

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326 In the course of that session, the Assembly renamed itself the NATO Parliamentary Assembly to emphasize its role as the parliamentary component of the transatlantic alliance.

Traditionally, Great Britain had been the most reliable, predictable partner of the United States when it came to dealing with defense issues. The British had shared US skepticism regarding initiatives that might create splits between the United States and Europe in the alliance, particularly those with roots in French neo-Gaullist philosophy.\footnote{Stanley R. Sloan, NATO, The European Union and The Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Challenged, Rowman & Littlefield, 2005, p.182.} The fact that Blair was moving out in front on this issue produced mixed reactions in the United States.

On the one hand, the United States believed that it still could trust Great Britain not to do anything that would hurt the alliance, and Blair claimed that his goal was to strengthen NATO by improving Europe’s ability to share security burdens in the twenty-first century.\footnote{Ibid., p.185.} On the other hand, Blair’s initiative sounded “too French” to skeptics, and even those who were hopeful were concerned about the political setting for Blair’s initiative.\footnote{Ibid., p.187.} It was said that Blair wanted to demonstrate commitment to Europe at a time when the United Kingdom was not going to join the inauguration of the Euro, the European Union’s common currency. Questions about the seriousness of the initiative were also raised by the fact that the proposal seemed to come out of nowhere. In discussions with British foreign office officials’ minutes after the Edinburgh speech was delivered, the author was told that the initiative until then consisted of the two speeches and that on their return to London, they would begin putting meat on the bones of the approach.

At the Edinburgh meeting, Blair and British officials got a foretaste of one of the key aspects of American reactions to the initiative. A report released at the meeting by US Senator William V. Roth Jr. said:

*The United States should give every possible help and encouragement to the continuing consolidation of European defense efforts. But the United States must not be held accountable for the inability of European states to develop a more coherent European role in the Alliance. It is the responsibility of the European Allies to develop the European Security and Defense Capabilities to give real meaning to a European Security and Defense Identity.*\footnote{William V. Roth Jr., NATO in the 21st Century (Brussels: North Atlantic Assembly, September 1998), 57.}

Any doubts about the serious nature of the Blair initiative were removed when Blair met with President Jacques Chirac at Saint-Malo early in December 1998.\footnote{Stanley R. Sloan, NATO, The European Union and The Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Challenged, Rowman & Littlefield, 2005, p.187.} The declaration, named for this French resort town, envisioned the creation of a Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) with the means and mechanisms to permit the EU nations to act “autonomously” should NATO not decide to act in some future scenario requiring military action.\footnote{Ibid., p.187.} The French delegation
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reportedly had lined up support from German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder prior to the meeting, giving the declaration even more weight. The statement included the following key elements:

1. The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage.

2. On the basis of intergovernmental decisions, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.

3. The NATO and WEU collective defense commitments of the EU members must be maintained, obligations to NATO honored, and the various positions of European states in relation to NATO and otherwise must be respected.

4. The Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication.

5. Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks, and which are supported by a strong and competitive European defense industry and technology.\(^\text{334}\)

US administration officials said the Blair initiative was given the benefit of the doubt.\(^\text{335}\) The administration thought that British motivations were solid, even if they remained concerned about those of the French. When the Saint-Malo statement emerged, however, administration officials felt that the British had not been 100 percent transparent about the likely outcome. The administration’s formal reaction took the traditional form of the “yes, but” approach characterized earlier. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, presenting themes originally developed as an op-ed piece for publication by National Security Adviser Sandy Berger, formally declared the administration’s support but cautioned the Europeans against “the three Ds”: duplication, decoupling, and discrimination. Secretary Albright emphasized these concerns at the December 1998 ministerial meetings in Brussels, just days after the Saint-Malo meeting.

According to Albright, the allies should not duplicate what already was being done effectively in NATO. This would be a waste of defense resources at a time when defense spending in most European nations was in decline. More fundamentally, the new European initiative should not in any way “decouple” or “delink” the United States from Europe in the alliance or the European defense efforts from those coordinated through NATO. This could result from a lack of candor and transparency that the United States feared might be an intended or unintended consequence of the new European approach. A tendency to “gang up” on the United States or even its perception


\(^{335}\) Interviews conducted with Clinton administration officials in Stanley R. Sloan, p. 170.
on the U.S. side of the Atlantic could surely spell the end of the alliance. Finally, Albright insisted there be no discrimination against NATO allies who were not members of the European Union. This point applied in particular to Turkey but also to European allies Norway, Iceland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, as well as Canada and the United States on the North American side of the alliance.

The “three Ds” accurately summarized the administration’s main concerns and hearkened back to the George H. W. Bush administration’s earlier warnings in reaction to the Franco-German development of the Eurocorps. Despite these footnotes to US support for the initiative, it moved ahead in parallel with NATO’s conduct of the air campaign over Kosovo intended to wrest the province from Serbian control and allow Kosovo refugees to return to their homes in peace. The campaign, which threatened to cast a dark shadow over NATO’s fiftieth-anniversary summit meeting in Washington, also added impetus to the Blair approach. When the numbers were toted up at the end of the air campaign, the United States had conducted nearly 80 percent of the sorties.

From the US perspective, the fact that the allies for the most part were not able to contribute to such a high-tech, low-casualty campaign suggested the wisdom of the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI). The DCI, adopted at the Washington summit, was designed to stimulate European defense efforts to help them catch up with the US Revolution in Military Affairs. From the European perspective, the Kosovo experience clearly demonstrated Europe’s (undesirable and growing) military dependence on the United States and the need to get together to do something about it. Even if Washington saw a more assertive European role as a challenge to American leadership, more capable European military establishments could relieve the United States of some of its international security burdens, improving the burden-sharing equation and thereby strengthening, not weakening, transatlantic ties.

The Washington summit communiqué and the strategic concept for NATO agreed upon at the meeting reflected transatlantic agreement that European defense capabilities needed a serious shot in the arm and that it had to be done in ways consistent with the US “three Ds.” However, although the Saint-Malo accord was endorsed by all EU members at meetings in Cologne (June 1999) and Helsinki (December 1999), over the course of the year there were growing rumbles and signs of dissatisfaction on the American side. According to one former administration official, as the initiative took shape, British officials came to Washington regularly prior to each major stage of negotiations with France and the other EU members to reassure US officials that they agreed completely with American perspectives. However, the Saint-Malo outcome and its subsequent implementation at Cologne and Helsinki gave much more emphasis to “autonomy” than the administration would have liked. This official noted that British reassurances throughout this period were often followed by outcomes that reflected compromises with French positions that
were not entirely to the liking of administration officials, raising concerns about the eventual impact of a “European caucus on transatlantic cooperation.

On the European side, NATO and government officials chafed under the impression left by the “three Ds” that the U.S. superpower was putting too much emphasis on the negative. European experts and officials openly cautioned US State and Defense officials at transatlantic discussions of defense issues not to allow this negative approach to capture U.S. policy. Former British Minister of Defense George Robertson, after succeeding Javier Solana as NATO secretary-general, offered a more positive approach. Addressing the forty-fifth annual session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Robertson said, “For my part, I will ensure that ESDI is based on three key principles, the three I’s: improvement in European defense capabilities; inclusiveness and transparency for all Allies, and the indivisibility of transatlantic security, based on shared values (emphasis added).” Moving from “Ds” to “Is,” Robertson tried to put a positive spin on the American concerns that would make the same points but in a fashion less offensive to the Europeans. 336

By the end of 1999, the European Union had tied a major package together based on the guidelines of the Saint-Malo statement. The EU members agreed that Javier Solana, in addition to serving as the Union’s high representative for common foreign and security policy, would become WEU secretary-general to help pave the way for implementation of the decision confirmed at Cologne to merge the Western European Union within the European Union.

In Helsinki, the EU members declared their determination “to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises.” They noted that the process “will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army.” The EU members continued to reiterate that collective defense remained a NATO responsibility and would not be challenged by the new EU arrangements. They agreed on a series of substantial steps, called the “Helsinki Headline Goals,” required to implement their political commitment, including the following:

1. To establish by 2003 a corps-size intervention force of up to 60,000 persons from EU member-state armed forces capable of deploying within sixty days and being sustained for at least one year;

2. To create new political and military bodies to allow the European Council to provide political guidance and strategic direction to joint military operations;

336 Ibid.
3. To develop modalities for full consultation, cooperation, and transparency between the European Union and NATO, taking into account the “needs” of all EU member states (particularly the fact that four EU members—Austria, Ireland, Finland, and Sweden—are not NATO members);

4. To make “appropriate” arrangements to allow non-EU European NATO members and others to contribute to EU military crisis management;

5. To establish a nonmilitary crisis management mechanism to improve coordination of EU and member-state political, economic, and other nonmilitary instruments in ways that might mitigate the need to resort to the use of force or make military actions more effective when they become necessary.

The EU members moved quickly to implement the goals. By March 2000, the Political and Security Committee (PSC, also known by the French acronym COPS), the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), and the EU Military Staff (EUMS) started functioning as interim organizations. The PSC was to be the political decision-making body for CESDP, preparing decisions for EU Council consideration on foreign policy and crisis situations and implementing decisions of the EU members. The EUMC, like the NATO Military Committee, was designed to provide military advice and recommendations to the PSC and to implement the military aspects of EU decisions. The EUMS was to support the work of the Military Committee.

The most immediate task was to prepare catalog offerees that would be made available to actions authorized under the CESDP. This work resulted in the European Union Capabilities Commitment Conference, which convened November 20-21, 2000. The conference produced an impressive inventory of resources, including about 100,000 soldiers, 400 combat aircraft, and 100 ships, including two aircraft carriers. In addition, non-EU NATO members and EU associate partners pledged capabilities that could join in future EU operations. One observer has emphasized that there were “certain realities” about the pledging operations that were missed by some observers. According to former high-level British defense official Michael Quinlan,

*First, there was no suggestion that the forces to be contributed by countries towards the Goals would be entirely new and additional ones created for that purpose; they would be existing ones though . . . much improvement or redesign might be required. Second, there was no suggestion that they would be separate from forces declared to NATO. European countries in the integrated military structure already customarily declared all that they could to NATO; there was no separate reservoir of similar forces available beyond those. Nothing in the CESDP concept rested on hypotheses of extensive autonomous EU action at a time when NATO itself needed to employ forces, and alternative earmarking did not therefore entail illegitimate or confusing double-count (any more than did the long-familiar fact that almost all Alliance members had sometimes used their NATO-*
declared forces for national or U.N. purposes). Third, the capability was not intended as a European Army—a description specifically rejected in EU utterances or even a European Rapid Reaction force in the customary usage of that term in NATO.\(^{337}\)

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CHAPTER 6

THE EVOLUTION OF ESDP
The main issue during 2000 was how these new EU institutions would relate to their NATO counterparts. The problem grew out of the strong desire of some in the European Union, particularly in French diplomatic and political circles, for an “autonomous” EU approach, less vulnerable to US influence, and the hope in NATO that the European Union’s role in defense would be integrated as fully as possible within the overall transAtlantic alliance.

Despite the relative novelty of security and defense in the EU, volumes have already been written on the various aspects of ESDP by political scientists, and increasingly also by legal scholars, not even counting scientific articles. After a brief history of the origins of ESDP this part following will focus on the origins, the institutions and the most recent developments of ESDP.

**External Political Origins of ESDP: The Balkan Wars**

Today there is wide agreement among most commentators of ESDP that the wars in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s were the political cause for the creation of the CFSP and ESDP. At first, events on the Balkans threw the project of a common foreign and security policy into a deep crisis. In the long term, they generated the realization that the Union needed to have some means of binding political consensus, diplomacy and military means to stop terrible wars in its close proximity from repeating themselves. The European Community (later the European Union) failed to recognize the early signs of the coming violent break-up of Yugoslavia, and then, once the civil wars angered in Croatia and Bosnia, it failed to bring enough pressure to bear on the various actors to end the conflict. ‘Europe’s hour’, unusually proclaimed in 1990 by Belgian foreign minister Jacques Poos in effect went past. This foreign policy failure in the Balkans, however, was not the EU’s alone. The UN community as a whole was faced with a new type of intra-state conflict, for which its traditional peacekeeping model, elaborated and tested in many cases since the first Suez observer mission in 1956, knew no solution. The ‘sub-contracting’ model, a loose framework of cooperation between the UN and regional security organisations, envisioned in UN

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340 Javier Solana, speech at the Annual Conference of the EU-ISS, Paris, 10 Sept. 2004, Council Doc. S0232/04: ‘The EU has a special responsibility for the Balkans. In a sense, the CFSP and ESDP were born in the region’.


Secretary-General’s Agenda for Peace in 1992, did not manage to address the fundamental gap between expectations and available resources and political will to engage in dangerous international peace missions. As a recent study succinctly put it, ‘it was impossible to keep a peace that did not exist or impose one without becoming involved in the conflict’. This recognition was more or less soberly admitted by the UN’s Agenda for Peace Supplement in 1995. A new ‘second generation’, and later a ‘third generation’ model of peacekeeping emerged. According to these new peacekeeping doctrines, strictly neutral observation was not enough to stop the parties from continuing hostilities and subjecting civilian populations to unspeakable atrocities in the process. ‘Robust peacekeeping’ gradually entered the security thinking not only on the East River in New York, but also in Brussels. The starting point of the European regional security effort was made by the Petersberg Declaration of the WEU of 1992 which admitted the need also for ‘tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking’.

**Bosnia**

At the outbreak of the wars in former Yugoslavia, there were a number of potential international organizations with some security function in Europe: NATO, the EC, the OSCE, the WEU, and of course the UN. Until summer of 1995, however, none of them managed, in the end, to prevent the hostilities on the ground. The hybrid ‘framework of interlocking security institutions’ soon came to be mocked by the term ‘inter-blocking’ institutions. Certainly an ‘institutional vacuum’ existed in the Balkans from 1991-1995, measured not by the number of available institutions, but by its incapacity to stop the war. It was also a conceptual vacuum which was only filled in 1995, albeit reluctantly, by NATO. The Alliance was not constrained by the strictly-defined peacekeeping limits which had prevented the UN from developing a credible deterrence on the ground. NATO’s military action was backed by active American diplomacy, both of which brought the Bosnian war to an effective end.

One of the first institutions to devise a plan for ‘robust’ intervention in Bosnia was the WEU at the request of the European Council in September 1991. The WEU examined several military options, the most far-reaching of which included a division made up of 20 000 troops of WEU member

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States which would be able to implement an expanded peacekeeping option.\textsuperscript{351} This, and also the more limited versions of the proposal, however, failed to find political consensus among the main actors of the EU. In theory a sufficient collective military capacity to decisively intervene to prevent the impending genocide would have existed.\textsuperscript{352} The United States, at this early stage, did not want to become involved in a conflict that was then deemed an entirely European affair which involved no strategic American interests.\textsuperscript{353} Moreover, there were budgetary concerns limiting the U.S. freedom of action.\textsuperscript{354} Diplomatic efforts such as the Carrington-Cutitiero partition plan of 1992\textsuperscript{355} and later the Vance-Owen plan\textsuperscript{356} followed but, in the absence of a credible threat to use force from Western European countries (or from anyone else), were easily rejected by the fighting parties.\textsuperscript{357} The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), created by the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, went as far as recognizing the need for a common security approach for exactly this kind of scenario. This was done mainly at the insistence of France, for the reason of the perceived gap in relative military capacity with the United States, which had already been starkly felt by the French military in the Gulf War of 3991.\textsuperscript{358} But the need for European defense integration in face of the European ‘embarrassment’ in the Balkans was found also in the Dutch Queen’s Speech in 1993.\textsuperscript{359} The statement of purpose in Art. J.4 of the TEU to provide for a future European defense could not, however, overcome the political mindset of mainstream European statesmanship at the time which was still mostly occupied with digesting the end of the Cold War:\textsuperscript{360} Large projects such as German reunification, the completion of the common market and the creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU),\textsuperscript{361} problems such as the general lack of orientation as to the new European security architecture, coupled with the EC institutional requirement of unanimity for decisions with defense implications, all made it difficult to find fast and effective responses to the Yugoslav crisis which developed so fast at Europe’s doorstep.

The Dayton peace accords\textsuperscript{362} were concluded after NATO’s air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs in late August of 1995, and after the simultaneous successful Croatian Krajina offensive that same


\textsuperscript{352} Ibid. The proposition that European militaries would have been fully capable of intervening at such a grand scale in Yugoslavia, however, is not unproblematic. Most of them were still primarily geared for Cold War-era scenarios of territorial defense. . EU- ISS, \textit{White Paper}, 2004, p. 40.


\textsuperscript{355} Ibid., p. 35.

\textsuperscript{356} Ibid, p. 43.

\textsuperscript{357} Eric Yesson, \textit{NATO, EU and Russia: Reforming Europe’s Security Institutions}, 6 EFAR , 2001, p. 197 at 213.


summer (Croatian forces had been armed and trained by the Americans for years previously). Among the hard lessons drawn by Europe from this event were:

1. that, civil war situations outside the territories of EU member States could affect major European security interests, due to proximity, a mass exodus of refugees, genocide or even an escalation into the EU security zone;\textsuperscript{363}

2. that, owing to the impotence of EU ‘civil power’ in the face of such a hard security challenge, \textsuperscript{364} solutions to security problems of the scale of the war in Bosnia and Croatia depended largely on the United States’ will to get involved;

3. that, this dependency could be against the interest of major European countries.

The interplay between political and military objectives in Bosnia had become evident, for example, to British and French commanders of UNPROFOR who feared retaliation of the Serbs against their peacekeeping troops in response to the American air strikes in 1994 and 1995.\textsuperscript{365} For similar reasons of the vulnerable position of their peacekeepers, European States had opposed in unison the idea of lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia. In the United States, in contrast, the idea of giving Bosnians the ‘just chance to defend themselves’ gained significant popularity, even though the Clinton Administration did support the embargo until the end of the war. Devoid of its own autonomous military options, however, Europe more or less had had to accept the solutions delivered by the United States to end the conflict, British military circles in particular, evaluating their operational experiences in UNPROFOR with their French counterparts, began to think about other options, \textsuperscript{366} in contrast to the traditional unconditional Atlanticist orientation of the British government, rejecting so far any European-only solution.\textsuperscript{367} The Union’s institutional response to the dilemma of its military incapacity was to provide itself with a ‘security arm’ through the WEU with its Petersberg tasks, in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1996. This did not add one soldier or transport plane to future European peacekeeping efforts, but it did insert, for the first time, into the process of EU integration an official mandate to develop a peacekeeping capability, if necessary of the robust kind (peace enforcement, called ‘peacemaking’). In addition, the WEU had, since the

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
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\bibitem[367]{367} Towards the end of the British Major government in 1996, however, even the Conservative leadership, traditionally with a staunch Atlanticist orientation, became convinced that some type of ‘European solution’ had to be found. See Jolyon Howorth, \textit{The ultimate challenge}, 2000, p. 22.
\end{thebibliography}
Alliance’s Berlin Summit of June 1996, also the possibility to draw on some NATO resources, resulting in the first connection of the EU with NATO.

When civil strife erupted in Albania in 1997, the EU played no role in the eventual intervention; ‘Operation Alba’, led by Italy, helped to stabilize the situation there. This disappointed many because, at that time, the Union already had some limited crisis management means at its disposal. Use of the WEU was vetoed by Britain and Germany.

**Kosovo**

The Kosovo war in 1999 confirmed Europe’s military shortcomings (despite warnings to heed the lessons from years of failure in Bosnia) and brought home again the disadvantageous political position of having to accept fails accomplish in peace solutions which were dictated by the American foreign policy priorities. The Clinton Administration categorically ruled out the option of committing troops for a ground campaign to drive out the Serbs from Kosovo and stop the massacre and exodus of the ethnic Albanians. Without the U.S., the option of staging a military ground campaign with European troops alone seemed too risky to military planners. Therefore, the intervention was executed from safe air distance alone. In air warfare, American military supremacy, thanks to technology advances unmatched by European militaries in the 1990s, was even more pronounced. European warplanes could only contribute a small fraction to the campaign. In airlift (that is, the capacity to transport an army at will to faraway places) the situation was similar. The campaign was intended to make Milosevic back down fast, but it took much longer than had been hoped by NATO allies, while pictures of the suffering Kosovar refugees were reaching European and U.S. living rooms night by night. For some European countries, such as Britain, which had emphasized the humanitarian rationale and urgency for the operation from the start, this situation was politically hard to bear. Relations among the NATO member States suffered strains accordingly. At the end of 1999, from a Washington point of view, the Alliance had lost value. Indirectly, this led to a shift in the debate on European defense: initiatives to this debate would in the future firstly come from the EU.

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370 Francois Heisbourg, L’Europe de la defense dans l’Alliance atlantique, 64 Politique etrangere, 1999, p. 219 at 231.

371 Nearly 80 percent of the intelligence and high-risk combat sorties were conducted by the United States. For a detailed discussion, see Nadia Mushtaq Abbasi, Security Issues between the US and EU within NAT, 2000, p.83– 98.


In the peace stabilization and implementation operations in both Bosnia (IFOR/ SFOR) and Kosovo (KFOR), however, European troops took the largest share. Foreign aid for national reconstruction was also predominantly European (both from member States and the Union). The sobering lesson drawn in Europe was that, while the United States with its highly mobile and technologically able forces was the only country with the means to solve a humanitarian crisis by force, the post-conflict ‘cleaning up’ fell to Europe more or less by default. Post-conflict rebuilding of a society is crucial for long-term peace. Europeans, most interested in such a peace due to their proximity to the region, did not resent peace-building, even if, compared to US air strikes, it was less heroic (in the eyes of the world press) and thanked (by the local Balkan populations). It did mean, however, missing the opportunity of having a say in the first phase: if and how to intervene militarily. The problem European leaders had with such a division of labor was that they would be left having to rebuild a country while having had little say on the initial intervention. In the discussions before Operation Allied Force, the link of this European deficiency in decision-shaping to the European argument in the intervention question was clear. It related to the post-conflict consequences: the ruling out a ground campaign exacerbated the humanitarian catastrophe and the number of refugees. Presumably, an early and massive intervention in early spring 1999 (or in late 1998) could have prevented the worst of the atrocities committed by the Serb forces in Kosovo. The need for Europe to start doing more on its own, particularly in its own ‘back yard’, was thus starting to be voiced with increased vehemence after Operation Allied Force. Underlying these voices was the realization that the United States would not be eager to intervene in every regional European conflict with its own forces, indeed, that this would be less and less likely given the gradual reorientation of US strategic interests away from Europe. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott observed in the autumn of 1999 that Europeans were ‘determined never again to feel quite so dominated by the US as they were during Kosovo’. As a result, even while the air bombings in Serbia were still taking place, the European Council in Cologne decided to create new EU military

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374 The call for European action to prevent crises overseas, however, had already been evinced throughout the 1990s with reference to Somalia or Rwanda. See e.g. WEU Assembly Doc. 1439, A European security policy, Report by Mr. Soell (Rapp.), 10 Nov. 1994, para. 4.


377 F. Stephen Larrabee, ESDP and NATO: Assuring Complementarity, 39 The International Spectator 1 (2004), p. 51 at 53. Warnings against such a development were voiced in the US Congress as early as 2000, 106th Cong., 2nd Sess., 146 Cong. Rec. S 4037 at S 4079 (Sen. J. Biden): ‘If the U.S. Congress were to compel the President of the United States to unilaterally withdraw all U.S. combat troops from the NATO force in Kosovo, you can rest assured that the Europeans would get the message that the ESDP is the wave of the future, not NATO. I can hear the grumbling all over Western Europe: “The French are right. We’d better have our own army, because we can’t count on the U.S. in NATO anymore.”

bodies. As J.A.C. Lewis argued, ‘Many believe that Kosovo has done more for the cause of a European defense identity in the past six months than the previous six years of deliberation’. In terms of European foreign policy, however, the Kosovo experience was not catastrophic. The crucial mediating role played for example by M. Ahtisaari in the spring of 1999 was a success for the CFSP. This stood in contrast to the situation during the Bosnian war, where three major European powers had pursued their own path in the Contact Group, in the absence of common action by the Union. A fundamental lesson in diplomatic crisis management, evident since the outbreak of hostilities in 1992 in Croatia and Bosnia, was the value of prevention.

Political disunity in the EU, along with initial hesitance to use force abroad in a misplaced emphasis on economic and cooperative instruments, was likewise perceived as a central failure preventing decisive action in the Balkan wars, As recently as 2000, U.S. academics doubted that the EU would ever live up to this challenge.

The recognition that some military muscle was an essential ingredient to prevent humanitarian catastrophes was already starting to show effects in some efforts such as the Franco-British St-Malo Declaration of Dec. 1998. But the birth-hour of ESDP came too late to have an effect on the Kosovo crisis.

By 2001, however, the EU was in a different position. ESDP was now more developed; it had the first institutional structures, most notably the High Representative, who, appointed in 1999, creatively used the office to some success. Early-warning capacity was also much improved, with the Early Warning Unit since 1999 and the Union’s first military structures in place since the beginning of 2001. The collective will of member States not to repeat the mistake of letting a crisis escalate because of European disagreements was also much stronger. A certain strategic culture already prevailed.

Under these improved conditions the EU soon faced two more potential crises: the inter-ethnic tension in Macedonia and the looming break-up of rump Yugoslavia into its Serbian and Montenegrin parts.

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382 William Bradford, The WEU... the new sick man of Europe, 2000, p. 46 attributes this anti-militarist strand in European foreign policy, harmful to the Balkans crisis, to the EU’s four neutral member States.
383 Ibid.,p. 15.
Macedonia and Serbia-Montenegro Cases

In Macedonia, the growing tension between the Slav and Albanian population parts was recognized early enough by the EU to force the parties to the conference table, eventually producing the Ohrid Framework Agreement of summer 2001, which to this day serves as the main framework of reference for reconciliation in that country. Observers attribute this success partly to the fact that ‘the European Union has absorbed and attempted to apply the lessons of the crises in Bosnia-Herzegovina am Kosovo in its approach [there]’.

Again, in 2002, EU diplomacy prevented break-up of rump Yugoslavia, by giving it a new constitution and renaming it Serbia-Montenegro.

Those two last cases are examples of successful preventive intervention by the EU at the right time, nipping a possible later conflict in the bud. They were helped by a powerful carrot: the long-term perspective of eventual EU membership for all countries involved. But the stick proved as influential: the EU’s voice was heeded more, because it was also silently backed up by some military might (and the political will to use it if necessary). It seems, therefore, that the EU has indeed drawn its lesson from the Balkan wars. By 2001, it was difficult to detect even a nuance of difference between Berlin, London and Paris on Balkans policy, in contrast to the summer of 1991, the military part of the lesson was manifestly the Union’s new defense dimension: ESDP.

Internal Political Reasons of ESDP’s Evolution

Functionalist theory about the European Community has long claimed that integration in one sector (for example freedom of goods) over time also leads to integration in other areas (for example competition, environment), because it creates a certain degree of systemic distortion and inconsistency in those areas not yet integrated. This ‘integrationist pull’ is often described as the ‘spill-over effect’. Functionalist spill over refers to a long-term development, and is in tune with what political scientist describe as the gradualist approach (that is, in small, separate unconnected steps) as opposed to an evolutive approach to European integration (that is, developing from core, following a pre-determined DNA-style ‘logic’): sometimes process counts over results because,

the long term, process leads to results. From a legal perspective the small steps that lead towards further integration in any policy are not only found in primary Community law, that is, in formal treaty amendments. Secondary legislation, regulations and directives, as well as other non-binding instruments o legislation limited in scope, all in execution of ‘mandates’ derived from primary EU law, are the prime playing field for this process. The traditionally integration friendly role played by the Commission and the European Court of Justice (each in their own different way) furthermore enhances this development.

Functionalist logic does not jail itself to the supranational first pillar of the European Communities. The intergovernmental second and third pillars are likewise affected, although their intergovernmentalism has acted as a break in this regard, as they are largely exempt from Commission and ECJ integrationist influence. Nevertheless, it has been argued since Maastricht that the Union could not remain a fully integrated body economically without also assuming some political weight on the world stage: further political integration was in a way dictated natural and indispensable. Further, no integrated EU foreign policy towards third States could be credible without a defense component. Enter the argument to include the WEU’s Art.V mutual defense commitment into the EU system, which was forwarded by some in the debates leading up to the 1996 IGC as a ‘logical conclusion’. Even though this did not happen, a sound case has repeatedly been made for tightening the relationship between defense and integration. The creation of ESDP after the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 was thus a logical next step to the CFSP, also in tune with popular expectations by many Europeans.

A next argument for developing ESDP is its great integrative potential as a catalyst for the EU as a whole. After the completion of EMU, the EU’s internal need for new dynamism may indeed be great. The process of European integration may in its entirety have reached the point where adding a military capacity can help it work more comprehensively. Bradford even argues that ‘continued failure to craft a European defense identity and to meld it to effective European security

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392 WEU Assembly Doc. 1564 (1997), para. 112.
399 K.A. Eliassen (Introduction; The New European Foreign and Security Policy Agenda, in: Id. (ed.), Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union (1998), p. 1) who argued that ‘the EU “is only as strong as its weakest link” which, at present, is to be found in the second pillar’. 
institutions will... ultimately ... threaten the project of European integration’. Even within the second pillar, the long-term relationship between the CESP and ESDP goes both ways: ESDP was born out of the CFSP, but there is also increasingly a feedback effect: activity in defense matters creates new common European interests on the world scene. For instance, already in the mid-1990s discussions about European defense began to have a direct bearing on prospects for more autonomy on the world stage, particularly in relations with the United States. More recently, it has been seen that the bulk of agreements of the EU with third parties under the second pillar (Art. 24 TEU) have in fact been concluded on ESDP matters.

Independently of these theoretical considerations, defense integration may happen also ‘from the simple reality that the politics of security and crisis management demand rapidity and efficiency of decision-making’.

The logic of integration does not stop here. Voices are being raised today who call for turning defense into a supranational policy area, that is, ceding substantial parts of the inner core of sovereignty from member States to the Union, alone able to coordinate and pool military resources without leading to their inefficient allocation and ‘redundant planning’. The European Armaments, Research and Military Capabilities Agency is a first step in this direction. Already today, several of the European Commission’s competencies have defense implications, such as the consolidation of the defense industry, military research, and the part-financing of peacekeeping operations.

Even though there is some support for departing from the current strict intergovernmental base of ESDP, particularly among German scholars and practitioners, opposition to any such move comes from the most influential camps in the EU. The British have traditionally pointed out that in defense, intergovernmentalism is what works best. Even French military circles are loath to give up the last anchor of the security of the nation to an international body ‘the failure of which cannot

be ruled out. In addition, supranationalisation of the second pillar finds enemies among those who adhere to the lofty goal of Europe as a civilian, rather than military, power.

Not far from the thought of a supranational European defense policy is that of forming a true sovereign political union, starting with the CFSP. Defense is at the heart of state sovereignty, for it is beyond any doubt that the ultimate expression of a nation-state’s sovereignty lies in its power of wartime and peacetime leagues and alliances. Implicating the life and death of the citizens, this power justly symbolizes a great historical force. R. Cooper writes that ‘foreign policy is about war and peace, and countries that only do peace are missing half of the story - perhaps the more important part’. The ‘country’ he is referring to is, incidentally, the EU. Transferring this concept of sovereignty to the European level - at the risk of over-simplifying - the meaning of ‘an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’ (Art. 1 TEU) becomes clearer. Security policy relates to the finality of European integration hence the description of defense as the EU’s ‘ultimate challenge’. In one of the many conferences held on ESDP during 2003, in Heidelberg (Germany), the final discussion produced a universal consensus that this development is eventually linked to full statehood, and that ESDP holds the potential to give the Union the decisive push in that direction.

**Institutions of ESDP**

At present, the Council has created three sub-bodies for the Union’s common defense policy, ranked roughly in hierarchical order:

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408 'A realistic stance should require us not to slip the prey for the shadow, admitting that a failure of the EU still cannot be ruled out; it should therefore remain part of our present planning. The EU as it stands is not yet solid enough for us to start relying on new defense mechanisms to the detriment of our existing national defense.' S. Vincon et al., *Defence: quels projets après 2002?,* 57 Defense nationale 6 (2001), p. 82 and 97.


411 Mr. Beregovoy, statement at the forty-fifth session of the Institut des hautes etudes de defense nationale, reprinted in: WEU Assembly Doc. 1333, *Parliamentary debates on security policy under the Maastricht Treaty,* Report by Mr. Nunez (Rapp.), 30 Oct. 1992, para. 62 (debates in the French National Assembly);


413 R. Cooper, *The breaking of nations,* 2003, p. 162.


417 A good broad overview over the institutions of ESDP can be found, e.g. in T.C. Salmon/A.J.K. Shepherd, *Toward a European Army,* 2003, p. 87-112.

418 The structure of these three bodies was in part modelled on that in NATO and the WEU, without however, repeating the separation between the civil and military branches. This mirrored the experience already gained by some EU member States.
1. The Political and Security Committee\textsuperscript{419} (PSC/COPS, Art. 25 TEU) monitors, examines, supervises, and also reports to the Council, which may delegate decision-making power to it for the duration of a crisis management operation regarding its political control and strategic direction. It has a central role to play in the definition and follow-up to the EU’s response to a crisis. It also manages regular consultation with third parties (such as NATO) on all defense-related issues. It is composed of senior national representatives at ambassadorial level.

2. The EU Military Committee\textsuperscript{420} (EUMC) provides the PSC with military advice, worked-out planning options and recommendations. This includes, for example, Concepts of Operations and Operation Plans. It is composed of the national Chiefs of Defense, represented by their military representatives, chaired by a four-star general acting in international capacity. The EUMC is the highest military body of the EU.

3. The EU Military Staff\textsuperscript{421} (EUMS) is composed of military personnel, seconded by the member States to the GSC. It develops detailed military and strategic analysis such as planning and situation assessment, and has a capability for early warning. The EUMS is a GSC department directly attached to the SG/CFSP-HR.

In addition to these three new bodies, the ESDP has since the Nice Treaty taken over all functions from the WEU not covering the mutual defense commitment in Art. V of the Modified Brussels Treaty (MBT) of 1954. Among these institutions are, most prominently, the WEU’s Institute for Security Studies in Paris\textsuperscript{422} and the Satellite Centre in Torrejon (Spain).\textsuperscript{423}

The role of the SG/CFSP-HR is described in broad terms in Arts 18, para. 3 and 26 TEU: to assist in formulating, preparing and implementing policy decisions by the Council. In practice, the first incumbent Javier Solana has taken a very active role, assisted by a growing number of staff in his General Secretariat.


The element with the highest political profile in the CFSP-HR’s staff is the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU), composed of personnel seconded from member States, the GSC and the Commission. Its main tasks, reporting to the SG/CFSP-HR, are early warning, assessment and policy formulation (such as, for example, the European Security Strategy of 2003). There is some institutional overlap of this civil body with its military counterpart, the EUMS.

Military Capabilities

The Council has, in conjunction with regular impulses from the European Council, worked on developing military capabilities to be put at the disposal of the Union. Prime among them are the Helsinki Headline Goal of 1999 (60 000 troops, at 60-days notice, sustainable in operation for a year), and the ensuing apparatus which resembles NATO’s ‘force generation’. This included identifying the main capability gaps to be filled in order to arrive at a European intervention force with all the means at its disposal to react quickly to a crisis. The Capabilities Development Mechanism (COM) has produced a European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP). This process in particular was aided by external expertise from NATO. Europe’s defense industry, which has close links to the first pillar, has a direct bearing on capabilities, and is thus addressed as a matter under ESDP. Despite member States’ continuing prerogative concerning national defense industries contained in Art. 296, the EU has recently begun to tackle the issue, by creating a European Armaments, Research and Military Capabilities Agency to coordinate procurement and create economies of scale, particularly in R&D. Although this last area formally pertains to industry policy, and thus to the first pillar, it clearly has a strong importance also for building ESDP.

Overview of the Main Developments of ESDP

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427 E.g. in the EU-NATO task group on capabilities.

In the latter half of 1998, Britain under Tony Blair announced an about-face in its position on European security\textsuperscript{429} which had up until then consisted in arguing against any institutional reform of Europe’s security architecture which could weaken NATO and put at risk the continued American military commitment to Europe.\textsuperscript{430} In December of that year, France and Britain decided at a bilateral meeting in St-Malo that the EU should in the future acquire “the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.”\textsuperscript{431}

It should be able to take decisions on military actions where ‘the Alliance as a whole’ was not engaged.\textsuperscript{432} The US supported this initiative from the start, but warned against decoupling from NATO, duplication and discrimination against non-EU NATO members.\textsuperscript{433}

At the European Council in Cologne in June 1999, the EU as a whole repeated the goal enunciated at the bilateral meeting of St-Malo, \textsuperscript{434} and thus formally introduced it into the EU framework. The Cologne Summit is thus sometimes referred as the birth hour of ESDP.\textsuperscript{435}

At the European Council in Helsinki, the EU decided to give the policy goal of international crisis management more substance by deciding on the creation of a ‘Headline Goal Task Force’ of 50,000-60,000 troops, deployable within 60 days and sustainable for at least one year, by 2003.\textsuperscript{436} It created the three new ESDP bodies (PSC, EUMC, EUMS) which were created, first on an interim basis.\textsuperscript{437} This new goal of the EU was without prejudice to the traditional collective defense functions of NATO and WEU.\textsuperscript{438}


\textsuperscript{430} See e.g.: Polygamy and the Illusion of Union, Le Monde, article in The Guardian, 4 Aug. 1994, p. 15.

\textsuperscript{431} British-French summit, St-Malo, 3-4 Dec. 1998 (CP 47, p. 8) [emphasis added]

\textsuperscript{432} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{434} European Council, Cologne, 3-4 June, 1999, Declaration of the European Council on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defense, para. 1, CP 47, p. 41.


\textsuperscript{436} European Council, Helsinki, 10-11 December 1999, CP 47, pp. 82, Presidency Conclusions, II. Common European Policy on Security and Defense, para. 28.

\textsuperscript{437} See above at: Institutions. They were accordingly called the interim Political and Security Committee (iPSC), the interim Military Committee (EUMC) and the interim Military Staff (iEUMS), until they became permanent in January 2001. Annex IV, Presidency Reports to the Helsinki European Council on ‘Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defense’ and on ‘Non-Military Crisis Management of the European Union’, CP47, p. 87.

\textsuperscript{438} Ibid. p. 83.
At Santa Marta de Feira, on 19-20 June 2000, the European Council further elaborated the concepts and particular objectives for creating an independent EU crisis management capacity, particularly capability goals for the Headline Goal.439

A first Capabilities Commitment Conference on 20-21 November 2000 produced a ‘Force Catalogue’, broken down in individual national capability goals, a total of 100 000 persons, approximately 400 aircraft, and some 100 vessels.440 Problems were identified with regard to strategic capabilities providing availability, deployability, sustainability and interoperability of those forces. As these military means could in the medium term only come from “external sources, relations with NATO (for example the compatibility with the Alliance’s Defense Capability Initiative (DCI)) took a particularly prominent part in that meeting.

At the European Summit of Nice in December 2000, the EU formalized the three interim bodies created at the Helsinki Summit.441 The Nice Treaty amending the TEU also introduced the possibility of enhanced cooperation for the CFSP, that is, not necessarily including all member States, but not for matters having military or defense implications. Thus, coalitions of the willing for peacekeeping operations were ruled out. Nevertheless, in 2003, two such operations involving only some member States did in fact take place.

As it stood, the Nice Summit document also staked the outer limits for the EU’s defense ambitions. It stated that the St-Malo-Helsinki process did not involve the establishment of a European army, and also reiterated the key role NATO continued to play in the collective defense of its members.

At its Laeken Summit on 14-15 December 2001, the EU announced that progress on the build-up of its crisis management capabilities had reached the point where it was ‘capable of conducting some crisis-management operations’.442

With the conclusion of the EU-NATO Berlin Plus agreement with NATO at the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002 on the borrowing of strategic military assets,443 the way was opened for the first EU crisis management operations in 2003.

The Issue Of Independent European Military Headquarters

The issue of whether the EU should have any military planning centre separate and independent from NATO, and at which level, was the main source of contention in EU-NATO relations in 2003, after the Berlin Plus issue had been resolved in December 2002.\footnote{J. de Hoop Scheffer, A Changing Alliance in a Changing World, speech in Bratislava, 30 June 2005, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s050630a.htm [visited 01/07/07].} It was not formally part of the discussions in the European Convention or the 2004 IGC, and thus not included anywhere in the Constitution. But it was clear to all actors that, once such an EU planning centre, no matter how small, would be in existence, this would set in train an irreversible process of the EU developing its own military options, and interests.\footnote{‘People will regard this as a Trojan Horse. You start with 30 and end up with 300. It is a bridgehead to something much bigger/ (Unnamed NATO diplomat, cited in: J. Dempsey / G. Parker, Hopes rise for deal on new EU framework, Financial Times, 1 Dec. 2003, p. 1).
} Hence, politically, the issue quickly became a kind of proxy war about the general question of EU military autonomy versus NATO.\footnote{LIE: Le projet britannique torpille l’idée de Paris at Berlin d’etat-major europeen; Londres vent cantonner la defense europeenne dans l’Otan, Le Figaro, 3 Sept. 2003.} The debate was sparked off by the Mini-Summit of the ‘Gang of Four’ in April 2003, and was finally resolved in the EU document titled ‘European Defense: NATO/EU Consultation, Planning and Operations’ of December 2003.\footnote{European Defense: NATO/EU Consultation, Planning and Operations, Council Press Release, 15 Dec. 2003.}

\textit{EU Dreams of Common Army}

2002. Part of the rationale for the idea of an EU military HQ fermented during the two years of the ‘Turkish deadlock’ over the Berlin Plus agreement, which led European leaders to think of an independent European option, in case the expected agreement over using NATO’s military assets should eventually fail. Once born, however, the idea persisted and survived beyond the successful conclusion of the Berlin Plus agreement at the end of 2002.

**Brussels Summit**

On 29 April 2003, Belgian PM Guy Verhofstadt convened a small Summit in Brussels with the Heads of State and Government of France, Germany and Luxembourg. The resulting Declaration stated the need for closer cooperation in defense, called a ‘European Security and Defense Union’ (ESDU). Furthermore, for EU-led operations without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, the EU needed to be provided with some independent planning capability. They therefore proposed to the other member States ‘the creation of a nucleus collective capability for planning and conducting operations for the European Union’, and resolved to put in place ‘not later than 2004, a multinational deployable force headquarters for joint operations, building on existing deployable headquarters’. This new headquarters should be placed at the Brussels suburb of Tervuren.

It was argued later by the architects of the St-Malo Declaration of 1998 that this was in essence a goal already stated at St-Malo: that the EU should be able to act, whether using NATO assets or in its own ‘outside the NATO framework’. The proponents defended the initiative’s exclusive character, arguing that various European projects, later successful, had started in this way.

Criticism was leveled at the Mini-Summit from the United Kingdom and other European countries as well as the United States because of the Summit’s bad timing at the height of the contentious debate of the Iraq campaign. Three of the four countries of the ‘Mini-Summit’ had been the ones who had blocked NATO’s Art.4 assistance to Turkey only in February, and the initiative was suspiciously regarded as a further effort to undermine the Alliance. In the case of Germany, this was particularly serious for the United States. Secretary of State Colin Powell reacted by saying

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452 Letter from Guy Verhofstadt, PM of Belgium, to Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac, Brussels, 18 July 2002.
455 Ibid, para. 6.
458 C. Winneker, *Defense Summit in the firing line*, European Voice (online edition), Vol. 9, No. 16.
that what was needed was not more headquarters, but more capabilities. Apart from this, however, the American reaction was still astoundingly quiet.

**Towards a full compromise in December 2003**

The United Kingdom recognized the necessity of some initiative to take the steam out of the proposal of the ‘Gang of Four’. At the end of August, it published a non-paper titled ‘Food for Thought’ in which it proposed the creation of ‘an EU planning cell at SHAPE’, that is, an EU body, but situated within NATO confines, for all kinds of EU operations, NATO-supported or otherwise. The idea of a permanent headquarters solely for autonomous EU operations was decisively rejected. The paper was purposefully leaked to the press, to have a maximum effect on the next informal meeting of EU foreign ministers in Riva del Garda (Italy) on 5 September. Despite being located at NATO, the EU cell proposed would be ‘more’ (in terms of European autonomy) than the Berlin Plus agreement provided because planning would be conducted by EU personnel at SHAPE themselves, not by NATO personnel for the EU. The idea was, it seemed, not in principle rejected even in NATO military circles. For Tony Blair, this first-time concession to an EU planning facility was a huge step, risking fierce criticism from the Conservative opposition at home.

Towards the end of September the views of the ‘Big Three’, Britain, France and Germany, were starting to converge on European defense. The result of this first compromise was an internal document approved by Blair, Chirac and Schroder in a trilateral summit in Berlin on 20 September which read that the EU ‘should be endowed with a joint capacity to plan and conduct operations without recourse to NATO resources and capabilities’. It was mooted that this capacity should comprise about 40 to 50 military officers. The project was to be explicitly open to other countries, not necessarily all EU members.

Belgium, which had before 20 September still insisted on building the EU planning headquarters in Tervuren, now fell into line, and the plan was endorsed by the Italian Presidency in early October.

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in an own ‘compromise proposal’. Some two weeks later, the European Parliament likewise issued a resolution in support.

The reaction of the United States and NATO to this emerging consensus within the EU on defense for a long time did not go beyond remarking occasionally that Belgian ‘chocolate-makers’ were best ignored. However, during the summer, US ambassador to NATO N. Burns had vociferously warned Europeans ‘not to go it alone’ on defense, an area where NATO was ‘the only show in town’. After Britain’s concession over the EU planning cell in August, however, the US diplomatic campaign against plans for a more independent European military capability began to mount. The United States called an extraordinary meeting of the NAC on 20 October and, during reportedly heated discussions, apparently called the EU’s plans the ‘most significant threat to NATO’s future’. The European allies took the point, and went to great length to reassure the US that all their initiatives were complementary to NATO. To further soothe the waves, Germany a few days later firmly held that the planned EU planning cell should be attached to NATO. Britain underlined its refusal to accept any EU planning unit outside the NATO headquarters. By mid-November the general European consensus, summarized by the CFSP-HR Javier Solana, was that the planned EU cell should not in any quantitative way duplicate the vast planning resources already available at SHAPE (partly available also to the EU, under the Berlin Plus agreement), but should be restricted to a small number of persons, and should facilitate EU-NATO cooperation in general. US President G.W. Bush himself felt reassured by Tony Blair that none of the EU’s incipient defense plans would undermine NATO. By the end of 2003 US opposition to most of the plans enunciated by the Mini-Summit in April would effectively cease; it still occasionally called them ‘hypothetical’. Drawing a preliminary balance over the debate on 17 November 2003, the Council acknowledged that various proposals have been made in recent months in order to improve the EU’s capacity for planning and conducting military operations. These should be examined further, in a framework of compatibility with NATO and aiming at avoiding unnecessary duplication.

470 E.g. at the joint NAC-PSC meeting on 15 July 2003.
474 Britain renews its opposition to EU defense headquarters, AFP, 5 Nov. 2003.
475 C. Adams, Blair faces hangover when the party ends and his guest is gone, Financial Times, 17 Nov. 2003, p. 3.
478 GAERC, Brussels, 17 Nov. 2003, Conclusions, para. 9 (CP 67, p. 256 at 257).
The consensus was already so far advanced among the EU 15 that on the same day a Status-of-Forces agreement (EU SOFA) could be concluded, concerning national military personnel to be made available to the future EU headquarters and crisis management operations.\(^{479}\)

The IGC Summit on 29 November 2003 in Naples delivered the final breakthrough between the ‘Big Three’. Britain dropped its resistance to an EU planning cell situated at the EUMS, that is, outside NATO. Its limited operational capacity would only, however, start operating as a ‘last resort’ measure, and NATO-supported missions (organized over an EU cell at SHAPE) would have a clear preference. The compromise was enshrined in the document ‘European defense: NATO/EU Consultation, Planning and Operations’.\(^{480}\) The compromise at Naples was realized as a grander package deal - the price to be paid for the British concession lay in a different place, namely in the negotiations at the IGC:

- a weakening of the obligation on mutual defense in the draft European Constitution (old Art. 1-40, para.7)\(^{481}\) and a strengthening of the reference to existing NATO obligations;

- the fulfilling of two British demands concerning the ‘battle groups’ provision (old Art. 1-40, para.6):

  - Unanimity in decisions to establish such enhanced cooperation and no minimum number requirement for the member States which wanted to participate.\(^{482}\)

Reactions to this deal from NATO quarters were expectedly cool, but the US government, apparently informed beforehand by the British, went along.\(^{483}\)

At the European Council in Brussels on 12 December 2003, the compromise document was tabled by Germany, France and Britain and adopted without changes.\(^{484}\) The European Council further called for speedy implementation of the document, in particular the establishment of the EU cell at SHAPE and the EU civil/military planning cell at the EUMS.\(^{485}\) An informal meeting of EU defense ministers on 5-6 April 2004 decided that the EU civil/military planning cell should be up and running in the latter half of 2004, a goal which was confirmed by the European Council on 17-18 June 2004,

\(^{479}\) Agreement between the Member States of the European Union concerning the status of military and civilian staff seconded to the institutions of the European Union, of the headquarters and forces which may be made available to the European Union in the context of the preparation and execution of the tasks referred to in Article 17(2) of the Treaty on European Union, including exercises, and of the military and civilian staff of the Member States put at the disposal of the European Union to act in this context (EU SOFA), 17 Nov. 2003, OJ C 321/6 of 31.12.2003.

\(^{480}\) The paper was not officially published, but is reprinted in CP 67, pp. 283-4.


\(^{482}\) Such a minimum requirement is still found in Art. 40 a TEU, para. 2, and was part of the Italian ‘compromise proposal’ in October 2004. L. Zecchini, p. 280.

\(^{483}\) Judy Dempsey, Rumsfeld emollient over EU military planning move, Financial Times, 2 Dec. 2003, p. 10.

\(^{484}\) It was published by the Council as a Press Release from 15 Dec. 2003, with no further document specification.

but not achieved in time. The High Representative issued a report on preparations in this regard on 15 June 2004.\(^\text{487}\) The Council decided on a more detailed outline for the civil/military cell on 10 November 2004.\(^\text{488}\) A proposal for modalities concerning the EU cell at SHAPE and the NATO Liaison Team at the EUMS were shortly thereafter sent in a letter from the High Representative to the NATO SG. With the endorsement of an enlarged NATO/EU Consultation document of December 2004 by the European Council on 17 December 2004, the way was opened for the cell to start its work and prepare the establishment of an EU operations centre by June 2006.\(^\text{489}\)

### NATO’s Reaction

NATO’s own interpretation of the EU’s NATO/EU consultation document-as made public in its Press Release containing the NATO-SG’s comments of 11 December 2003 - conformed, on most of the points, to the letter and spirit of that text. It restated NATO’s position as the ‘natural choice’ for operations involving European and North American allies. It confirmed that ‘there will be no duplication of NATO’s standing operational planning capabilities’ and that ‘there would be no permanent EU operational staff’. In addition, it elaborated, somewhat more than the NATO/EU Consultation document itself, on the requirement for ‘transparency’ between NATO and the EU.

However, in two crucial points NATO’s interpretation did deviate from the wording of the EU’s document. Firstly, it said that the ‘EU arrangements for civil-military coordination’ (meaning option 3 and 4) were ‘firmly within the context of Berlin Plus’. The EU’s document, contrastingly, says that only option 2 ‘will be conducted through the “Berlin Plus” arrangements’.\(^\text{490}\) However, NATO-SG Robertson’s comments could still be reconciled with the language of the EU’s document if one understands ‘within the context’ to mean ‘in conformity with’ or ‘not prejudice’.

Secondly, the phrase “where NATO as a whole is not engaged”\(^\text{491}\) in the EU’s document was adapted in NATO’s Press Release to ‘where NATO as a whole has decided not to be engaged’. While the EU’s formulation in an exercise of constructive ambiguity leaves open the crucial question whether NATO has a right of first refusal to any future operation before the EU can consider engaging in it, NATO’s formulation is crystal clear in the affirmative. The lacuna between those two

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\(^\text{489}\) European Council, Brussels, 16-17 June 2005, Presidency Conclusions, para. 82, Council Doc. 10255/05.

\(^\text{490}\) European Council, Brussels, 16-17 June 2005, Presidency Conclusions, para. 82, Council Doc. 10255/05.

\(^\text{491}\) NATO/EU Consultation document, para. 3 (emphasis added).
formulations cannot be healed by even the most creative interpretation. The conclusion must be that NATO, while being in agreement with most of the points in the EU’s ‘NATO/EU Consultation document’, still insisted on a right of first refusal versus the EU concerning crisis management operations.

**European Security Strategy**

A *strategy* is a policy-making tool which, on the basis of the values and interests of the EU, outlines the long-term overall policy *objectives* to be achieved and the basic categories of *instruments* to be applied to that end. It serves as a reference framework for day-to-day policy-making in a rapidly evolving and increasingly complex international environment and it guides the definition of the *means*.

**The Absence of a European Strategy**

The creation of the EU military bodies for European cooperation, and the necessity to improve the usability and difficulties to field of the European armed forces, in the consequential crisis and peacekeeping operations that ESDP was obligated to attend, was the most strong evident, of the absence of a European Security Strategy plan. A task that seemed impossible to complete, especially before the Saint-Malo agreement, as the political and strategic views of the member states widely differed, far beyond the creation of the ESDP. Because of those divisions of views and in order not to lose the momentum, it was decided, as happens so often in European decision-making, to push through with those elements on which an agreement already existed, assuming that once these were in place the strategic debate would inevitably have to follow.492

There was no common strategic vision behind the consensus on the demand to gradually develop more effective military capabilities for the EU, as a consequence, the EU external action was lacking of direction, determination and consistency. Characteristics that the US and NATO possessed for many years now and were an essential point, to the restriction of the Union to a classic reactive role. The EU needed to promote its own policy priorities, in terms of both objectives and instruments in the ‘European way’, so as to distance themselves from US policy with which they could not agree and highlight alternatives and comprehensive methods, preserving the same time the transatlantic partnership, that was perceived to be threatened from the ESDP existence, rather

than be relieved that Europe as well, could be held responsible for security and crisis management operations. It was not until the informal meeting of the General Affairs and External Relations Council in Greece on May 3rd 2003, that Javier Solana produced a draft strategic document, that later the same month, the European Council welcomed Solana’s document, “A secure Europe in a better World”, and charged him with the work for the completion of the European Security Strategy, as expected the European Council adopted the plan in their meeting in December 2003.

**New Security Environment and Objectives**

The EU member states that had been long halted being a threat to one another, but rather were readily agreed to join the Union, enlarging it to twenty seven member states in 2007, had to secure the enlarged number of European civilians and neighbors’, from the negative spill-over effects of the globalize terrorism, armed conflicts between or within third states, organized crime, illegal migration, social and economic underdevelopment, lack of democratic institutions and human rights, failed states and the most tremendous of all ecological problems, that threatens the proper functioning of our planet. The security changed meaning, because it further meant that the security of one dependent on the security of the other and the stability of International system.

At the Dec. 2003 Brussels meeting, when the European Council adopted the European Security Strategy and highlighted the fact that ‘Europe had never been so prosperous, so secure nor free’ and which ‘as a union of twenty five states and over 450 million people actively producing a quarter of the World’s Gross National Product, and with a wide range of instruments at its disposal, is inevitably a global player’, hence ‘Europe should be ready to equally share the primary responsibility for global security and in building a better World’.

**‘Atlantist’ vs. ‘Europeanist’ Views over ESDP**

There are two visions concerning the common European defense. On the one hand, the NATO version, supported by the United States envisages European defense as a process inside NATO following the notion of “separable but not separate.” On the other hand, the EU version, supported

by France, envisages space for autonomous operations “when NATO is not engaged as a whole.” It can be argued whether the NATO and EU visions are complementary or competitive.

It is necessary to recognize therefore that within the European Union a gap exists among those who consider the transatlantic relationship the essential element of European defense and those who desire to create an autonomous and independent European defense. This question, basic to defining a strategy of European security, is still pending and underlies all other debates and decisions concerning security and defense issues inside the EU. Aware of this division, the European Security Strategy is ambiguous on these issues, although it is possible to observe a slippery slope toward the independent side. Thus, the document depicts NATO as “an important expression of the transatlantic relationships” while the Constitution Treaty considers it the “foundation of their collective defense.” The problem is even more acute when considering that France and the United Kingdom, the two most important EU countries at least as far as defense is concerned, support opposing views. Three criteria will be used to analyze the future of the European common defense: feasibility, suitability, and acceptability. In order to determine feasibility, the relevant question to answer is whether the European common defense can be accomplished with the means available. Despite statements about the EU’s ability to undertake crisis management operations, the figures concerning military budgets do not match the aspirations. From 2001 to 2003, the EU defense expenditure mean was 1.9 percent of GDP whereas the NATO mean was 2.2 per cent, and the U.S. mean was 3.3. In 2004, the US spent more than twice as much on defense as the 25 EU members combined. By 2009, the US defense budget is expected to surpass half a trillion dollars, further widening the transatlantic gap. is also very uneven among EU countries. The defense spending of three countries, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, accounted for more than 60 per cent of total EU defense spending in 2004. However, budget expenditures do not fully explain the lack of EU capabilities. Europe’s fragmented defense markets and varied national procurement policies have led to costly duplication. At the recent EU summit at Hampton Court, Solana emphasized that there was not enough money to finance EU crisis management commitments for 2006. European defense resources do not match the level of ambition set by EU politicians, even to achieve the full range of Petersberg missions. A common European defense is not feasible with the current level of expenditure. Concerning the suitability of the common European defense, the question to answer is whether it will accomplish the desired effect. The challenge for the EU is to deal with future needs derived from the 9/11 attacks. However, previous conflicts in which EU countries were involved biased common defense developments and hindered its suitability. When EU members decided in 1999 to start a process for an autonomous European solution concerning security and defense, the decision was heavily influenced by the recent Kosovo crisis and the previous humanitarian interventions in the Balkans.

When the Berlin wall fell and Western countries reached a disproportionate victory in the first Gulf war, European countries did not feel any threat and looked for “peace dividends.” The need for a new role for the military and pressure from public opinion resulted in a focus on humanitarian missions. Therefore, most European armies were oriented toward these new missions. This fact also helped to improve the image of the armies in societies with strong pacifist movements. Spain is a case in point. But the 9/11 attacks were a dramatic awakening; high-intensity capabilities were again necessary against rogue states. The threat of terrorism changed the strategic scenario, but in Europe the attacks were not perceived as dramatically as in the United States. Four years later, despite 9/11, Afghanistan, and Iraq, ESDP continues as if the world has not changed. When most security analysts acknowledge that the question of a terrorist attack with weapons of mass destruction is not “whether it is going to take place” but “when,” ESDP continues to focus on humanitarian operations away from its borders, leaving the military defense of European territory to NATO. The recent lack of agreement among European NATO countries concerning the possibility that the alliance would take the lead in the fight against the terrorism in Afghanistan shows that European countries are not focused on the fight against terrorism either in NATO or the EU. They prefer focusing on stabilization and security missions rather than offensive operations against terrorists. Some common measures have been taken within the third EU pillar, police and justice—but not within the exterior dimension of the second pillar. When the European Security Strategy (ESS)\(^498\) discusses future contingencies, it considers widening the spectrum of missions to include disarmament operations, support for third countries combating terrorism, and reform of the security sector. No mention is made regarding high-intensity operation capabilities. Therefore, the core military missions needed to challenge rogue states are not even considered within EU military parameters. The current European defense architecture is suitable to match neither current nor future challenges.

The third yardstick is the acceptability of common European defense. In the middle of the Cold War, France designed the European Defense Community (EDC) to integrate post-war Germany into the Western system. When it became apparent that the new European army would no longer be national, the French National Assembly rejected its own plan. In 2005 France did the same thing when voting on the European Constitutional Treaty. The current security and defense policy could lead in the future to a common European defense, but could entail a loss of sovereignty that some European countries are reluctant to accept. This rejection is more likely to occur when considering that the single European currency still has not been adopted by all EU members, and also that security and defense are not priority items to Europeans.\(^499\) Their preponderant concerns are


\(^{499}\) Eurobarometer, “How Europeans see themselves,” available from http://europa.eu.int/comm/publications/booklets/05/txt_en.pdf; Internet; [accessed 03 December 2006].
unemployment and environmental improvements. A serious defense commitment would also require additional resources and increases in defense budgets, but current defense expenditures are low and will stay that way for the foreseeable future.
CHAPTER 7
THE MILESTONES OF EU-NATO COOPERATION
EU-NATO relationships are relatively new, as each of the two organizations for a longtime occupied a very different area of activity, so the possible interface between, them was virtually nil. Today, in contrast, the EU and NATO seem to develop new areas, of cooperation and harmonization of their respective activities with amazing speed, the most widely documented example of which was the 2002 Berlin Plus agreement on the borrowing of assets by the EU from NATO for its crisis management operations in the Balkans. But there are many others. Indeed, it seems increasingly hard today to understand them all in their entirety and to see them together in a coherent framework.

The relationship between NATO and the European Union evolved gradually though the 1990s, to an almost mature state today. Yet, it seems clear for further changes in the future. During the Cold War, circumstances which shaped the sociopolitical division of the roles of the EU and NATO, as found enshrined in the organizations’ statutes and practice, had remained constant for close to forty years. With the Berlin Wall gone, new and different forces began to unravel and underlying interests began to shift. After the threat of Soviet invasion had disappeared, old definitions of security centering mainly on territorial defense gave way to a broader view reflecting different, and more complex and diverse, security problems, taking also account of the human dimension.\(^{500}\) In search of answers to these problems, crisis management (including peacekeeping) became significantly more important.\(^{501}\)

**First Contacts**

Informal meetings seem to have been held with some regularity between NATO-SG J. Solana and the Commission President J. Santer and RELEX Commissioner H. van den Broek as early as 1997.\(^{502}\) These informal contacts reached a new level when Solana became the EU’s High Representative for the Common and Security Policy. He was replaced by G. Robertson, formerly British Defense Secretary and one of the architects of the St-Malo agreement. With Solana, Europe had finally got its famous ‘number to call in Europe’ (H. Kissinger). Immediately after his appointment, Robertson announced he would work with Solana, which implied a direct EU-NATO contact.\(^{503}\) Solana, who had only recently been the NATO-SG himself, had already participated in the discussions of the NAC.\(^{504}\) The two met regularly for lunch. This contact, started so informally, may have been a cultural transfer carried over from NATO’s common practice of informal consultation which Solana

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503 Speech by Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary-General, Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Amsterdam, 15 Nov. 1999, CP47, p. 60.  
and Robertson, already familiarized from NATO, simply continued in a new framework. As a side-effect, the two established for the first time some kind of informal EU-NATO institutional connection. This phenomenon would be described in political science as ‘internalism’. The Solana-Robertson connection soon began to show its effects. Both regularly reported on these meetings to their respective Councils. The 1999 Helsinki European Council already made reference to it: ‘Initially, relations will be developed on an informal basis, through contacts between the SG/HR for the CFSP and the Secretary General of NATO.’ By summer of 2000, these contacts bore first fruit in the interim arrangement on Security of Information between the Council’s General Secretariat and NATO. By that time there was wide agreement that EU-NATO institutional cooperation need to be deepened and intensified beyond the informal level.

Permanent Institutionalization

Permanent institutionalization began to be envisaged by Javier Solana and US ambassador A. Vershbow from the end of 1999. The EU’s Helsinki Summit in December 1999 had stated that all EU member States would participate in decisions and deliberations of the Council relating to EU-NATO relations on an equal footing. The US had only recently clearly come out in favor of ESDP, overcoming earlier ambiguities. Some hesitancy to establishing direct institutional EU-NATO relations on the part of some EU member States also existed notably by France. In spring 2000, France’s reservations were rooted in its policy goal to establish the future EU-NATO relationship on an equal footing. The institutional base for ESDP was only just beginning to be built. Involving NATO at this early stage was seen as detrimental to the independence of the new ESDP institutions.

The fear in Paris, shared to some extent by other capitals, was that the monolithic strength of NATO would steamroller the infant CESDP into adopting structures, procedures and policies which would be unduly influenced by Washington and would therefore be likely simply to replicate NATO practice.

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509 ibid., speech at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 7 Oct. 1999, America’s Stake in a Strong Europe, CP 47, p. 54.
512 Jolyon Howorth, The ultimate challenge, 2000, p. 56.
Therefore, France favored a continuation of the existing informal structures for the time being. By May 2000, however, France took the plunge and proposed creating a set of joint EU-NATO committees which should tackle the most difficult issues surrounding ESDP.\textsuperscript{513}

At its next Summit in Feira, on 19-20 June 2000, the European Council proposed that four ad hoc joint working groups should be installed with NATO to address the various aspects of the EU-NATO relationship: security issues, capabilities goals, modalities enabling EU access to NATO assets, and permanent consultation mechanisms for non-EU European NATO members.\textsuperscript{514} Chief among these aspects were military capabilities, where NATO expertise in time proved very beneficial to the build-up process of the ERRF.\textsuperscript{515}

In a much-celebrated event, the new interim Political and Security Committee (iPSC) met the NAC at ambassador level on 19 Sept. 2000.\textsuperscript{516} Such a meeting, although long expected from many sides, still lacked any formal base. Towards the end of the year, NATO began to press harder for institutional links between NATO and the EU.\textsuperscript{517} In an exchange of letters between NATO and the Swedish EU Presidency of 24 January 2001, it was finally agreed that NATO and the EU should meet at least three times per half-year at PSC-NAC ambassadorial level, and at least once at ministerial level.\textsuperscript{518}

Under this new formal arrangement, the first EU-NATO ministerial meeting was held on 30 May 2001 followed on 12 June 2001 by the first formal PSC-NAC meeting.\textsuperscript{519} EU-NATO cooperation at lower levels (between the respective Military Committees and Military Staffs) had taken place already since the EU's Nice Summit\textsuperscript{520} without any formal base. Planning activity by the EU's new military bodies does not seem to have conflicted with NATO's work.\textsuperscript{521} Moreover, a harmonious collusion of respective activities in the EU and NATO seems to be assured by the fact that the military representatives of most EU member States in both organizations are the same persons.\textsuperscript{522}

Consultation and Collaboration out Periods of Crisis

\textsuperscript{513} Ibid., France softens stance on NATO's involvement in EU defense policy, European Voice (online edition), Vol. 6, No. 17, 27 April 2000.
\textsuperscript{515} Martin Reichard, “The EU-NATO Relationship: A Legal And Political Perspective”, Ashgate, 2006, p.119
\textsuperscript{516} Intervention by Dr Javier Solana, High Representative for CFSP, COPSI/NAC first joint meeting, 19 Sept. 2000, CP 47, p. 140.
\textsuperscript{518} Martin Reichard, “The EU-NATO Relationship: A Legal and Political Perspective”, 2006, p. 128.
\textsuperscript{519} Trevor C. Salmon/AJK Shepherd, Toward a European Army, 2003, p. 175.
In the European Council Summit Conclusions of Nice, 7-9 December 2000, the matter of formalized contacts between NATO and the EU was first tackled in earnest. The Conclusions identified three different levels at which formal meetings should take place (PSC-NAC, MC level and subsidiary bodies), in addition to ‘regular contacts’ between the SGs, the Secretariats and the Military Staffs. NATO civil and military representatives would be invited to meetings of EU bodies, especially concerning matters ‘where the capabilities and expertise of the Alliance are concerned’. It was considered a huge step towards institutionalizing EU-NATO cooperation. However, the Conclusions stated that for the formal category of meeting, the ‘organizational arrangements’ remained to be agreed between the two organizations. An exchange of letters which took place between the Swedish EU Presidency and the NATO-SG on 24 January 2001 is the main document regulating in a formal way the format of meetings between NATO and the EU. It provides that

...meetings between the NAC and PSC will be held not less than three times, and EU/ NATO ministerial not less than once, per EU Presidency. Either organization may request additional meetings as necessary.

The EU and NATO have proceeded to hold joint meetings in regular format since the beginning of 2001, at various levels. PSC-NAC meetings, held monthly, are always announced to the public in advance. The NATO SG is also regularly invited to attend the Informal Meetings of EU Defense Ministers. More elaborate formats have also been developed for meetings at MC and MS level.

Cooperation of EU-NATO during Periods of Crisis

The Conclusions of Nice Presidency had also contained detailed provisions on ‘EU-NATO relations in times of crisis’, that is, in the preparatory phase prior to a peacekeeping operation. It was stated that:

In the emergency phase of a crisis, contacts and meetings will be stepped up, including those at ministerial level if appropriate, so that, in the interests of transparency, consultation and cooperation,

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523 European Council, Nice, Annex VII to Annex VI. at 11, CP 47, pp. 204.
524 Permanent arrangements for consultation and cooperation between the EU and NATO. Exchange of letters between George Robertson, Secretary-General of NATO, and Anna Lindh, Swedish FM and Chairman of the Council of the European Union. 24 Jan. 2001 (released by the Council on a request by the author on 10 May 2004) [Hereinafter: EU-NATO exchange of letters, 24 Jan. 2001], The exchange of letters is reproduced in full in the Annex. The operative provisions are also contained in Council Doc. 5251/1/01 of 16 Jan. 2001 (with the same title).
527 Modalities for meetings between the Military Committees of NATO and the EU, 27 March 2003, Council Doc. 7870/03.
the two organizations can discuss their assessments of the crisis and how it may develop, together with any related security problems.\textsuperscript{528}

NATO-SG G. Robertson, in his proposing letter to the High Representative of 24 January 2001,\textsuperscript{529} made brief reference to the EU’s Nice proposals:

*We endorsed the view of the EU that in the emergency phase of a crisis contacts and meetings will be stepped up.*

This same passage was, however, missing in the ensuing reply from the Swedish Presidency.\textsuperscript{530} Hence, from a formal point of view, the matter of EU-NATO consultation from the time leading up to a crisis cannot be said to have been included in the subject matter regulated by the exchange of letters of 24 January 2001. It should be pointed out that EU-NATO consultation in times of crisis did concern part of the Berlin Plus agreement which, despite the EU’s detailed Nice proposals, was still being negotiated in January 2001. In light of NATO’s comment on the Berlin Plus negotiations in mid-December 2000 that ‘nothing will be agreed until everything is agreed,’\textsuperscript{531} the phrase above in NATO-SG G. Robertson’s letter cannot be read as substantive proposal to extend to subject matter of the exchange of letters, in addition to the matter of EU-NATO consultation outside of crises, also to the area of EU-NATO consultation in crisis. Regulation of that second question would have to await the conclusion of the ‘Berlin Plus’ package deal in December 2002.\textsuperscript{532}

**The “Berlin Plus” Arrangements**

The Alliance took an important step with a view to effective EU-NATO teamwork at the Washington Summit in April 1999. The Allies approved principles for cooperation with the EU known as “Berlin Plus,” to signify that they would build on the June 1996 agreements in Berlin. The Allies declared that they were “ready to define and adopt the necessary arrangements for ready access by the European Union to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance, for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily as an Alliance,” and added that these arrangements would address:


\textsuperscript{529} See above, EU-NATO exchange of letters, 24 Jan. 2001.

\textsuperscript{530} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{532} See Berlin Plus Arrangements.
Assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to military planning for EU-led operations; the presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations;

Identification of a range of European command options for EU-led operations, further developing the role of DSACEUR in order for him to assume fully and effectively his European responsibilities; The further adaptation of NATO’s defense planning system to incorporate more comprehensively the availability of forces for EU-led operations.

It took the NATO Allies and the EU member states from April 1999 to December 2002 to determine how to formalize this agreement. Tony Blair, then the British Prime Minister, said that the challenge had been “to resolve differences between Turkey and Greece.” In a less diplomatic analysis Fraser Cameron attributed the delay to “blocking maneuvers by, alternately, Greece and Turkey.” The December 2002 European Council meeting in Copenhagen took note of one of the key decisions relating to EU-NATO cooperation: “As things stand at present, the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements and the implementation thereof will apply only to those EU Member States which are also either NATO members or parties to the ‘Partnership for Peace,’ and which have consequently concluded bilateral security agreements with NATO.” The European Council noted that the exclusion would affect Cyprus and Malta, which would “not take part in EU military operations conducted using NATO assets once they have become members of the EU,” nor have access to “any classified NAT information.” The principle limiting EU-NATO transfers of classified information to EU members that are also members of NATO’s Partnership for Peace and that have concluded a security agreement with NATO in that framework was formalized in March 2003 in a separate EU-NATO document.

On the day following the European Council’s December 2002 Copenhagen declaration concerning “Berlin Plus,” the North Atlantic Council adopted several decisions to implement the “Berlin Plus” principles first outlined at NATO’s 1999 Washington Summit. Lord Robertson, then the NATO

533 North Atlantic Council, Washington Summit Communiqué, 24 April 1999, par. 10. The statements in the 1999 Strategic Concept about NATO-EU cooperation, adopted the same day as the Washington Summit Communiqué, are less precise and not entirely consistent with the political reality of an emerging ESDP, perhaps owing to a residual wish on the part of some NATO Allies to retain the previous concept of an ESDI within the Alliance. For example, the Strategic Concept states that “the European Security and Defense Identity will continue to be developed within NATO” and adds that “This process will require close cooperation between NATO, the WEU and, if and when appropriate, the European Union.” The call in the Strategic Concept for “the full participation of all European Allies if they were so to choose” may have reflected the concerns of Turkey and other non-EU European Allies. North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, 24 April 1999, paragraph 30.

534 Tony Blair, statement on the European Council meeting on 12-13 December 2002 in Copenhagen, on 16 December 2002


Secretary General, stated that “These decisions follow a letter from EU High Representative Javier Solana informing me that the European Council has agreed modalities to implement the Nice provisions on the involvement of non-EU European Allies in EU-led operations using NATO assets.”\textsuperscript{538} For Iceland, Norway, and Turkey, one of the most important aspects of the subsequent EUNATO Declaration on ESDP was indeed the statement that “The European Union is ensuring the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European members of NATO within ESDP, implementing the relevant Nice arrangements, as set out in the letter from the EU High Representative on 13 December 2002.”\textsuperscript{539}

According to the EU-NATO declaration, the ESDP’s “purpose is to add to the range of instruments already at the European Union’s disposal for crisis management and conflict prevention in support of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the capacity to conduct EU-led crisis management operations, including military operations where NATO as a whole is not engaged.” The declaration also stated that “a stronger European role will help contribute to the vitality of the Alliance, specifically in the field of crisis management,” and affirmed that the EU-NATO relationship would be “founded on the following principles”:

- Partnership: ensuring that the crisis management activities of the two organizations are mutually reinforcing, while recognizing that the European Union and NATO are organizations of a different nature; Effective mutual consultation, dialogue, cooperation and transparency; Equality and due regard for the decision-making autonomy and interests of the European Union and NATO; Respect for the interests of the Member States of the European Union and NATO;

- Respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, which underlie the Treaty on European Union and the Washington Treaty, in order to provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment, based on the commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any other through the threat or use of force, and also based on respect for treaty rights and obligations as well as refraining from unilateral actions; [and] Coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the military capability requirements common to the two organizations.\textsuperscript{540}

In March 2003 NATO and the EU announced that they had worked out a “Berlin Plus” package of arrangements to allow the Alliance to support EU-led operations in which the Alliance as a whole

\textsuperscript{538} Statement by the Secretary General, 13 December 2002, NATO Press Release (2002) 140.

\textsuperscript{539} EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP, 16 December 2002, NATO Press Release (2002) 142. The 13 December 2002 letter from the EU High Representative is a classified document. Reaching agreement on this aspect of the arrangements was evidently the most significant difficulty in the negotiations. Lord Robertson said after a NAC-PSC meeting in October 2001 that success in concluding the arrangements would depend “on the resolution of the participation issue of the non-EU countries that are members of NATO.”

is not engaged. The “Berlin Plus” package consists of approximately fifteen agreements, most of which are classified.\textsuperscript{541} The main elements of the package include the following:

- **a EU-NATO Security Agreement** (covers the exchange of classified information under reciprocal security protection rules);
- **assured EU access to NATO’s planning capabilities for actual use in the military planning of EU-led crisis management operations**;
- **presumed availability of NATO capabilities and common assets, such as communication units and headquarters for EU-led crisis management operations**;
- **Procedures for release, monitoring, return and recall of NATO assets and capabilities**;
- **Terms of reference for NATO’s Deputy SACEUR - who in principle will be the operation commander of an EU-led operation under the “Berlin Plus” arrangements (and who is always a European) - and European command options for NATO**;
- **EU-NATO consultation arrangements in the context of an EU-led crisis management operation making use of NATO assets and capabilities**;
- **incorporation within NATO’s long-established defense planning system, of the military needs and capabilities that may be required for EU-led military operations, thereby ensuring the availability of well-equipped forces trained for either NATO-led or EU-led operations.\textsuperscript{542}**

**Formal EU-NATO Deliberations**

The EU Council’s Political and Security Committee (PSC) was an interim body in late 2000, but it has been in a position to meet with the North Atlantic Council (NAC) since the beginning of 2001. Ambassador level NAC-PSC meetings have taken place with the following frequency: 8 times in 2001, 6 in 2002, 8 in 2003, 10 in 2004, 6 in 2005, 4 in 2006, and 3 times in the first half of 2007. These meetings were originally co-chaired by the NATO Secretary General and the Ambassador to the PSC of the EU member state holding the rotating Presidency of the EU. The PSC decided at the beginning of the Netherlands Presidency in July 2004 that the EU Council’s Secretary General/High

\textsuperscript{541} The fact that most of the “Berlin Plus” agreements are classified may be a factor contributing to continuing disputes about the scope of the arrangements and the specific political obligations assumed by NATO and the EU, notably with respect to crisis consultations.

\textsuperscript{542} This summary of the “Berlin Plus” arrangements, approved by NATO and the EU on 17 March 2003, is drawn from “NATO-EU: A Strategic Partnership,” available at http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-eu/evolution.html
Representative would henceforth serve as the co-chair for the PSC; and this agreement has been respected under subsequent Presidencies. A representative of the European Commission has also attended NAC-PSC meetings. If the EU Council and the European Commission disagree, neither can speak for the other. Representatives of the EU Council have attended meetings of the EU-NATO Capability Group since its first meeting in May 2003, and representatives of the European Commission have also attended since November 2004.

The EU Council’s Secretary General/High Representative has been invited to all meetings of the North Atlantic Council at the level of foreign and defense ministers and to all NATO summits. However, the NATO Secretary General has normally been invited only to meetings of EU defense ministers, and has rarely been invited to summit-level European Council meetings or to meetings of the General Affairs and External Relations Council (that is, meetings of the foreign ministers of EU member states). The NATO Secretary General and the EU Council’s Secretary General/High Representative reportedly meet every month or two, or more often when necessary. NATO and EU foreign ministers have held formal meetings on only five occasions: 30 May 2001, 6 December 2001, 14 May 2002, 3 June 2003, and 4 December 2003. Their joint press statements expressed their agreement in pursuing “complementary measures to enhance security, stability and regional cooperation” in the Balkans; their determination to “play mutually supportive roles to fulfill the common goal to achieve peace and stability in the region;” their commitment to achieve a close and transparent EU-NATO relationship; their support for the “Berlin Plus” arrangements, described as “essential to effective partnership” and their “common strategic interests” in building “a closer and trusting partnership.” According to an exchange of letters between the EU Presidency and the NATO Secretary General in January 2001, the two organizations agreed to convene joint meetings of foreign ministers twice a year.

ERRF and NRF

543 The NATO Secretary General participated in the meeting of the General Affairs and External Relations Council held the day after the terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001. NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2006), p. 248.
Both the ERF and the NRF are based on political commitments made by the member States of the EU and NATO. It is therefore open to political and factual inquiry, and it is from this premise that the following analysis departs. The NRF’s relationship with the ERF was the key question raised from its beginning, a question the answer to which is not clear.

The most evident problem in the ERF and the NRF is that both of them draw on the same set of national forces of the member States, forces which are thus in many cases ‘double-hatted’. The question of the implications of this double assignment in practice went unanswered for a long time. What would happen if, for example, NATO wanted to engage in an international military operation against terrorism, using the NATO Response Force (NRF) while the EU at the same time planned to engage in a peace-enforcement action in its near abroad, using the Rapid Reaction Force (ERF)? The two organizations would then find themselves in political competition for the same military resources, rendering their operations mutually exclusive. Solutions varied. A well-designed rotation system between the two forces might be a way around this problem. Similar discussions have already been held in the EU-NATO Capability Group, about the coherence of respective capability criteria of the EU Battle Groups to the NRF. But then the question could easily be put, from a technical point of view, why the capabilities of the two forces should not be entirely joined together. Another solution, often advanced by NATO, argues for a functional division of labor between the ERF and the NRF. The ERF would take on the ‘low-end’ tasks of crisis management, such as humanitarian and rescue operations and peacekeeping, while the NRF would deal with ‘high-end’ intense combat situations, including forced entry. The NRF’s task description and general outlook would conform to such a view: its tasks could be described as a catalogue of reinforced Petersberg missions on a global scale. But from the ERF’s point of view, such a division of labor ignores that the ambition of the Petersberg tasks has, in addition to humanitarian and rescue tasks and peacekeeping, always in theory included tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including ‘peacemaking’ (that is, peace enforcement).

The Helsinki Headline Goal refers to the ‘full scope’ of these tasks, ‘including the most demanding among these’. A manifestation of this ambition for more demanding missions is the EU’s new ‘battle groups’ project,

554 WEU Assembly, Rec. 723 on the EU headline goal and NATO Response Force (NRF), 3 June 2003, Explanatory Memorandum (Rivolta, Rapp.), para. 76.
557 WEU Assembly, Rec. 723 on the EU headline goal and NATO Response Force(NRF), 3 June 2003, Explanatory Memorandum (Rivolta, Rapp.), para.26, WEU AssemblyDoc. A/1825.
now also found in the Headline Goal 2010, and which is also covered by the European Constitution. The Battle Groups would, militarily speaking, be doing more or less exactly what the NRF does. This problem, although recognized in early 2004, was apparently still unaddressed at that time. The idea of an ERRF/NRF division of labor touches on the relationship between the EU and NATO as a whole.

The common parlance found in EU and NATO public documents - including in NATO’s Prague Declaration as well as in the EU-NATO Berlin Plus agreement - was that the ERRF and the NRF should be ‘compatible’ and their military capability development ‘mutually reinforcing’, ‘respecting the autonomy of both organizations’. These terms had already been used to describe the relationship between the capability programmes in the EU and NATO, before the time of the NRF. Frequent exchange of information between the EU and NATO in this domain was thus increasingly recognized as critical by 2004.

The political aspect of the ERRF/NRF dichotomy was more far-reaching. Even before the NRF had been officially decided at the Prague Summit in November 2002, some European States feared that the initiative could undermine the ERRF, and hence attached to their support for the new US initiative the condition that the NRF should not prejudice the Helsinki Headline Goal. The EU CFSP-HR J. Solana was overheard saying that the two forces were ‘not necessarily compatible’. Other sides pointed out more explicitly that the raison d’être of the ERRF and the NRF was not the same, and that this conceptual chasm invited political competition, or at least led to the question which of the two had political primacy. As a result, the much-sought complementarity between the ERRF and the NRF is only able to be achieved through close political cooperation. The process of mutual information exchange which started in 2004 would seem like a step in the right direction to overcome the divisions, real or imagined. Political awareness at the top level notwithstanding, it is to be expected that, in the event of competing NATO and EU demand for a capability, this matter would be resolved in consultation between the cognizant NATO and EU commanders at the lowest practical level.

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567 WEU Assembly, Rec. 723 on the EU headline goal and NATO Response Force (NRF), 3 June 2003, Explanatory Memorandum (Rivolta, Rapp.), para. 5, WEU Assembly Doc. A/1825.
NATO and EU-Led Operations

The March 2003 agreement on the “Berlin Plus” package made possible the first EU-led peacekeeping mission, Operation Concordia\(^{568}\) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, from March to December 2003.\(^{569}\)

From 1 April to 15 December 2003 the EU led its first small peacekeeping operation in Macedonia involving some 350 lightly armed military personnel. The operation was a continuation of NATO’s earlier Allied Harmony mission, in place since the Ohrid Framework Agreement of August 2001 between the Slav and Albanian populations.\(^{570}\) The EU’s mission was requested by the Macedonian government and covered by the mandate of the United Nations in Security Council Resolution 1371 from 26 September 2001.\(^{571}\) Its main task was to ensure the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement, including by patrolling the ethnic Albanian-populated regions of Macedonia that border Albania and Serbia-Montenegro, including Kosovo. The mission saw wide participation by 13 member States and by 14 third States (most of them EU candidates). It was originally launched for a period of six months,\(^{572}\) but later extended until 15 December 2003.\(^{573}\) France acted as framework nation for the first period. In this mission, the EU drew on planning facilities and other logistical support from NATO under the Berlin Plus agreement.\(^{574}\)

After the conclusion of the Ohrid agreement, EU Special Representative Francois Leotard had already suggested in October 2001 that the EU should take over Allied Harmony from NATO. This was judged premature at the time.\(^{575}\) As long as the Berlin Plus agreement on the borrowing of NATO military assets was not concluded, a takeover was permanently postponed.\(^{576}\) Once Berlin Plus was concluded, Operation Concordia was seen as the first test of the EU-NATO strategic partnership established therein.\(^{577}\) This was also in view of a possible later takeover by the EU of

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\(^{569}\) NATO and the OSCE consistently use the name “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” in their documents in deference to Greece. NATO regularly adds a note in its documents indicating that “Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.”


\(^{571}\) The broadly worded mandate in para. 5.


NATO’s SFOR mission in Bosnia.\textsuperscript{578} Implementation of the procedure provided by Berlin Plus was meticulous and detailed,\textsuperscript{579} due partly to US insistence that the agreement be implemented to the letter before NATO handed over control in Macedonia.\textsuperscript{580} Preparations included, inter alia, a ‘Specific Agreement on the use of NATO assets for the EU-led military operation in FYROM’, following a standing ‘model contract’ on the release, monitoring and recall of NATO assets.\textsuperscript{581} Its main contents were set out in a letter from the NATO-SG of 17 March 2003.\textsuperscript{582}

In terms of troop composition, Operation \textit{Concordia} was largely a continuation of NATO’s \textit{Amber Fox} mission under a different name.\textsuperscript{583} The vast majority of soldiers who had participated in the former NATO mission had already come from EU countries. Even before the takeover, the force command had been held successively by the United Kingdom, Germany, and then the Netherlands, while the United States had only contributed a handful of support staff.\textsuperscript{584} March 2003 did not mean ‘EU in and NATO out’.	extsuperscript{585} NATO stayed involved with the mission in numerous ways. Firstly, the EU of course relied on its assets and planning capabilities (including the DSACEUR as Operation Commander) under the Berlin Plus agreement, and as agreed specifically before the start of the mission. Operative command structures were provided by NATO’s AFSOUTH Command in Naples, although formally under an EU chain of command.\textsuperscript{586} In addition, the EU was able to call for NATO reinforcement or evacuation in any time of need. A reserve for such a contingency was held ready at KFOR, operating under AFSOUTH.\textsuperscript{587} Some logistical and reconnaissance support was also provided to Operation \textit{Concordia} directly by KFOR.\textsuperscript{588} Lastly, NATO retained a small number of its own troops in Macedonia.\textsuperscript{589}

Because Operation \textit{Concordia} was the first test case for the Berlin Plus cooperation framework hammered out in years of negotiation, both the EU and NATO eagerly awaited comparing notes in

\begin{footnotes}
\item[581] Annalisa Monaco, \textit{NATO and the EU –In ‘Harmony’ over Macedonia}, ISIS NATO Notes, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2003), p. 3
\item[582] Council Doc. 15484/04, 28 Nov. 2003, p. 15.
\item[584] Hajnalka Vincze, \textit{Beyond symbolism: the EU’s first military operation seen in its context}, 2003, p. 4.
\item[585] Javier Solana, CFSP-HR, Remarks on the launch of the EU-led military operation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (\textit{Concordia}), Brussels, 31 March 2003, para. 4.
\item[586] Hajnalka Vincze, \textit{Beyond symbolism: the EU’s first military operation seen in its-context}, 2003, p. 4.
\end{footnotes}
a follow-up ‘lessons learned’ process. Overall, the mission was judged a success of ESDP, and of Berlin Plus in particular.

However, some practical problems arose in the daily conduct of the operation: there were problems with the security clearances of the officials from Sweden, Finland and Austria who were working at the EU cell at SHAPE. The United States was reportedly concerned about the sharing of information. The most structural problem, however, concerned the EU Command Element in AFSOUTH. Many countries felt that this element was in practice not really under EU control, but under NATO’s. This would raise questions about the autonomy of EU decision-making and action in Operation Concordia. After its termination, the mission was followed by an EU police mission (EUPOL ‘PROXIMA’), involving some 200 officers, who should help train the Macedonian police forces to international standards. This mission contained no NATO elements or support.

Operation Concordia was a good showpiece for EU-NATO cooperation at work, most of all the Berlin Plus agreement. However, perhaps precisely because the transfer from Amber Fox was so well planned and predictable, it does not make very good evidence for answering some open questions of the EU-NATO relationship, such as that of NATO primacy. When the EU harmoniously takes over an existing peacekeeping operation from NATO, this is different from a situation in which both would like to start an operation. Only the latter case, however, could really help to answer questions such as the ‘right of first refusal’.

In July 2003 the EU and the Alliance agreed on “a common vision” for the western Balkan region: stability, democracy, prosperity, and closer cooperation with (and possible eventual membership in) European and Euro-Atlantic organizations. In the framework of this vision the Alliance decided at the June 2004 Istanbul Summit to conclude its Stabilization Force (SFOR) operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the end of 2004 and to work with the EU in the “Berlin Plus” framework to organize the transition to an EU-led operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina named Althea.

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590 EU-NATO Ministerial meeting, Brussels, 4 December 2003, Joint Press Statement by the NATO Secretary General and the EU Presidency, para. 1, CP 67, p. 285.
592 Ibid. Continuous contact between EU and NATO officials during an EU operation calling on NATO assets is provided by the Berlin Plus agreement.
593 Ibid.
Operation Althea began in December 2004. The commander of the European Force (EUFOR) responsible for Operation Althea is NATO’s DSACEUR. This command arrangement helps to ensure EU-NATO coordination and facilitates EU access to NATO assets and capabilities. The EU has established liaison missions at NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and at NATO’s Joint Force Command in Naples. Since the termination of the SFOR operation in December 2004, NATO has maintained a presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina via a military liaison and advisory mission in Sarajevo and has assisted local authorities with defense reform, counter-terrorism, the detention of people indicted for war crimes, and the country’s membership in NATO’s Partnership for Peace. The EU-led ESDP operations need not necessarily be conducted in close coordination with NATO. In June-September 2003, the EU conducted Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the first EU military operation outside Europe; and it was accomplished without NATO assistance. In Operation Artemis, EU troops (mostly from France) stabilized the security situation in the Bunia area of the DRC. Moreover, since January 2003 the EU has classified under the ESDP rubric a large number of essentially civilian operations — police, rule of law, security sector reform, monitoring, and other missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the DRC, Iraq, Indonesia, Sudan, Gaza, and elsewhere. Of these the most recent is the EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan), launched in June 2007.

Since the enlargements of the EU and the Alliance in 2004, and the adherence of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU in 2007, 21 countries (out of 27 in the EU and 26 in the Alliance) belong to both organizations. Each organization has expressed its resolve to deepen and improve cooperation, in view of their shared interests, common values, and limited resources.

Moreover, NATO and the EU have much work to do together. For example, the EU envisages a police and rule of law mission that would perform several of the functions currently accomplished by the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The EU planning team, and lastly EULEX, has been consulting closely with the NATO-led KFOR in order to define the respective responsibilities and the interaction of the military and civilian security operations in Kosovo. The basic principle is that NATO troops would operate under KFOR command and civilian EU personnel under the head of the EU police and rule of law mission. EU-NATO interactions will remain essential to clarify functions on the ground. For example, some of the Italian carabinieri and French gendarmes in KFOR may be reassigned to the EU police and rule of law mission (EULEX).

599 NATO invited Bosnia and Herzegovina to join the Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council at the November 2006 Riga summit. The President of Bosnia and Herzegovina signed the Partnership for Peace Framework Document on 14 December 2006.

600 EU activities in security sector reform in the Western Balkans have been conducted in coordination with NATO. See “EU and NATO agree concerted approach for the Western Balkans,” NATO Press Release (2003) 089, 29 July 2003, par. 10, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p03-089e.htm.
Throughout the Western Balkans, NATO and the EU face demanding tasks in preventing renewed violence and promoting peaceful transitions.\(^\text{601}\)

### EU-NATO Collaboration in the AU in Darfur

Calls for a clearer coordination between the EU and NATO in addressing rising crises on the globe had never ceased.\(^\text{602}\) This need became evident once more as each of the two organizations made ready to support the African Union (AU) in its crisis management mission in Darfur (Sudan) in June 2005, at first independently of each other.

The humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur, although already raging for years, had come to number at least 180,000 dead and 2.5 million in danger of starvation as a result of the conflict in that region. The UN Security Council addressed the issue more urgently than ever before in the first half of 2005, inter alia referring the matter to the ICC. Impressions of genocide were almost universally shared by the international community. The AU decided on 28 April 2005 to increase the troop presence of its AMIS mission in Sudan from 2200 at the time to about 6200 by September.\(^\text{604}\) The AU’s claims for ‘ownership’ of the problem were generally accepted by Western countries, probably also because of political sensibilities which would have been involved with sending white soldiers to Africa. However, as AU members lacked the military capabilities, particularly to transport troops from other parts of Africa to the region, external help was needed to fill the gap.

Although discussions within the EU about sending a crisis management mission (police or military) to Darfur had never gained much support,\(^\text{605}\) the EU already had a legal framework in place for giving military training and crisis management support to the AU.\(^\text{606}\) It focused on capacity building, planning support, disarmament, demobilization and reintegartion of combatants and security sector reform and EU internal and external coordination.\(^\text{607}\) Some human, technical and logistic assistance in terms of military and police planners and observers, besides financial assistance for AMIS, had already been provided to the AU for Darfur in 2004,\(^\text{608}\) without this assistance taking the form of a

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\(^{601}\) For an informative analysis, see Jeffrey Simon, Preventing Balkan Conflict: The Role of Euroatlantic Institutions, Strategic Forum no. 226 (April 2007).


\(^{603}\) UNSCR 1590 (24 March 2005), 1591 (29 March 2005) and 1593 (31 March 2005).


\(^{605}\) Judy Dempsey, EU-led forces ‘could intervene’ in Sudanese conflict, Financial Times, 13 April 2004, p. 6.


proper ESDP operation. By April 2005, the EU received a list of priority needs from the AU.609 On 26 May, an offer including all possible support to military, police and civilian efforts was made on a pledging conference in Addis Ababa. Coordination with other international organizations such as NATO was recognized by that time.610 Concerning NATO, this was just about time. On 26 April 2005 NATO too had received a letter from the AU, asking for logistical support to AMIS. This assistance request was detailed by a high-ranking visit from the AU at NATO HQ on 17 May. By 24 May, NATO had agreed that the elements to be provided to the AU would include strategic airlift, training (command and control, operational planning), and use of intelligence by AMIS.611 The final decision was announced at the NATO defense ministers meeting on 9 June,612 and NATO airlifts for troops from AU countries started on from 1 July.613

A few days before NATO’s decision on 9 June, an open split broke out between members of the EU and NATO on the question which organization should coordinate measures in support of AMIS, particularly airlift.614 The United States and Canada preferred NATO (through SHAPE) as coordination institution, while France favored the EU. Other countries like Germany or the UK were undecided or wanted to use both organizations. The pressure of the situation on the ground in Darfur, however, contributed to a quick solution of this renewed competition issue by 9 June.615 In the event, both organizations agreed to provide support staff to the AU-led military cell in Addis Ababa,616 with the choice of organization being left to individual member States.617

The open relief evidenced by defense ministers after the NATO meeting on 9 June testifies to the fact that everyone wanted to avoid a repetition of the EU-NATO competition issue which had caused great rifts in 2003 during the Iraq crisis and the European Convention. Rather, the general impression was that consultation by all sides in the EU and NATO on the Darfur support issue was very close in those days. There was coordination at the military level. In addition, in an effort of mutual transparency, NATO kept the EU informed on the general aspects of its support to AMIS. Nowhere was there heard, from public sources at least, any talk of a NATO primacy, a NATO right of first refusal, or a geographical division of labor leaving Africa to the EU for historical reasons. Even if

611 NATO’s assistance to the African Union for Darfur, NATO Topics, http://www.nato.int/issues/darfur/index.html (visited 18/06/05).
613 NATO starts airlifting African Union troops to Darfur, NATO Update, 1 July2005.
614 Daniel Dombey, NATO-EU spat hits airlift to Darfur, Financial Times, 8 June 2005, p. 4.
616 Green light for NATO support to African Union for Darfur, NATO Update, 9 June 2005; D. Dombey, Nato defends deal on Darfur airlift, Financial Times, 10 June 2005, p. 3.
a general NATO right of first refusal had existed, it could arguably not have been applied in this case. For the EU's help to the AU had been running already since 2004. At that time NATO had not appeared particularly interested in Africa. In effect, the brief Darfur split between the EU and NATO was another example showing that these theoretical precepts could quickly be sidelined by the priorities of the day, given political will and pragmatism. A few weeks after the incident, Darfur was already being presented as a positive example of EU-NATO cooperation.618

Operative Cooperation Limited

The current mechanism for formal cooperation between NATO and the EU is the “Berlin Plus” arrangement, signed in March 2003. Under this agreement, the EU has been given “assured access” to NATO assets, including planning capabilities, for EU-led military missions. In a “Berlin Plus” operation, the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) is the operation commander and uses the force generation and planning capacities at SHAPE. But political control of the operation remains with the EU, once NATO members have agreed to the operation. Associated arrangements also provide for the sharing of classified information between EU and NATO staffs, based on the conclusion of security agreements between NATO and those EU member states that are not Alliance members.

Based on these agreements, some EU-NATO cooperation has developed, especially in military to military contacts and expert consultations between civilians from the two headquarters. For example, scenarios used by the EU to identify capabilities goals and shortcomings were developed with the assistance of NATO planners. An EU cell has recently been established at SHAPE, and a reciprocal arrangement is under negotiation at the EU Military Staff (EUMS).

Furthermore, these agreements have been successfully applied to two operations. Concordia in Macedonia, the first EU-led operation conducted under Berlin Plus, went forward smoothly, although its small size made such coordination less challenging. The Althea mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina put Berlin Plus arrangements more fully to the test. The EU, which was already running the UN-sanctioned police operation in that country, assumed the bulk of NATO’s military mission in December 2004.619 DSACEUR is the operation commander for Althea, as envisioned under Berlin Plus. He is also NATO’s military strategic coordinator with the European Union. This arrangement allows him to ensure that proper coordination occurs and to promote synergies rather than duplication. For example, in the recent past, tactical reserves from Althea have been

619 The Bosnia military missions (first IFOR and then SFOR) were also UN-sanctioned, although they were not UN “bluehelmet” operations.
made available to the NATO-led KFOR mission in Kosovo, while the KFOR reserve has also been made available for operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

It would be a mistake, however, to see these modest successes as indicators of a healthy EU-NATO relationship. Berlin Plus applies to a very limited set of operations — those in which the EU takes the lead but wants access to certain NATO assets, such as the planning, force generation, and headquarters capabilities at SHAPE. As for military capabilities, NATO owns only a few, notably its 17 AWACS planes. Berlin Plus does not provide EU access to troops and equipment belonging to NATO members, thus very much limiting the scope of any operation. Nor does it provide a mechanism for combining military and civilian capabilities in a specific operation. Most important, Berlin Plus does not necessarily facilitate the process of deciding whether the EU and NATO should or could work together in response to a particular threat or crisis. It only applies after that decision is made, and only if the result is an EU-led operation.

The Darfur crisis in Sudan offered NATO and the EU a recent opportunity to demonstrate that they could cooperate in an operational setting. In May 2005, the African Union asked both the European Union and NATO to provide assistance to the AU’s peacekeeping mission in western Sudan. Specifically, AU President Alpha Oumar Konore requested help in moving troops from various contributing countries in Africa to the theater of operations.620 Both NATO and the EU responded positively. However, they were unable to decide on a single command center for the strategic airlift, with the EU proposing to use the European Airlift Centre at Eindhoven, and NATO seeking to use SHAPE. In the end, they agreed to disagree, and two separate airlifts were established, with the expectation that they would be coordinated by the African Union.

If members of both institutions had been willing, the support mission for the AU could have been a genuinely cooperative effort. The two airlifts will continue at least through spring 2006. In addition to transport, NATO has provided training for AU personnel in command and control and other areas. The EU has provided training and other support for the police component of the AU mission, along with training, other technical expertise, and materiel support for the military component. While the NATO and EU military staffs and working-level experts have been able keep these efforts in sync, their task has been made much harder by the failure of the political leadership to direct the two institutions to work together.

Although the achievements of EU-NATO cooperation and the substantial shared tasks facing these organizations, there are serious difficulties in their relations. The difficulties include institutional and national rivalries, the participation problem, the institutional overlap and the disagreements about the proper scope and purpose of EU-NATO cooperation. Such natural but ominous

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CHAPTER 8
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Institutional and National Rivalries

As Simon Lunn, the Secretary General of the NAT Parliamentary Assembly, has observed, “Whenever a fresh crisis arises, there is always a strong sense of institutional rivalry and competition.”621 Rivalries were, for example, apparent in the “beauty contest” between NATO and the EU about assistance to the African Union regarding Darfur in the spring and summer of 2005. In the event, both NATO and the EU have assisted the African Union regarding Darfur (outside the “Berlin Plus” framework, it should be noted); and countries that are members of both organizations have in several cases made contributions under the auspices of both NATO and the EU. Some EU nations, such as France, would have preferred strictly EU action, without any NATO involvement. These nations hold as a matter of principle that NATO should stay out of Africa and that the EU should be responsible for security assistance to this continent, in view of the magnitude of EU development aid to Africa. Moreover, the EU includes several former colonial powers with long-standing ties in Africa that wish to make the EU an instrument of enduring influence in this continent.

EU and NATO nations have in recent years considered establishing a military training center in Africa. France, supported at times by Belgium and Greece, has opposed the idea of a NATO training center in Africa, and has argued that the EU should undertake this project. No one doubts that such a center would be within the EU’s financial means, but it can be argued that NATO’s superior operational experience and expertise in multinational education, training, and exercising would make a decisive difference in the implementation of training programs.

EU differs from other international organizations in that it is a political project involving transfers of sovereignty in certain policy areas from the member states to central institutions. It should be noted, however, that EU member states have pursued the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) on an intergovernmental basis.622 That is, ESDP decisions depend on a consensus involving

622 For an analysis of the social attitudes in EU member states that suggest that ESDP will continue to be pursued on an intergovernmental basis in the foreseeable future, see Wolfgang Wagner, The Democratic Legitimacy of European Security and Defense Policy, Occasional Paper no. 57 (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, April 2005).
all member states of the EU. Because ESDP actions may involve military operations and entail the use of force, EU members have been unwilling to make transfers of sovereignty regarding such matters. In contrast, transfers of national sovereignty have been evident in the “first pillar” economic matters decided by shared EU institutions.

The “first pillar” of the European Union concerns trade and economic matters, including the customs union, the single market, and agricultural policy. The “second pillar” consists of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, including the ESDP. The “third pillar” covers cooperation in justice and law enforcement matters. To repeat, some of the policy areas included in the “first pillar” involve transfers of sovereignty; and for this reason the decision making by shared institutions in certain policy areas is sometimes called “supranational” or “communitarian.” Decision-making in the second pillar remains intergovernmental, and this means that each nation retains its sovereign right not to participate in particular ESDP operations. There is no qualified majority voting in ESDP decision-making; and a consensus rule applies, as in NATO.

Whether “second pillar” and “third pillar” matters that are currently under national sovereignty will eventually come under supranational EU institutions remains to be seen. The new Treaty on European Union is expected to adopt a different approach to the concept of pillars, which may lose their conceptual and practical importance. However, ESDP matters will continue to be handled on an intergovernmental basis.623

The EU’s multiple functions and capacities mean that it has economic, police, justice, social and other instruments to support reconstruction, reform, and democratization far beyond what NATO has historically been able to offer. The EU’s civilian assets outside NATO’s scope of activity include tools essential to state capacity-building. There is, for example, no NATO equivalent to the European Agency for Reconstruction.624

Moreover, in dealing with some situations the EU can brandish an incentive to promote cooperation, the prospect of EU membership, that may be in some cases more potent than NATO’s capacity to offer partnership or membership. In principle the EU’s many capacities offer opportunities for synergies and high levels of effectiveness. In practice, however, rivalries among

623 The mandate for the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) responsible for preparing the new Treaty on European Union, to be known as the “Reform Treaty,” stipulates twice that the IGC will recall “that the provisions governing the Common Security and Defence Policy do not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of the Member States.” IGC Mandate, Annex I of the Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council, 21/22 June 2007, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 20 July 2007, 11177/1/07, p. 19, note 6, and p. 26, note 22.

EU institutions, including the Commission and the Council, may hinder the EU in achieving optimal results.

The EU-NATO competition over missions derives in part from the fact that NATO’s non-Article 5 operations and the EU’s Petersberg tasks concern the same types of challenges. The declared purposes of the EU’s ESDP today remain the Petersberg tasks, first formulated by the Western European Union (WEU) in 1992. In that year the WEU member states agreed that, in addition to the continuing collective defense obligations of the WEU members under the 1948 Brussels Treaty, as amended in 1954, and the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, “military units of WEU member States, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.” These phrases were integrated into the Amsterdam and Nice versions of the Treaty on European Union.

It is relevant to consider the security and defense policy objectives indicated in the proposed EU constitutional treaty, despite its rejection in referenda in France and the Netherlands in 2005, for two reasons. First, the document is representative of recent thinking in EU governments. Second, many of its elements, including with respect to the ESDP, may be retained in the alternative treaty currently being negotiated.

In the proposed EU constitutional treaty, the declared purposes of the ESDP were recast to include “peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.” According to the proposed EU constitutional treaty, ESDP tasks “shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.”

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627 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Official Journal of the European Union, 16 December 2004, p. 138, Article III-309, par. 1. The prominence of terrorism in these formulations, in comparison with those in the Amsterdam and Nice treaties, may be attributed to the impact of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. It is noteworthy that the constitutional treaty’s “solidarity clause” applies “if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or manmade disaster.” Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Official Journal of the European Union, 16 December 2004, p. 32, Article I-43, par. 1.
In short, in terms of ratified treaties, the ESDP’s purposes remain limited to the Petersberg tasks, but the proposed constitutional treaty envisaged adding “joint disarmament operations . . . military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention . . . [and] post-conflict stabilization.”

The potential for duplication or competition with NATO’s non-Article 5 operations is obvious. Although NATO and EU foreign ministers have declared that “NATO and the European Union bring different comparative strengths” to the fight against terrorism and other tasks, the significant overlaps between NATO’s non-Article 5 missions and the EU’s Petersberg tasks mean that these organizations have been and remain in competition for similar responsibilities. Some observers have proposed that the two organizations might agree on a “division of labor” in crisis response operations based on geographical or practical criteria in order to avoid competition. However, neither NATO nor the EU appears prepared to accept such a constraint on its latitude for action, owing in part to national ambitions for specific organizations and the uncertainty of future security requirements.

The competition could become more intense if the EU members agreed to pursue collective defense in the ESDP framework. The ESDP does not yet compete with NATO in the field of collective defense, however. The reference to collective defense in the currently operative version of the Treaty on European Union makes clear that the pursuit of this goal is conditional and dependent on a unanimity among the member states that does not yet exist: “The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defense policy, which might lead to a common defense, should the European Council so decide.”

Even in the proposed constitutional treaty, the mutual defense clause based on Article 51 of the United Nations Charter is carefully circumscribed to protect the autonomy of neutral and NATO members of the EU: “This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which, for those States which are...
members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defense and the forum for its implementation.”

The EU’s tendency to compete with NATO can be seen as the mirror image of NATO’s tendency to compete with the EU. In a sense, this competition goes back to the summer of 1992, long before the EU’s ESDP came into being, with the NATO-WEU rivalry over embargo enforcement in the Adriatic Sea. Some observers have described the EU-NATO relationship, not entirely in jest, as one of long-standing “mutual paranoia,” aggravated since 1999 by the ESDP. The tendency to compete with NATO may be aggravated by the fact that the ESDP missions do not concern collective defense, but “optional” activities. What NATO considers non-Article 5 tasks and what the EU has designated as ESDP missions are all “by choice” operations, as opposed to binding treaty obligations or existential imperatives of national survival. This increases the potential scope for national contention and posturing about organizational roles. The leading powers in the EU have differed fundamentally about the extent to which ESDP should be pursued autonomously or in cooperation with NATO.

The EU has in recent years strengthened its capacity to plan and conduct EU-led operations without depending on NATO assets and capabilities. It is for this purpose that the EU established a Civilian/Military Cell within the EU Military Staff that could serve as “the nucleus of an operations centre.” According to the German Foreign Ministry, “It is envisaged that the ‘OpsCen’ will plan and conduct autonomous EU-led operations in the event that no national headquarters has been designated for this purpose. It has been ready for activation since 1 January 2007.”

It should be noted, however, that this capability falls short of what Belgium, France, Germany, and Luxembourg proposed in April 2003. Instead, the United Kingdom negotiated with France and

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631 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Official Journal of the European Union, 16 December 2004, p. 31, Article I-41, paragraph 7. The same stipulation is expressed, with slightly different wording, in the version of the Treaty on European Union currently in force: “The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.” Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Official Journal of the European Union, 29 December 2006, p. 17, Article 17.

632 For background, see “When Europeans Unravel,” The Economist, 1 August 1992, p. 38. On 8 June 1993 the North Atlantic Council and the Council of the Western European Union agreed to join the previously distinct but coordinated NATO and WEU naval operations in the Adriatic Sea into a combined operation named Sharp Guard. The objectives in combining the operations included “unity of command, appropriate levels of engagement and adequate force levels.” Günter Marten and Sir Keith Speed, Rapporteurs, WEU initiatives on the Danube and in the Adriatic — reply to the thirty eighth annual report of the Council, Report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee, Document 1367 (Paris: Assembly of Western European Union, 15 June 1993), p. 153, par. 45.


Germany to establish the current arrangement 149. As Frank Kupferschmidt, a German scholar, has noted, Britain prevented the establishment of a European HQ that could have become a competitor of SHAPE but accepted a limited additional capacity for early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning within the EU Military Staff (EUMS). As an exceptional option for the conduct of EU autonomous operations of a smaller scale, it was agreed that upon Council decision based on EU Military Committee advice an operations centre could be set up drawing on the EUMS personnel and augmentations from member states. As a result of these developments the future of ESDP will more than ever depend on British cooperation.

It was a fundamental shift in British policy that made the launching of what became the ESDP possible in late 1998. Owing in large part to its exceptional military capabilities and prowess, the United Kingdom retains pivotal influence over the course of the EU’s ESDP and its relationship with NATO.

The Berlin Plus In Reverse

As noted earlier, the “Berlin Plus” arrangements adopted in March 2003 provides for assured EU access to NATO operational planning capabilities and for the availability of NATO capabilities and common assets, such as headquarters and communications units, for EU led operations. The clearest example is Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, an EU-led operation supported by NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) under the command of NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR). In view of this precedent, some observers have suggested, it might be possible to envisage a “Berlin Plus in reverse” or “Berlin Plus-Plus” arrangement, whereby the EU would provide support to NATO with the EU’s civilian assets.

However, some NATO observers have expressed reservations about the “Berlin Plus in reverse” concept. In their view, it could be counterproductive to create a sense of dependence in NATO on EU assets and capabilities, because this could delay or prevent NATO operations by enabling the EU (or specific EU members) to say no to the Alliance. This concern is, to be sure, the mirror-image of that expressed by EU observers dissatisfied with the “Berlin Plus” arrangements and correspondingly eager to promote the EU’s autonomy and gain independence from reliance on

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638 David Yost, EU-NATO Relations, 2007, p.85.
NATO assets and capabilities. Some EU nations have expressed little enthusiasm for the proposition of lending EU assets and capabilities to NATO, particularly in the fields of civilian crisis management and post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction. Some European observers maintain that “Berlin Plus in reverse” would undermine the rationale for the EU’s ESDP and lead to the EU subsidizing NATO.

Civil-military missions in reconstruction and stabilization may offer the most promising area for improving the EU-NATO relationship. However, it could limit NATO’s freedom of action if the Alliance was obliged to ask the EU for help. It would strike of a dependence that some Atlanticists would be uncomfortable with. The assumption that NATO should hand off operations to the EU and civilian agencies as soon as a safe and secure environment has been established has become common in both Europe and North America, and this may constitute an obstacle to strengthening NATO’s civil-military and non-military capacities.

The “Berlin Plus in reverse” discussion may be overtaken by events if the “Berlin Plus” arrangements become less central to EU-NATO interactions. Some experts speculate that Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina may be the last operation under “Berlin Plus” auspices for various reasons. Some EU member states prefer autonomy, and for them turning to the “Berlin Plus” arrangements is a “last resort” for cases in which the EU absolutely cannot get by with its own capabilities and those which it can lease such as the transport aircraft. In their view, “assured EU access” to NATO assets and capabilities is obviously less desirable than direct control over EU assets and capabilities, because the Alliance might in some circumstances regard its requirements as more compelling than those of the EU and choose to recall its assets and capabilities. This line of reasoning concludes that the EU should build up its capabilities to such an extent that the “Berlin Plus” arrangements would become unnecessary and irrelevant.

Moreover, some NATO Allies do not care for the impression that the Alliance may be used by the EU as a “tool box.” NATO decision-making about interactions with the EU has become increasingly stalemated, if not paralyzed, by the “Berlin Plus” arrangements; and some experts see them as increasingly problematic. Indeed, some observers have noted a tendency to seek ways to “work around” the “Berlin Plus” arrangements in the interests of effective EU-NATO cooperation in the field.

Until January 2007 the main alternative to the “Berlin Plus” arrangements for the EU to conduct a military operation was to rely on one of the operational command headquarters furnished by one of the five member states with such facilities: France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and the United Kingdom. The EU relied, for example, on French facilities for Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2003 and on German facilities for Operation EUFOR Congo in the same

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639 Such as France and Germany.
country in 2006. In January 2007, however, as noted earlier, the EU Operations Centre in the EU Military Staff was declared ready for activation.\textsuperscript{640} The EU Operations Centre was activated for the first time in June 2007 in an EU command-post crisis management exercise. Lieutenant General David Leakey, Director-General of the EU Military Staff, said that the Operations Centre “gives us the extra flexibility to run an operation, particularly at short notice.”\textsuperscript{641} Some observers have interpreted the establishment and activation of the Operations Centre as signs of an interest in the EU in greater autonomy and less dependence on NATO.

The Participation Problem

Despite the agreement and their professions of a shared commitment to effective cooperation and partnership, NATO and EU foreign ministers have not held any formal meetings since December 2003, owing to the “participation problem.”

The “participation problem” is shorthand for the conflict of principles that has since the 2004 enlargement of the EU limited effective cooperation between the members of the EU and NATO. EU member states hold that all EU members should attend EU-NATO meetings, while NATO member states maintain that the Alliance must uphold the EU-NATO agreement on security that stipulates that classified information can only be shared with EU members that have joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) and concluded a security agreement with NATO in that framework. Turkey in particular has adopted a restrictive approach. Ankara has on various occasions blocked consensus within NATO concerning interactions with the EU, including the distribution of information to EU members. In other words, the EU will not meet formally with NATO to discuss matters outside the “Berlin Plus” framework without all 27 EU members present. Meanwhile NATO, owing in part to Turkey’s firm and principled position on the matter, will not meet in an official NATO-EU format with nations that have not completed a security agreement in the framework of PfP. Turkey is not an EU member, while Cyprus and Malta are the two EU countries that are not PfP members and that have not concluded security agreements with NATO in that framework.

Operation Althea is the only on-going EU-led operation under “Berlin Plus,” and it is the sole operation that can be considered in a formal EU-NATO format. All the EU countries participating in Operation Althea are in PfP and have a security agreement with NATO. As a result, aside from capability development issues, Althea is the only agreed agenda subject that can be discussed without the presence of Cyprus and Malta. While Malta’s stance on joining PfP and concluding a


\textsuperscript{641}Lieutenant General David Leakey quoted in “Military exercise sees first OpsCentre activation,” in \textit{ESDP Newsletter}, Council of the European Union, Issue no. 4, p. 5.
security agreement in that framework may change in the coming years, a solution to Cyprus status issues appears to be more remote.

Turkey has since 1963 refused to recognize the government of the Republic of Cyprus, which joined the EU in May 2004. Turkey has since 1983 recognized the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and has maintained that the Nicosia government has lacked the legal authority to represent Cyprus as a whole and to join the European Union.\(^{642}\) Since all NATO Allies must recognize and approve candidates for Partnership for Peace (PfP) membership, Ankara’s non-recognition policy vis-à-vis the Nicosia government blocks any move toward PfP membership by Cyprus. This makes it impossible for Cyprus to conclude a security agreement with NATO in the PfP framework. The EU-NATO “participation problem” is thus rooted in part in the absence of a negotiated settlement in Cyprus.\(^{643}\)

The participation problem has been aggravated by an extensive interpretation of the “Berlin Plus” package which has limited EU-NATO cooperation to capabilities development discussions and crisis management operations using NATO assets and capabilities. In other words, the participation problem has contributed to a scope problem, owing to the policies of at least one non-EU NATO European Ally, Turkey. Ankara’s decision to uphold the EU-NATO security agreement in relation to participation in all aspects of “the strategic partnership established between the European Union and NATO in crisis management,” to use the phrase in the EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP,\(^{644}\) presents an obstacle to extending EU-NATO cooperation to additional domains. This combined participation and scope problem is linked to the main scope problem discussed below that is, the reluctance of some EU member states that are NATO Allies to expand the scope of EU-NATO

\(^{642}\) According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “in 1963 . . . the Turkish Cypriots were ousted by force from all organs of the new Republic by their Greek Cypriot partners in clear breach of the founding documents and the Constitution. The claim put forth thereafter by the Greek Cypriots to represent the ‘Republic of Cyprus’ has been illegal, and has not been recognized by Turkey. . . . Turkey and [the] TRNC [Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus] argued that the Greek Cypriot side had no authority to negotiate on behalf of the whole Island and that this accession [to the European Union] would be in contravention of the relevant provisions of the 1959-1960 Treaties on Cyprus, and thus, constituted a violation of international law. The said Treaties prohibit Cyprus from joining any international organization of which both Turkey and Greece are not members.” See “Cyprus Issue (Summary)” on the website of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MainIssues/Cyprus/Cyprus_Issue.htm](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MainIssues/Cyprus/Cyprus_Issue.htm).

\(^{643}\) Some observers maintain that there are three possible solutions, all improbable in the near term: Turkish membership in the European Union, the reunification of Cyprus, or Cyprus becoming a member of Partnership for Peace and concluding a security agreement with NATO in that framework. The last solution is the most plausible in the near term, if only because Turkish recognition of the Nicosia government would presumably have to precede the reunification of Cyprus or Turkish membership in the EU. However, in current circumstances Turkey’s non-recognition policy vis-à-vis the Nicosia government would prevent a NATO consensus to approve a hypothetical Cypriot application to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace. Turkey might reconsider its position in light of progress on the Cyprus question and/or improvements in its relations with the EU.

\(^{644}\) EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP, 16 December 2002, Press Release (2002) 142. Some interview sources have also referred to the phrase “EU-NATO strategic cooperation,” which was evidently employed in an unpublished North Atlantic Council decision on 13 December 2002.
cooperation beyond capabilities development discussions and operations under the “Berlin Plus” arrangements.

To repeat, the “participation problem” has resulted in confining official interactions to Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina and capabilities development. As currently interpreted, the “Berlin Plus” package functions to restrict cooperation, not to facilitate and promote it. This situation could deter EU and NATO members from using “Berlin Plus” arrangements to deal with important future tasks so, the eventual transfer of KFOR from NATO to EU command, on the model of the replacement of SFOR by EUFOR’s Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Participants in NAC-PSC meetings on Bosnia and Herzegovina have reported that the meetings usually involve no genuine dialogue: only formal statements of policy by the representatives of each organization, with no follow-up discussion. The same unproductive pattern has been repeated in a number of the EU-NATO meetings on capability development.

The Cyprus/Malta “participation problem” and the extensive interpretation of “Berlin Plus,” particularly by Turkey, have created serious dysfunctions in the EU-NATO relationship. NATO and the EU conducted a crisis management exercise in November 2003, but have been unable since the 2004 expansion of the EU to agree on another. Such an exercise is overdue, and was envisaged for September 2007; but it has been postponed until perhaps 2010.

In December 2003, at their last formal meeting, NATO and EU foreign ministers “discussed the fight against terrorism . . . and agreed to develop closer cooperation in this area, beginning with a seminar on terrorism which will be co-sponsored by NATO and the EU.” Some observers expected the EU-NATO co-sponsored seminar to facilitate the pursuit of other steps, including enhanced information exchanges concerning terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the definition of possible coordinated responses to these threats, and the formulation of a joint declaration by NATO and the EU in this regard. However, the implementation of the announced plan for a EU-NATO seminar on terrorism has been shelved, owing to the “participation problem” that has emerged since EU enlargement in May 2004.

The “participation problem” is one of the main explanations for the sub-optimal relations between NATO and the EU, and it accounts for the jocular assertions that NATO and the EU are divided by a common city and that the relationship amounts to a “frozen conflict.” On the positive side, as Mihai Carp has pointed out,

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Despite institutional EU-NATO policy disagreements at the Brussels level, cooperation and coordination are proceeding in the field. In Afghanistan, for instance, the NATO Senior Civilian Representative regularly meets with the EU’s Special Representative to exchange views. In September 2005, NATO also agreed to provide in extremis support to the EU election observation mission at the request of the EU Commissioner for External Relations. Yet Afghanistan has never been on the agenda of joint meetings of NATO’s North Atlantic Council and the EU’s Political and Security Committee. Ironically, this is also the case with other operations in which NATO and the EU have convergent interests but seem unable to have a constructive exchange of views at a formal level. On Darfur, staff level contacts have been productive (including a scheduled joint assessment mission on possible further needs of the African Union) but no formal meetings among NATO and EU Ambassadors have taken place. 646

By the same token, some EU observers have drawn a contrast between NAC-PSC interactions and most other forms of EU-NATO interaction, including relations between the EU Military Staff and NATO’s International Military Staff and command organizations and between NATO’s International Staff and the staff of the European Commission and the EU Council’s General Secretariat. According to these observers, interactions below the NAC-PSC level, including in operations in the field, generally proceed productively, thanks in part to improvised ad hoc arrangements, whereas participants in NAC-PSC meetings often lack a sense of shared objectives and are instead preoccupied with institutional prerogatives and agendas.647 As a result, observers report, ambassadors from the same country, one serving on the NAC and one on the PSC, sometimes pursue divergent objectives in NAC-PSC meetings.

Informal Meetings of NATO and EU Foreign Ministers

As noted above, the principles in the EU-NATO security agreement exclude the formal participation of Cyprus and Malta with regard to operations under “Berlin Plus.” So far only sub-optimal solutions, such as informal ministerial meetings, have been found to include these countries and promote high-level dialogue among all the member nations of NATO and the EU. NATO foreign ministers agreed at their informal meeting in Vilnius in April 2005 to seek “informal meetings of NATO and EU Foreign Ministers on a semi-regular or regular basis to discuss the broad range of

647 For a valuable discussion of the achievements and limitations of pragmatic EU-NATO coordination in the field, see Leo Michel, NATO and the European Union: Improving Practical Cooperation, Washington DC, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2006, at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Repository/Outside_Publications/Michel/NATOEU_Workshop_Final_Summary.pdf
issues on the agendas of both organizations, where they complement each other, where they work together.”

The foreign ministers of NATO and EU member nations have subsequently met, together with the NATO Secretary General, the EU Council’s Secretary General/High Representative, and the EU Commissioner for External Relations, in informal lunches and dinners.

The first of these meetings took place at UN Headquarters in New York in September 2005 in conjunction with the UN General Assembly meeting. This was followed by meetings in December 2005 in Brussels, in April 2006 in Sofia, in September 2006 in New York, in January 2007 in Brussels, and in April 2007 in Oslo. These informal lunches and dinners have been called “transatlantic” events and have not been, strictly speaking, EU-NATO meetings, despite the attendance of top-level institutional representatives. In each case the host country has invited the foreign ministers of the member states of NATO and the EU to an informal no-agenda gathering meetings.

Some observers have praised these “transatlantic” events for promoting a “very healthy” form of interaction. The NATO Secretary General praised the first such lunch as “exactly the kind of dialogue we need to keep having between our two organizations.” While such a dialogue is obviously superior to having none at all, the prospects of informal EU-NATO mechanisms are inherently limited and less than fully satisfactory. The off-the-record “at 32” meetings may have carried forward deliberations on some issues, but no decisions have to date been attributed to these events.

**Institutional Overlap a Barrier for Partnership**

Since European Union (EU) member states decided to create the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) both ESDP and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have occupied the same institutional space of security. In recent years, both have been under pressure to act on a global scale: ESDP experienced an institutional maturing after its creation in 1999 and over 16 military, civil-military or civilian operations and missions have been conducted under its auspices.

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648 Video background briefing by the NATO Spokesman, James Appathurai, 29 April 2005.
649 Switzerland’s foreign minister attended the September 2005 meeting. According to interview sources, Switzerland’s status as a member of neither NATO nor the EU removed any EU-NATO label from the meeting and facilitated the attendance of the foreign ministers of Cyprus and Turkey.
650 The same formula of informal “transatlantic” events has been applied to meetings involving NATO and EU ambassadors (and the NATO Secretary General, the EU Council’s Secretary General/High Representative, and a representative of the EU Commissioner for External Relations). Each such meeting has been devoted to a single topic: Darfur in June 2005 and April 2006, and Kosovo in February 2007.
since 2003. It is set to assume policing responsibility in Kosovo and is contemplating sending a police force to Afghanistan. Around the same time, NATO has been experiencing institutional transformation towards managing similar situations as the EU. Since 1999, NATO has been engaged in 17 military missions with various degrees of civilian elements. Nonetheless, as NATO General Secretary Jaap de Hoop Scheffer recently observed at a conference on ESDP: “It is astounding how narrow the bandwidth of cooperation between NATO and the Union has remained. There is a remarkable distance between them.” (De Hoop Scheffer 2007) While the two institutions overlap, they do not engage much with each other on a strategic-political level.

Institutional overlap of EU and NATO can be analyzed in three dimensions: common membership, intersecting mandate and shared resources. Because of the continuous nature of the concept, there are no specific threshold values to qualify a relationship between two institutions as overlapping. Instead overlap has to be understood as a matter of degree.

Membership: At ESDP’s creation NATO and the EU had 12 members in common (out of 19 for NATO and 15 of the EU). Today the number is 21 (out of 28 for NATO and 27 for the EU).

Mandate: The mandates of neither ESDP nor NATO specify any division of labor or hierarchy between them. Instead, both institutions act upon (but in the case of NAT not exclusively) the so-called “Petersberg Tasks.” These comprise humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping, and combat forces in crisis management – including peacemaking. While ESDP incorporated the Petersberg tasks from its inception, NATO only reassessed its mandate and military structure to include “peace support operations” in 1999. The outlook of both organizations is global. Both organizations have deployed missions and operations to Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Europe.

Resources: Both institutions possess a capacity for independent crisis management and conflict prevention. ESDP created at least as a concept the European Rapid Reaction Force (1999) and the battle groups (2004). NATO established the NATO Response Force (2002). Notably, the latter two are based on the same pool of national forces and assets (Cornish 2006).

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652 Sometimes missions are named civil-military for budgetary reasons. That is, when they are declared civil military, then the mission will be paid from the CFSP budget instead of the states participating in the mission. Interview with EU military official #1, September 15, 2006.

653 Key documents refer to the EU’s “autonomous capacity to take decisions” and to “launch and conduct EU-led military operations” “where NATO as a whole is not engaged” (European Council Nice, Presidency Conclusions, Annex VI, 2000).

654 The EU adopted the Petersberg tasks in the Amsterdam Treaty (1997).

655 In the Strategic Concept of 1999, NATO members recognized that “the appearance of complex new risks to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability, including oppression, ethnic conflict, economic distress, the collapse of political order, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction” had changed the Euro-Atlantic security.
The Scope Problem

NATO and EU members have disagreed frequently and sometimes heatedly about the proper scope and purpose of EU-NATO cooperation. As the NATO Secretary General observed in a widely noted speech in Berlin in January 2007, “when one looks at how diverse and complex the challenges to our security have become today, it is astounding how narrow the bandwidth of cooperation between NATO and the European Union has remained.” He pointed out that NATO and the EU ought to conduct a genuine and far-reaching dialogue on Kosovo, Afghanistan, and military capabilities. With regard to the last area, he noted, the pattern has remained one of “leaving it at a mere exchange of information . . . Instead of cooperation, we are talking about ‘deconfliction.’” He called for a “comprehensive dialogue” between NATO and the EU on strategic challenges, including terrorism, energy security, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, “the enlargement processes of both institutions,” and their broader outreach policies: “The EU's Neighborhood Policy and NATO's Partnership policy could complement one another excellently if we had a regular exchange on these issues.”

The NATO Secretary General attributed the sharply restricted scope of EU-NATO dialogue and cooperation partly to the participation problem, which has led to “formal wrangles over security agreements, the exchange of information or the format of meetings.” As he remarked, “if those who put up these hurdles do not display more responsibility and flexibility, it will continue to place a heavy burden on EU-NATO relations.” The second and “more important” factor behind the narrow scope of EU-NATO dialogue and cooperation, he said, resides in the policy choices of some states:

Some deliberately want to keep NATO and the EU at a distance from one another. For this school of thought, a closer relationship between NATO and the EU means excessive influence for the USA. Perhaps they are afraid that the European Security and Defense Policy is still too new and too vulnerable for a partnership with NATO. And time and again I hear the argument that the EU is a superior form of an institution compared to the purely intergovernmental NATO, for which reason the very idea of a genuine strategic partnership between the two is misguided.

In his role as the Secretary General of the Alliance, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer was not in a position to name specific allies as the parties responsible for constricting the scope of EU-NATO cooperation and dialogue. Independent analysts, such as the Irish scholar Daniel Keohane, have been able to refer more freely to particular countries. According to Keohane, France thinks NATO should not be a forum for global security issues, and therefore it is inappropriate to discuss these issues at EU-NATO meetings. France’s blocking tactics have greatly frustrated other governments, in particular

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the Netherlands, the UK and the US. They want the EU and NATO to discuss closer cooperation on a whole host of issues, including Afghanistan, the Caucasus and counter-terrorism. They suspect France is using the Turkey-Cyprus dispute as an excuse to prevent closer cooperation between the EU and NATO. The French seem to worry that EU defense is a delicate flower which risks being squashed in the embrace of a military giant such as NATO. French officials sometimes say that close EU-NATO cooperation could lead to the US gaining excessive influence over EU foreign and defense policy. They also say that the US may use NATO missions as a means for getting European troops to serve American strategic interests.658

Many other observers have attributed to France a desire to confine NATO’s potential and enlarge that of the EU by limiting the scope of EU-NATO dialogue and cooperation.659 France’s objectives evidently include containing U.S. influence and creating greater room for the EU to expand its field of competence. The widespread and longstanding French conviction that the EU should become an autonomous great power, an *Europe-puissance*, is linked to French conceptions of the EU’s *finalité*, or ultimate purpose. The French have not been entirely alone in championing this vision of the EU’s future, and have won support from various other EU members on specific issues. Belgium, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, and Spain have been among the EU members supporting French views on particular matters, particularly Germany under Gerhard Schröder and Spain under José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero. France has, however, been the most consistent and systematic advocate of this vision of the EU’s future political and strategic autonomy. As Fraser Cameron has observed, “There has long been an underlying tension between those, led by France, with a desire to have a fully autonomous ESDP and those, led by the UK, with a determination to keep ESDP wedded to NATO.”660

Some French analysts such as Laurent Zecchini, have presented the tension as ultimately a competition between France and the United States concerning the future responsibilities of the EU and NATO, and hold that the EU alone has “the legitimacy of a political organization.”661 That is, the EU is a political project involving transfers of sovereignty to shared supranational institutions in certain policy domains. In contrast, NATO is an intergovernmental organization, an alliance

658 Daniel Keohane, “Unblocking EU-NATO Cooperation,” *CER Bulletin*, Issue 48 (June/July 2006). The *CER Bulletin* is published by the Centre for European Reform, London. With regard to the last point, some observers in Paris have been less than entirely enthusiastic about expanding NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan through ISAF, owing to an impression that the United States has belatedly obtained European assistance via NATO for an intervention that began with the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom coalition. This argument overlooks the major contributions by European NATO Allies from the outset to both Operation Enduring Freedom and ISAF. Moreover, the strategic interests at stake in Afghanistan concern all the NATO Allies, not only the United States.

659 See, for example, Nora Bensahel, *The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Europe, NATO, and the European Union*, California, RAND, 2003, p. 52-53. According to interview sources, France has blocked EU-NATO dialogue on terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, among other topics.


founded for the collective defense of its member states that has been applied to additional purposes since the early 1990s.

Although NATO and the EU have asserted that they stand for a common vision, they have not been able to work together with optimal productivity at the top political level. Aside from institutional rivalries, the national policies of France, Turkey, and to some extent other states, depending on the issue, have created what has come to be called the “scope problem.” As noted in the discussion of the “participation problem” above, the participation problem has contributed to the scope problem. Some commentators single out both France and Turkey as leading factors in the scope problem: “Turkey is opposing some EU-NATO discussions beyond the implementation of ‘Berlin plus’ in the presence of Cyprus, while France was not ready to accede to the NATO request for a joint EU-NATO discussion on the fight against terrorism.”

The French have made clear their ambition for the EU to become an even more influential actor in international security affairs. In the interests of advancing this vision for the EU, they have attempted to constrain NATO’s areas of competence and responsibility; and this has included efforts to constrict the scope of EU-NATO cooperation. The French have presented their policy with subtlety and finesse, as with President Chirac’s repeated statements that NATO is “a military organization” and that its true “legitimacy” resides in its collective defense role. Michèle Alliot-Marie, then the Minister of Defense, wrote in October 2006 that “reconstruction missions must imperatively be a matter for the competent organizations — particularly the UN and the European Union . . . Let us be careful not to dilute the Alliance with vague missions in which it would lose its soul and its effectiveness.”

Whether French policy will change under President Nicolas Sarkozy, elected in May 2007, remains to be seen. In his March 2007 speech on defense questions, Sarkozy declared that NATO must “maintain a clear geopolitical anchorage in Europe and a strictly military vocation.” Commentators have interpreted Sarkozy’s remarks as consistent with those of his predecessor at NATO’s Riga summit in November 2006.

663 Allocution de M. Jacques Chirac, Président de la République, lors de la présentation des voeux du Corps diplomatique, 10 January 2006.
The United States has been among the leading proponents within the Alliance of the contrary viewpoint, one that would not limit NATO to military operations, particularly collective defense, but that would build up the Alliance’s capacity to take on stabilization and reconstruction tasks in cooperation with other international organizations. According to Eric Edelman, the U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, NATO's future must not be limited to just the combat missions we prepared for during the Cold War. The challenges of this new century will call for NATO developing a capability to take on missions that provide stabilization, reconstruction and reform to failed states. The Alliance must step up and master this most complex mission, and Afghanistan is the test case for that proposition. NATO missions in the Balkans helped us prepare for the challenge of working with the international community to help rebuild a nation; success in Afghanistan depends on NATO rising to the occasion and helping to lead the effort.666

As the NATO Secretary General suggested in his speech in Berlin in January 2007, there are several important areas in which NATO and the EU could constructively cooperate. It would be desirable, moreover, for NATO’s Defense Group on Proliferation to improve cooperation on chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) matters with the EU, perhaps in early warning and data sharing. The proposals advanced by the German Minister of Defense in February 2006 suggest how much remains to be done in usefully expanding the scope of EU-NATO cooperation:

Possible areas of cooperation range from intelligence sharing to coordinated force planning to joint training of the NATO Response Force and the EU Battlegroups. One of these possibilities is the right of either organization to speak before the bodies of the other, another is the further development of diplomatic capabilities and, where possible, the pooling of military capabilities, and to make an even greater effort to pursue transformation.667

Conclusion: A Better Cooperation Panorama

EU-NATO liaison arrangements currently consist of military representatives, an EU cell at NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, (SHAPE) and a NATO liaison team at the EU Military Staff. Some observers maintain that the access accorded to these liaison teams is asymmetrical that is, while the EU cell at SHAPE has extensive access to NATO planning and decision-making, the NATO liaison team has encountered rigid limitations regarding access to the EU Military Staff headquarters and is consulted by the EU Military Staff only concerning Operation Althea, the sole current “Berlin Plus” operation in which the EU is benefiting from NATO support. The effectiveness

of these liaison arrangements might be expanded through greater sharing of documents and joint assessments of potential crises and responses.\textsuperscript{182} Moreover, NATO and the EU might also establish civilian liaison arrangements. The EU civilian liaison mission could consist of an office at NATO Headquarters to interact with the NATO International Staff.

The EU would have to determine whether a counterpart NATO civilian liaison office should interact with the European Commission or the EU Council Secretariat or both. Some observers maintain that one of the complicating factors in the EU-NATO relationship is institutional rivalry within the EU. For example, in Afghanistan, the European Commission office in Kabul is distinct from that of the Special Representative of the EU Council. This is parallel to the situation in Brussels, where the European Commission’s decision-making is separate from that of the EU Council Secretariat.\textsuperscript{669} It is not clear whether it would be possible to find resourceful “work-arounds” to promote greater complementarity and de-confliction without passing documents on to member states. Some observers have proposed that keeping the documents at the level of the EU and NATO staffs without communicating them to national capitals might be a solution, at least in some policy areas. NATO and EU staff members could, it is argued, achieve greater transparency and report to capitals without passing on classified materials. It seems doubtful that such an approach would be accepted by all the member states of NATO and the EU. Joint briefings to NAC-PSC meetings by NATO and EU field commanders regarding topics of common concern such as the operational situation in Kosovo, might be a more practical way to promote greater mutual understanding and consensus about the right way forward in policy implementation.

Some observers have suggested that the value of the informal “transatlantic”, events involving the foreign ministers of NATO and EU member states, the NATO Secretary General, the EU Commissioner for External Relations, and the EU Council’s Secretary General/High Representative could be enhanced by offering a chairman’s statement or press conference at the end. The counter-argument is that such an arrangement would be inconsistent with the informal nature of the meetings. Belgium, Cyprus, France, Greece, and Turkey might be among the nations most likely to oppose instituting such an arrangement.

Another “work around” approach suggested by some observers would be for NATO and the EU to hold separate, but parallel discussions on topics of common interest on an agreed agenda. The NATO Secretary General and the EU Council’s Secretary General/High Representative could coordinate these discussions, and briefings could be exchanged with respect to the interim conclusions from the discussions in each organization. Such an arrangement would respect the

\textsuperscript{668} Some NATO observers have suggested that the operational military headquarters of NATO and the EU be co-located at SHAPE, on the grounds that this would maximize opportunities for interaction and simplify liaison arrangements. It appears most unlikely, however, that this suggestion would win political approval from all EU governments.

\textsuperscript{669} Some EU observers maintain that the European Commission represents the interests of the European Union as a whole and the EU Council Secretariat the interests of the member states.
autonomy of each organization and might carry forward the pursuit of consensus on emerging security requirements.

If the political obstacles could be surmounted, more direct interactions could be usefully pursued regarding urgent matters. Leo Michel, an American expert, has proposed that NATO and EU member states and representatives engage in informal discussions during crisis build-up situations:

As a potential crisis develops, senior representatives of member states of NATO and EU, plus the NATO Secretary General and EU High Representative and senior military representatives of both organizations, should gather — if need be, on an “informal” basis — for a tour de table to air and discuss initial assessments and hear from each other what capabilities might be available to formulate a comprehensive crisis management response. The member state representatives would then take information back to capitals to deliberate on an appropriate response. The initial EU-NATO meeting would not be “joint decision making” — everyone understands this is a bridge too far — but it would serve the purpose of getting key parties to put their cards on the table, allowing all member states and NATO and EU officials to make better informed decisions.\(^670\)

Some NATO experts have proposed that NATO and the EU elaborate modalities for combined civil-military missions. In their view, these modalities should allow NATO nations to conduct such missions under NATO auspices and avoid the presumption that one organization or the other does all the civilian missions or all the military missions. The concept of mixed civil-military missions under NATO leadership has, however, evoked strong political objections from some observers in France, Germany, Italy, and other countries. Their concern is that such an approach could undermine the coordinating role of the United Nations in mixed civil-military missions. They hold that the correct interpretation of the comprehensive approach calls for close cooperation between the civilian activities of other states and organizations and the military operations under NATO auspices.

In Afghanistan, for example, the military elements in all Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have been under the command of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), while the civilian elements have been under national chains of command in close coordination with the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Since the deployment of the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) in June, 2007, some personnel from EU member states have been “re-hatted” and put under an EU chain of command while other personnel for instance, diplomats and development experts have remained under national command.

Another contested issue is whether, and how, EU member states should respect the agreed principle of “equality and due regard for the decision-making autonomy and interests of the European Union and NATO,” as stated in the December 2002 EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP. Some French officials have proposed organizing an EU caucus within NATO, so that EU members would speak with one voice in NATO, as they often do within the UN, the OSCE, and some other forums. In November 2006, for example, French President Jacques Chirac wrote that “France . . . wishes that the voice of the European Union could be heard within the Alliance. This presupposes in particular the possibility for its members to establish a specific concertation there.”

Proposals for an EU caucus show, some observers have argued a lack of regard for NATO’s institutional autonomy. The EU members of the Alliance would determine a common position before meetings of the North Atlantic Council and present the rest of the Alliance members with a pre-coordinated EU policy that could not be readily modified. Indeed, if the caucus principle was upheld strictly, EU members of the Alliance might decline to make decisions, pending the determination of a common EU position. This approach would make NATO decision-making hinge upon prior choices made by the EU, and thus the EU would become the primary forum of deliberation. Such proposals could invite counterproposals to form a NATO caucus within the EU that is, the Alliance members of the EU might in theory choose to support NATO policies in EU deliberations and refuse to make decisions in the absence of an agreed NATO policy.

Proponents of an EU caucus in NATO have cited Article 19 of the Treaty on European Union to support their position: “Member States shall coordinate their action in international organizations and at international conferences. They shall uphold the common positions in such forums. In international organizations and at international conferences where not all the Member States participate, those which do take part shall uphold the common positions.” There is clearly a tension between this article and the agreed principle of “equality and due regard for the decision-making autonomy and interests of the European Union and NATO.” Respect for the agreed principle would mean no pre-coordination of EU positions in NATO deliberations or vice-versa.

NATO and the EU have nonetheless not yet found an effective way to express the political reality of the EU’s ESDP within the Alliance. If EU-NATO cooperation is to move forward, the states in these organizations must find a means to reflect the fact that 21 of the 26 NATO Allies are EU

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672 This counter-proposal is plainly hypothetical in terms of practical politics, because it is difficult to imagine France and some other EU member states agreeing to it.

members.\textsuperscript{674} If the NATO Allies cannot find a way to take the ESDP into account within Alliance structures and make cooperation with NATO attractive, the tendency for several EU members to give increased attention to autonomous ESDP structures and capabilities outside the Alliance framework will persist. This will remain a key policy issue for the Alliance in the coming years.

Daniel Keohane’s three modest suggestions for improving EU-NATO cooperation indicate that important basic steps have yet to be taken:

First, the EU’s foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, and the NATO secretary-general, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, should meet once a month, to share information and co-ordinate policy on issues such as counter-terrorism. If they jointly presented their ideas to meetings of EU and NATO ambassadors, it could help to foster a new spirit of co-operation between the organizations.

Second, the EU and NATO should talk to each other before conducting operations. One way would be for their ‘situation centers’ - the cells that assess the situation in a country before an operation - to share information. That would help the situation centers to develop better and common analyses. The two centers could also think of ways that their organizations could help each other on the ground.

Third, both organizations find it hard to get their members to provide the military capabilities that they need, and they should ensure that if faced with future shortfalls they do not compete to use the same equipment. For example, they should co-ordinate their use of available transport aircraft through the Eindhoven-based European airlift co-ordination cell.\textsuperscript{675}

As Keohane’s third point suggests, more could also be done with the EU-NATO Capability Group established in May 2003. Its interactions have been of uneven quality. Some meetings have involved genuine and productive dialogue, while others have been limited to formal presentations of agreed NATO and EU positions. According to Leo Michel, “some nations have blocked the formation of EU-NATO subgroups of technical experts who could actually coordinate on, or

\textsuperscript{674} Conversely, the fact that 21 of the 27 EU members are NATO Allies could furnish a political basis for seeking solutions to the “participation problem.” The solutions might include addressing unresolved questions regarding the status of Cyprus and ensuring satisfactory implementation of agreed arrangements for consultations and participation by non-EU NATO European Allies in ESDP operations.

\textsuperscript{675} Daniel Keohane, “Unblocking EU-NATO Cooperation,” \textit{CER Bulletin}, Issue 48 (June/July 2006). The principle articulated in Keohane’s third point is sound, but the import of his example is less than entirely clear. The European Airlift Centre (EAC) at Eindhoven in the Netherlands is not an EU organization. The EAC participants include seven EU members (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom) and one non-EU country (Norway). The EAC’s predecessor, the European Airlift Coordination Cell (EACC) at Eindhoven, began working closely with SHAPE regarding air transport requirements for ISAF in 2002. This relationship has continued since the EACC was renamed the EAC in July 2004. The EAC and the SHAPE Allied Movement Coordination Centre have, for example, coordinated EU and NATO strategic airlift contributions to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) since 2005. In other words, effective coordination of strategic airlift has been underway for years, so strategic airlift is not an example of coordination that has yet to be accomplished.
propose joint solutions to, specific capabilities development tasks.” European Defense Agency and NATO staff members have had informal discussions, but the dialogue could be developed to a much greater extent. Moreover, there could be more planning for EU use of NATO assets and capabilities.

The coherence of EU-NATO capabilities planning and coordination is important because the military resources of all the NATO Allies and EU members are finite. Important concepts in this domain include harmonizing plans for NATO Response Force rotations and EU Battlegroup commitments and integrating EU requirements in NATO’s defense review and force planning process. Some observers have called for joint EU-NATO defense planning, but this goal remains remote in foreseeable political circumstances.

The fact that NATO Allies that are also EU members have only one set of forces has been underscored by the practice of attaching “caveats” to the usability of forces. As General James Jones, then the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), pointed out in 2004,

A national caveat is generally a formal written restriction that most nations place on the use of their forces. A second facet of this “cancer” is unofficial “unwritten” caveats imposed by a military officer’s superiors at home. The NATO tactical commander usually knows nothing about “unwritten caveats” until he asks a deployed commander to take an action, and the subordinate commander says, “I cannot do this. . . .” Collectively, these restrictions limit the tactical commander’s operational flexibility.

Similarly, in 2006, General Henri Bentégeat, then Chief of Staff of the French Armed Forces, declared that “the multiple caveats imposed by nations hamper commanders on the ground and present risks for the forces.” Now the Chairman of the EU Military Committee, General Bentégeat has reason to be concerned that the practice of attaching caveats to the usability of forces could affect the organization and conduct of EU-led military operations as well as NATO-led missions. According to interview sources, some British and Dutch officials have resented French

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677 EU priorities have, however, been integrated in NATO planning for several years. According to interview sources, EU Military Staff members, European Defence Agency staff members, and representatives of non-NATO EU member states have attended NATO meetings to discuss NAT planning, including the responses of NATO Allies to Defence Planning Questionnaires. The EU has evidently not welcomed NATO staff members or representatives of non-EU NATO European Allies to its meetings to a commensurate extent, reportedly owing to concerns about protecting its institutional autonomy.
and German decisions not to operate in southern Afghanistan, while some French officials have deplored German caveats in the 2006 EU operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

General Jean-Louis Georgelin, the Chief of Staff of the French Armed Forces, underscored the crucial importance of EU-NATO relations in October 2006: “The question of relations between NATO and the EU is... in my view the major strategic question, in terms of capabilities, organization, and political control, the one which must illuminate our thinking about our military instrument and guide our relations with our Allies.” 680

Some analysts have discerned a consistent logic in (a) French opposition to strengthening the Alliance’s civilian capabilities and/or integrating civilian and military activities in stabilization and reconstruction operations under NATO auspices and (b) French reservations about expanding the scope of EU-NATO cooperation, in that both policies can be seen as designed to confine NATO’s latitude for action and inhibit an expansion of its political standing and thereby create space for the EU to take on greater responsibilities. As Leo Michel has noted, a paradoxical consequence of France’s approach is that it may place at risk operations in which France’s European partners are engaged and “undermine the capacity of the two organizations to work together in crisis prevention or in supporting other actors on the international scene, such as the UN or, as in Darfur, the African Union.” 681 In other words, one of the major risks raised by sub-optimal EU-NATO cooperation is that the capacity of both organizations to make effective contributions to international security and to the security of their member states could be diminished.

The EU is the only major organization with which NATO has formally structured cooperation, but this cooperation has been far from optimal. The key problems, as suggested above, concern “participation”, “institutional overlap” and “scope,” and these problems derive from firmly maintained national policies. But which are the most important states creating these barriers for better cooperation and partnership between EU and NATO? What are the reasons that make them slowing or even blocking these relationships? In the following piece it will be shown in detail the situation of France, Turkey, the U.S, Germany and the UK as the most crucial actors of these relations.


681 Leo Michel, “Quelle place pour la France dans l’OTAN?” Le Monde, 6 June 2007
The EU-NATO Relations in Post-Cold War Era
# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

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<td>ABM</td>
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<td>BYIL</td>
<td>British Yearbook of International Law-</td>
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<tr>
<td>C3I</td>
<td>Command &amp; Control, Communications and Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEPS</td>
<td>Centre for European Policy Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARDS</td>
<td>Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBMs</td>
<td>Confidence-building measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CER</td>
<td>Centre for European Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFE</td>
<td>Conventional Armed Forces in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSP-HR</td>
<td>EU High Representative for the Common and Security Policy</td>
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<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force(s) (NATO)</td>
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<td>CME</td>
<td>EU exercise</td>
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<td>Cong. Rec.</td>
<td>US Congressional Record</td>
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<td>CONV</td>
<td>European Convention Document</td>
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<td>COPS</td>
<td>Comité politico et de sécurité (PSC)</td>
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<td>COREPER</td>
<td>Committee of Permanent Representatives (EU)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Concerted Planning and Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPC</td>
<td>Conflict Prevention Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>Crisis Response Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSTO</td>
<td>Collective Security Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Directorate-General (European Commission)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peace Keeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSACEUR</td>
<td>Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EADRCC</td>
<td>Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAPC</td>
<td>Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBAO</td>
<td>Effects-Based Approach to Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECAP</td>
<td>European Capabilities Action Plan (EU)</td>
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<td>ECJ</td>
<td>European Court of Justice</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>ECR</td>
<td>European Court Reports (ECJ)</td>
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<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDA</td>
<td>European Defence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDC</td>
<td>European Defence Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEZ</td>
<td>Exclusive Economic Zone</td>
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<td>EFAR</td>
<td>European Foreign Affairs Review</td>
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<td>EFJ</td>
<td>European Federation of Journalists</td>
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<td>EJIL</td>
<td>European Journal of International Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>ELR</td>
<td>European Law Review</td>
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<td>EMP</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Partnership</td>
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<td>EMU</td>
<td>European Monetary Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENA</td>
<td>Ecole Nationale d'Administration</td>
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<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Policy Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERRF</td>
<td>EU Rapid Reaction Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESDI</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Identity</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESDU</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESR</td>
<td>ISIS European Security Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU-ISS</td>
<td>Institute for Security Studies European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUCI</td>
<td>EU Classified Information</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUFOR</td>
<td>EU Force in BiH</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUMC</td>
<td>EU Military Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUMM</td>
<td>EU Monitoring Mission in Former Yugoslavia</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUMS</td>
<td>EU Military Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUPM</td>
<td>EU Police Mission in BiH</td>
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<td>EUPOL</td>
<td>EU Police Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>EURATOM</td>
<td>European Atomic Energy Community</td>
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<td>FDCH</td>
<td>US Federal Documents Clearing House</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSC</td>
<td>Forum for Security Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>G8</td>
<td>Group of Eight Industrialised Nations</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>GA</td>
<td>UN General Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAERC</td>
<td>General Affairs and External Relations Council (EU)</td>
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<td>GAOR</td>
<td>UN General Assembly Official Records</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>Gulf Cooperation Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GMO</td>
<td>Genetically-modified organism</td>
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<tr>
<td>GSC</td>
<td>General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terror</td>
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<tr>
<td>HHG</td>
<td>Helsinki Headline Goal (EU)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HLTF</td>
<td>High Level Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICJ</td>
<td>International Court of Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICLQ</td>
<td>International and Comparative Law Quarterly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICTY</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGC</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Conference (EU)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IISS</td>
<td>International Institute for Security Studies (London)</td>
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</table>
ILC: International Law Commission
ILM: International Legal Materials
ILO: International Labor Organization
ILR: International Law Reports
IMF: International Monetary Fund
IPTF: International Police Task Force
IRFFI: International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq
ISAF: International Security Assistance Force
JCG: Joint Consultative Group
JCMB: Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board
JCSL: Journal of Conflict and Security Law
JHA: Justice and Home Affairs (EU)
KFOR: NATO Kosovo Force
LJIL: Leiden Journal of International Law
LNTS: League of Nations Treaty Series
MBT: WEU Modified Brussels Treaty
MC: Military Committee
MEP: Member of the European Parliament
NAC: North Atlantic Council
NACC: North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NAFTA: North America Free Trade Agreement
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>NAMSA</td>
<td>NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency</td>
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<td>NAT</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO-IS</td>
<td>NATO International Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>NBA</td>
<td>Non-Binding Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NPT</td>
<td>Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRF</td>
<td>NATO Response Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSO</td>
<td>National Security Office (NATO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODIHR</td>
<td>Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OGM</td>
<td>Organisme génétiquement modifié</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHQ</td>
<td>Operation HQ</td>
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<td>OJ</td>
<td>Official Journal of the European Communities/ European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMC</td>
<td>Organisation mondiale du Commerce</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONU</td>
<td>Organisation des Nations unies</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>Operation Plan Organization</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCC</td>
<td>Prague Capabilities Commitment (NATO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCIJ</td>
<td>Permanent Court of International Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PfP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PJHQ</td>
<td>Permanent Joint HQ</td>
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<td>PPEWU</td>
<td>EU Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
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<td>PSI</td>
<td>Proliferation Security Initiative</td>
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<td>RELEX</td>
<td>External Relations (European Commission)</td>
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<td>RTO</td>
<td>NATO Research and Technical Organisation</td>
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<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Command Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACLANT</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (NATO)</td>
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<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
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<td>SCEPC</td>
<td>Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>Shanghai Cooperation Organization</td>
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<td>SCR</td>
<td>Senior Civilian Representative</td>
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<td>SEA</td>
<td>Single European Act</td>
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<td>SEATO</td>
<td>South East Asian Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>SFOR</td>
<td>NATO Stabilisation Force (BiH)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIPRI</td>
<td>Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>Status-of-Forces Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRSOG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary General</td>
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<tr>
<td>STANAVFORMED</td>
<td>NATO Standing Naval Force Mediterranean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEC</td>
<td>Treaty establishing the European Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNC</td>
<td>Charter of the United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCIO</td>
<td>Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Law</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>UN Development Program</td>
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<td>UNGA</td>
<td>UN General Assembly</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>UN High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>UN Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNITAR</td>
<td>UN Institute for Training and Research</td>
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<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<td>UNODC</td>
<td>UN Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<td>United Nations Protection Force (BiH)</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>UN Security Council</td>
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<td>UNSG</td>
<td>UN Secretary General</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTS</td>
<td>United Nations Treaty Series</td>
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<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>US Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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</table>
WEAG     Western European Armaments Group
WEAO     Western European Armaments Organization
WEU      Western European Union
WMD      Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO      World Trade Organisation

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• Centre For Security Studies, http://www.css.ethz.ch/index_en
• Council of Europe, http://www.coe.int
• EU Observer, http://www.euobserver.com
• Europa - The European Union, www.europa.eu/
• European Union, www.iss.eu.org/
• Fondation Pour La Recherché Stratégiques, http://www.frstrategie.org/
• Genève Centre For Security Policy, http://www.gcsp.ch
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The Institute of Strategic Studies, [http://www.issi.org.pk](http://www.issi.org.pk)

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